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*INTRODUCTION* 
 
 
On May 13, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act of 2002. The 2002 farm bill directed federal support not only to 
agriculture, but a wide range of other programs like social welfare, environment, 
conservation, and nutrition, many of which are not directly tied to agriculture. The 2002 
farm bill would cost $180 billion over a ten year period, $70 billion more than the 1996 
farm bill. The Federal Agricultural Improvements and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR Act) 
was the most serious effort by Congress to reform agricultural policy since its 
introduction in the 1930s. The FAIR Act had attempted to wean farmers off government 
subsidies over a seven-year period. But the FAIR Act was considered a failure already in 
1998, and agricultural policy was largely changed back to the traditional measure of 
commodity subsidy programs by the 2002 farm bill. If the FAIR Act had succeeded the 
2002 farm bill would have been the last farm bill. 
Farm groups, politicians, journalists, economists, and political scientists from all 
camps have argued for policy change in agriculture. Some insist that farm policy should 
move away from government intervention to a free-market oriented policy (Orden et al. 
1999). Others try to debunk the agrarian myths surrounding agricultural policies and 
argue that public programs only benefit big corporate farm businesses, not the family 
farms, and that the current subsidies encourage overproduction which leads to lower 
commodity prices (Browne et al. 1992). Environmentalists complain that farm subsidies 
encourage pollution and want more money for conservation. Traditionalists argue for 
price support programs and to provide a “safety net” for American farmers.  
When agricultural policy is mentioned in the media, it is often introduced by the 
question of why such a small group receives huge federal subsidies. In the months before 
the introduction of the 2002 farm bill, the New York Times complained that new huge 
subsidies were “out of line at a time when the United States is fighting a sluggish 
economy and a life-or-death war on terrorism (“The Farm Bill Charade”). Commenting 
on the 2008 farm bill, the Economist labeled the 2002 farm bill a “gargantuan, five-year 
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giveaway to America’s farmers” (“Uncle Sam’s teat”). Despite criticism Congress passed 
a generous farm bill in 2002.  
Many of the traditional reasons explaining the outcome of agricultural policy 
were still valid in 2002. The central research question of this paper is: Why did the 2002 
farm bill increase farm subsidies and change agricultural policy away from the free-
market direction of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 
1996? To answer this question this thesis will use the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 as a case study. The North American Area Studies is an 
interdisciplinary program that allows the use of many methodological approaches. This 
thesis will therefore apply methods from both the disciplines of history and political 
science. It relies primarily on textual studies of legislative documents and analyses of 
congressional debates and newspaper reports. Because of the contemporary nature of the 
subject, I have leaned heavily on newspaper articles and internet accounts, while 
checking these sources against official documents whenever available.  
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) there were 
2,128,982 farms in the United States with an average size of 441 acres in 2002. 1,909,598 
of these were family or individually owned, 129,593 were partnerships, 73,752 were 
corporations, and 16,039 were other-cooperative, estates, etc. (USDA, “Census of 
Agriculture”). According to the Environmental Working Group, the top ten percent of 
recipients got 74 percent of all USDA payments from 1995 to 2006. Since much of the 
payments are tied to production, it is the big corporate farms that receive most subsidies. 
The remaining 80 percent of recipients were paid 12 percent of all USDA subsidies 
(EWG, “Subsidies in the United States”). In 2002 US agricultural exports were 
$53, 115, 000 and the agricultural percentage of total export eight percent. Import was 
$41, 909, 000, making it a surplus of $11, 205, 000. The agricultural export business is a 
big and vital part of the US economy (OMB, “Summary Tables”). 
In the nineteenth century agricultural policies consisted primarily of land laws and 
ways of developing and bringing new technology to agriculture. Congress established the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1862, which marked the beginning of a federal 
agricultural policy. After the Great Depression, agricultural policies became 
institutionalized in permanent legislation in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. 
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This piece of legislation established the beginning of a sustained federal involvement in 
farm policy. It centralized the fragmented farm policies to Washington and became the 
main focus for farm interest groups. Since then, all farm bills have been temporary 
amendments to the permanent legislation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. 
Amendments are traditionally added every four to seven years. The 1965 farm bill was 
the first to establish a comprehensive program covering most commodities. The period 
leading up to a new farm bill has seen an increasingly fierce battle over the new 
directions of agricultural policy. If a new farm bill is not produced, the 1938 Act with the 
1949 amendments automatically remains the law of the land.  
In broad terms on most issues the Democratic Party tend to support a significant 
role for the federal government, while the Republican Party tend to favor a stronger 
private sector and less governmental interference. This is also reflected in agricultural 
policy. Democrats are more supportive of commodity programs with higher price 
supports and more intrusive supply controls. This is also the traditional position of the 
National Farmers Union which claims to represent smaller-sized family farms that tend to 
identify themselves as Democrats. The groups who support federal agricultural programs 
are most often referred to as traditionalists (Orden 179).  
Republicans will more often support farm income programs that do not seek to 
constrain full-production agriculture. This is also the position of the Farm Bureau which 
represents large-scale commercial farmers and export interests. There are also those in 
the Republican Party who support a free-market policy in agriculture that seeks to reform 
the agriculture sector and end federal programs (Ibid.).   
 On issues like the environment Democrats are most likely to support conservation 
programs and regulations. In 2002 Senator Tom Harkin, Democrat of Iowa, took the lead 
in championing a large conservation program. Republicans will tend to oppose any 
regulation that is inconvenient to commercial farm operations. It is important to note that 
one party is not necessarily more favorable toward farmers than the other. Both parties 
have traditionally advocated helping farmers, and most often both parties have supported 
generous farm bills.  
 
 
 8 
The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of two main parts. Agricultural policy is an extremely complex, 
organic, and fragmented policy area that cannot be analyzed in isolation. It has to be put 
into the context of its origins and history. The 2002 farm bill was an amendment to 
previous agricultural legislation, and a continuation of a long tradition of agricultural 
policies. The first main part will provide a historical background of the evolution of 
policies and interest groups involved in agricultural policy-making. Part two will offer a 
legislative history and analysis of the 2002 farm bill. 
The first chapter is a historical account of agriculture in America from the early 
days of the republic until agricultural policies were institutionalized in federal programs 
in 1938. To understand the current agricultural policy debate it is imperative that a 
historical background of agriculture in the United States is provided. Chapter one relies 
heavily on the works by historians William W. Cochrane, Douglas R. Hurt, Murray R. 
Benedict, and David B. Danbom. Policies that were important to the period were land 
acts, economic issues, infrastructure, technology, and education. Chapter one also 
discusses the passing of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 which laid down the 
foundations for further agricultural policies. 
Chapter two is a historical analysis of farm organizations involved in agricultural 
policy deliberations. The first few pages discuss the political ideology of farmers in early 
America using the works by Louis Hartz and Adam Smith. In U.S Agricultural Groups: 
Institutional Profiles, William P. Browne and Allan J. Cigler presents five stages of 
evolution that agricultural groups have gone through. Using these stages as a framework, 
chapter two presents the history of farm organizations and introduces key actors like the 
American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Farmers Union. 
 Chapter three examines the history of farm policies (farm bills) from its initial 
institutionalization in 1938 to the beginning of the 2002 farm bill debate. It focuses on the 
evolution of the different policies that have been used as well as political and socio-
demographical changes. The chapter relies on a wide range of sources, but particularly 
the works by historians Thomas R. Wessel and Douglas R. Hurt. At the end of the 
chapter the 1996 FAIR Act is analyzed using the book Policy Reform in American 
Agriculture: Analyses and Prognosis by economist David Orden, political scientist 
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Robert Paalberg, and economist Terry Roe. The book offers a legislative history of the 
1996 farm bill and explanations to its policy-outcome. The 1996 farm bill is especially 
important since it was the farm legislation that existed before the 2002 farm bill. It is 
important to have in mind that Orden et al. champions a free-market agricultural policy.  
Chapter four provides a legislative history based on text analysis recounting key 
events preceding the passing of the 2002 farm bill relying on secondary sources like 
newspaper reports, but also primary sources from actors involved in the farm bill debate 
and government documents. Although the selected sources are fairly varied the New York 
Times is often used mainly because it was easy to access. It is important to note that the 
New York Times is an outspoken critic of farm programs. Variations of sources are used 
whenever available. Editorials are used to express newspaper opinions. 
Chapter five provides an analysis of the policy-outcome of the 2002 farm bill. The 
main focus is on traditional structural explanations and public choice theory. Many of the 
factors Orden et al. uses to explain the 1996 farm bill is used when discussing the 2002 
farm bill. Some of the factors addressed are interest groups, logrolling, party control of 
Congress, the 2002 election, international trade agreements, previous farm legislation, 
and commodity prices.  
 Chapter five discusses structural factors and leaves out the importance of ideas, 
myths, and tradition to agricultural policy-outcome. A satisfactory analysis needs to 
include both. The last chapter traces the origins of the agrarian myth and its development 
in American history and discusses the influence that the agrarian myth has had on 
agricultural policies and the outcome of the 2002 farm bill. 
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*CHAPTER ONE* 
 
Agriculture in America, 1780 - 1938 
 
The agricultural sector has been vital to both survival and economic growth on the North 
American continent since the very first settlement in Jamestown. When the American 
Revolution was over, and the thirteen colonies had established the United States of 
America, agriculture was one of the core factors which would shape America socially, 
economically, and politically. When George Washington took the oath of office on April 
30, 1789, he and his fellow founders were faced with an agriculture sector with huge 
potential. Chapter one will analyze how the evolution of early land policies on the local, 
state, and federal levels all played their vital part in forming agricultural policy in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. It all culminated in the institutionalization of farm policies in the 
1930s.  
 
1.1 Land Acts 
During the 19th century the United States more than doubled its size. The United States 
purchased the Louisiana Territory in 1803. Then it obtained Florida from Spain in 1819, 
annexed Texas as a state in 1845, and made an arrangement with Great Britain for the 
Oregon Territory in 1846. It achieved the Mexican Cession from Mexico in 1848, 
obtained the Gadsden Purchase from Mexico in 1853, and purchased Alaska from Russia 
in 1867. By 1853 the United States stretched from coast to coast and covered an area of 
more than 1.9 billion acres. The population increased from 9.6 million in 1820 to 31.5 
million in 1860 (Cochrane 41). It is no surprise that with such an increase in numbers and 
size, the issue of land became very important.   
An early political front developed between the small farm agrarian ideals of 
Thomas Jefferson and the more traditional proponents of mercantilism. Jefferson saw a 
huge potential in America for establishing a democracy of small, independent, and self-
sufficient farmers. With the abundance of land, the goal of achieving this was possible. 
President George Washington appointed Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the 
Treasury. Hamilton quickly realized that the new nation was agonizingly poor, and saw 
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potential in selling land for enormous profit. Jefferson and Hamilton agreed on the need 
to privatize the land, but they disagreed on how to achieve it. Jefferson wanted to sell in 
small unites and give easy access. Hamilton wanted to sell off bigger chunks at high 
profits.   
 The Land Ordinance of 1785 authorized the survey and sale of the public domain. 
The ordinance laid the groundwork for any land acts that would come later. Land acts 
that followed were compromises that eventually culminated in the Homestead Act of 
1862. Demands for free access to public domains had increased during the 18th century. 
People believed that the nation could benefit from the land being occupied and cultivated. 
Many believed that the best way of doing this was giving it away to pioneers. The South 
did not like this idea, however, because it meant that more people would settle in non-
slave states. But the Civil War changed this. 
 On May 20, 1862, President Lincoln signed the Homestead Act. After the 
secession of the southern states many obstacles in the way for a settler-friendly public 
domain policy had been removed. The act opened the interior to many people who 
otherwise could not afford buying land. Between the “claiming of the first homestead on 
January 1, 1863, near Beatrice, Nebraska, and 1880, homesteaders established 
approximately 57 percent of the farms on the frontier” (Hurt 188).  
In his book The Development of American Agriculture, Willard W. Cochrane 
points to some of The Homestead Act shortcomings. One was that there was little ‘first-
class’ land left in the 1870s and 1880s. Most of the best land had already been taken. 
Second, 160 acres were too little to make it economically viable on the Great Plains. 
Third, no serious effort was attempted to get people from the coasts to take advantage of 
the Homestead Act, although Cochrane contends that it might have been very difficult to 
achieve even if tried. Fourth, land speculators took advantage of the system and managed 
to buy up a lot of land. Although inhabiting shortcomings, the Homestead Act was 
important to spread farmers out into the American interior.  
In addition to the Homestead Act, there were four other major land disposal acts: 
The Timber-Culture Act of 1873, The Desert Land Act of 1877, the Timber and Stone 
Act of 1878, and the Timber Cutting Act of 1878. All of these acts contributed, for better 
or worse, to settling the interior of America. The total land in farms increased from 
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around 407 million acres in 1860 to 839 million acres in 1900 (Cochrane 84). 
Homesteaders accounted for only 80 million of this increase, meaning that 352 million 
acres were bought either from railroad companies or speculators. In 1890, The Bureau of 
the Census declared the frontier closed, and a new era of American agriculture began. 
Most of the land was settled, although some areas especially in the West did not become 
settled until technological advances made these areas possible to cultivate. The end of the 
19th century marked a change in the farmers’ focus from land policies to other areas that 
became more pressing.  
 
1.2 Economic Issues 
At the close of the early 19th century the United States faced two basic economic 
problems. In Farm Policies of the United States-1790-1950, Murray R. Benedict argues 
that “farmers were active and keenly interested participants in nearly all of the tariff 
controversies of the nineteenth century” (60). But they were also divided. Agricultural 
groups in the South produced crops that could be exported for good prices, because both 
tobacco and cotton production had a huge competitive advantage on the rest of the world. 
Already from the beginning the South wanted low tariffs and opposed protective duties. 
The North wanted to protect its industry and naturally wanted high tariffs. This 
North/South divide was persistent through the entire 19th century. The result of this 
divide on tariff issues were, according to Murray R. Benedict, that the North most often 
won, but that the South had an strong moderating influence (60).  
 Not until the mid-19th century did the West become an important force in 
American politics. When it did, its farmers often supported high tariffs because their 
crops were mostly used for national consumption, not export. Their biggest concern was 
infrastructural problems due to their demographical location. Prices for farmers in the 
interior were more influenced by transportation costs then by tariffs. Markets in Europe 
continued to expand during the 19th century. That “enabled farmers to continue their 
heavy exports without suffering serious handicap from the lack of balance between 
exports and imports” (Benedict 60). As the 1800s progressed, the image of the need for 
farmers to be protected from forces outside their power to control grew strong.  
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Cochrane points to two problems that in particular plagued the pioneer farmers: 
(1) A shortage of credit and (2) inadequate markets. A universal problem for farmers was 
access to cheap credit so that they could invest in the necessary equipment. In the rough 
environment of the westward expansion, the right equipment was a key to success. 
Farmers also sought ways of competing and gaining access to markets that were rigged 
against them and ways of fighting the railroads and other monopolies (Cochrane 111). 
The agrarian revolts of the time were spurred out of the frustration of losing control of 
marketing their own products. Many attempts were made by farmers to “perform the 
functions of middlemen, manufacturers, and bankers through cooperative enterprise” 
(113). These early attempts were short-lived and unsuccessful mostly due to the 
competition they faced and a lack of business experience. In the early days of the 
republic, farmers were generally skeptical of any government intervention in their daily 
life. When Hamilton wanted to establish the first Bank of United States, farmers were 
generally against it. This reflected more their general ideology of independence than a 
good understanding of economic issues  
During the Civil War the U.S Government started to issue greenbacks that were 
not backed by gold. Farmers wanted to maintain and increase the circulation of paper 
money to keep prices high. Others wanted to go back to the gold standard because gold 
was the standard medium of exchange in international trade. Farmers lost this first major 
struggle over national policy, much because they were “only loosely organized, and as 
yet able to express themselves only through their representatives in the national 
Congress” (Benedict 35). Although farmers lost, it helped them to unite. What farmers at 
the end of the 19th century sought was exactly what they in the beginning of the 19th 
century had fought: government intervention. It became evident that America had grown 
too fast and too big for farmers to have a fighting chance against big business and 
monopolies. This increasing frustration eventually erupted in the agrarian revolt toward 
the end of the 19th century.   
 
1.3 Infrastructure: Roads, Canals, and Railroads  
When Thomas Jefferson sent Lewis and Clark to explore the interior in the early 1800s, 
nobody really knew the enormity of the North American continent. Even when they 
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returned from their travel, the size of the land was still in question. Land was being 
settled at a rapid pace. This called for infrastructure. To the pioneers and settlers, access 
to the land was often the most difficult. A farmer could find a good plot of land 
somewhere, but it might be in the “middle of nowhere”. Industrialization also called for 
infrastructure, and it very soon became evident that huge investments in roads, canals, 
and railroads needed to be done. Willard W. Cochrane defines physical infrastructure 
related to agriculture as “the physical capital, both public and private, which provides 
services to, and which has a significant effect on, the economic functioning of the 
individual farm firm, but which is external to the individual farm firm” (209). The 
development of infrastructure and the consequences these developments gave were one 
of the most important issues for farmers in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
  The nature of infrastructural enterprises in early America made it clear that there 
had to be some government involvement. Large projects like dams, canals, and highways 
were so expensive that it was impossible for investors to find much profit in them. Most 
of the states themselves did not have sufficient funds to meet the demands for large 
highway development. There was also an unwillingness to cooperate on joint projects 
among states. This resulted in railroads having different standards and contributed to 
national highways being very slow in their making. Only the federal government could 
solve this collective action problem. But the strong anti-federalist sentiments of the time 
made it difficult for the federal government to intervene. The states were not willing to 
grant the federal government power being afraid that it would become too strong. Many 
people questioned the constitutional authority of the federal government, and some, like 
Madison and Hamilton, wanted an amendment to the Constitution to combat this 
problem. But the federal problem seemed difficult to solve. To make matters worse, the 
federal government also lacked funds (Benedict 61).  
 The strong anti-federalist sentiment of both presidents and representatives ruined 
many joint plans to build roads. This bickering continued throughout the 19th century and 
the farmers would suffer for it. In 1811, the Cumberland Road, later called the National 
Road, was the only major highway directly constructed by the federal government (62).  
During the same time, states and entrepreneurs started to build canals in the area 
around the great lakes and the large rivers. This marked the beginnings of a national 
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infrastructure that would be vital to the whole nation. New York State initiated the Erie 
Canal in April 1817. In 1825 it was finished at a cost of $7 million. Tolls taken from the 
Erie Canal made it a hugely profitable enterprise (Cochrane 213). The success was due to 
its location and by the possibilities it created. It spurred others to join the canal business, 
and soon more projects were undertaken. From 1825 to 1840 canals were created to make 
a web of canals. By 1840, 3,326 miles of canals had been constructed. No major canals 
were begun after 1840, and the numbers of canals started to decline. The possibilities and 
potential of canals had been largely developed by 1860. Canals benefited the northeastern 
part of America the most. Canals did provide efficient transportation to the western ports, 
but west of Chicago, Minneapolis, and St Paul supplies and products had to be 
transported by roads.  
American farmers needed radical improvements of the physical infrastructure. 
Although there still were farms that produced their own food and were to a large extent 
self-sufficient, more and more were marketing their surplus. As technology advanced, the 
need to get products to markets grew. Settlers needed roads and bridges to travel 
westward, and farmers already settled needed good transportation to get their products to 
markets, and to be able to get access to the products they needed. Canals met stiff 
competition from railroads for a while during the mid-18th century and could only 
compete on fright rates. They were slower and had natural boundaries, which the railroad 
did not have. Railroads started to become a much more sought after transportation. The 
farmers realized this and soon became interested in the possibilities railroads represented 
(Benedict 67). 
 At a time before automobiles, roads were only well suited for small distances. To 
develop both roads and canals states had borrowed money and were now in debt. The 
continuance of a strict constitutional interpretation of federal authority made matters 
worse since it gave them no relief. This led to a privatization of many of the projects that 
were initially state owned. Murray R. Benedict points out that the “responsibility for 
transportation development was shifted to private corporations, a policy that was to hold 
for the remainder of the century” (67). This paved the way for the railroad tycoons.  
 What followed was a boom in railroad building. The amount of railroad tracks 
created during the latter part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th was 
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enormous. The Union Pacific-Central Pacific link with the West Coast opened up 
millions of acres of land that previously could not have been cultivated by farmers 
because of their location. This was something farmers had wanted for a long time. But it 
became soon apparent that this was not a good deal for farmers. With the privatization of 
railroads, farmers became more dependent of capitalism. In those hands no special 
concession to farmers was possible. Railroads were at the beginning very expensive to 
use, because they were so enormously expensive to build. Low traffic by normal 
passengers had to be paid by farmers that depended on the railroads. This caused 
increasing frustration among farmers who had seen a major possibility for their wealth 
disappear into the hands of a few people no one really knew, and “whose requirements 
seemed to [them] arbitrary in the extreme” (Benedict 70).  
 The federal and state governments had given the railroad companies enormous 
subsidies through land grants. Land grants totaled “at least 130 million acres to different 
railroad companies to help them finance the construction of their routes” (Cochrane 221). 
Through land grants the governments played their part in building the railroads that 
would at the end of the 19th century provide superior transportation. Railroads were the 
best form of transportation, but the deal it offered most farmers was not good. The option 
of producing the increased output of agriculture through the use of more land would have 
been foreclosed to them in the absence of the railroads (Cochrane 223). In other words, 
for many farmers of the 19th century, the railroads became both a blessing and a curse.  
 
1.4 Agricultural Technology 
One very important development that occurred during the 19th century was technological 
advancement. This would both transform American and international agriculture. There 
were few federal policies directed at technological advancement during this time. The 
most important was patent law. But the nature of the United States and its agriculture was 
ideal for innovation. New harsh and troubling environments had to be countered with 
new methods of farming. Since the land area was so big, improvements in all 
geographical environments took place. Shortage of labor, ingenuities of individual 
farmers, and the nature of the land all contributed to the technological revolution. These 
factors, combined with industrialization and urbanization in the United States and 
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Europe, stimulated the expansion of American agriculture. Farmers were now able to 
make higher profits. With the surplus they could afford to invest in new machinery. As 
always, farmers were eager to produce more and increase their wealth, and this was a rich 
incentive for inventors and investors. But in this environment some farmers got into debt 
and could not compete. And as David B. Danbom writes in his book Born in the Country: 
“the late nineteenth century was a bad time to be in debt” (153). Although the number of 
farms was still high, this period signaled the beginning of an agriculture where only the 
most adaptable and competitive farmers managed to survive.  
Farm mechanization started in the 1830s and became widespread in the 1850s and 
accelerated in the period of 1860-97 (Cochrane 89). Most of the technological inventions 
came out of the northern states, and the “upward surge in the use of machines on farms 
occurred primarily in the Midwest, on the eastern fringe of the Great Plains, and in 
California and the Pacific Northwest” (Benedict 89). The South had grown used to 
having slaves, and enough labor, and kept growing crops in the old-fashioned ways. It 
“stuck to his hoe, one mule, and shallow plow (90). The North and West badly needed 
labor. Most of the machines that were invented were aimed at replacing labor, not 
improving farming. But the inventions made American farmers able to cultivate almost 
all areas where natural hindrances had stood before. Without technology, a lot of the 
prairie areas could not have been cultivated. In total, a more than doubling of the land in 
farms occurred from 1870 to 1900. This led to a huge demand for laborsaving machinery 
(Cochrane 89).  
 Cochrane points to three important improvements in the agricultural industry: (1) 
Machinery greatly reduced the drudgery of farm work. (2) It increased productivity, and 
(3) widened economic opportunities of farm producers (91). The mechanical and 
technological revolution that occurred in the 19th century led the American farmers to 
produce more and gave American farmers a great competitive advantage over the rest of 
the world. It might have reduced the drudgery of farm work, but the increased production 
still made farmers work long toilsome hours. Most of the changes for farmers during the 
19th century were adopting “horsepower machinery to replace manpowered implements” 
(Hurt 242). It was not until the turn of the century that tractors and steam engines really 
started to radically change agricultural output.  
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 Technology opened up the last areas of American land to be cultivated. The 
number of farms increased in the years between 1870 and 1900 from 2.66 million to 5.74 
million. Acres of farmland increased from 407.735 million to 841.202 million. Total 
value of farm property rose from $9.4 billion to $20.4 billion. The sheer land size was not 
the only astounding increase in agriculture in that period. Wheat production went from 
254 million to 599 million bushels. Corn production rose from 1.125 billion to 2.552 
billion, and cattle numbers rose from 24 million to almost 63 million (Danbom 131). 
Another reason for this output increase was that more farmers found ways to educate 
themselves and others regarding the new technology. 
 
1.5 Agriculture and Education 
Agricultural education is a relativity new phenomenon in human history. Farmers have 
always learned their trade throughout history by doing practical work on a farm. In 
America there were some early attempts to found agricultural societies and journals that 
aimed at bringing information out to farmers. This was still in an age where only classical 
disciplines like Latin were taught in colleges, and there would be a good while before real 
agricultural education was seriously attempted. In the early 1800s agricultural societies 
were founded, with many of the Founding Fathers as members. Some early journals were 
also published. The American Farmer was published in 1819, the Cultivator in 1834 and 
the Prairie Farmer in 1840 (Benedict 82). The nature of the American ideal of 
independence and the self-made man that was deeply imbedded in the American farmer 
made it difficult for any serious attempt of thinking in “unison as an occupational group” 
(82). But it did mark a beginning of a common consciousness.  
 The South had for a long time opposed any land-grant college, a system in which 
the federal government granted funds to states to establish agricultural and mechanical 
colleges (Hurt 193). Congress passed the Morrill Land-Grant College Act in 1862. 
Although many reformers had “advocated agricultural education at the college level since 
the 1850s, more than a decade passed before the idea reached fruition”. The first state 
college of agriculture had been established already in 1857 in Michigan. Maryland and 
Pennsylvania followed in 1859. An early criticism of these colleges was that lack of 
trained faculty members and an insufficient base of knowledge made them unable to meet 
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the needs of farmers. Critics argued that young people better learned their trade at home. 
Few actually attended these colleges, and many of those who did never returned to their 
farms (193). It might not have contributed too much in training professional farmers, but 
it did do a lot for agricultural science, and it did create another cornerstone in the 
foundation of farm cooperation and development. 
Connecticut established the first agricultural experiment station in 1875 (Hurt 
193). Within twelve years Congress passed the Hatch Act of 1887. It provided an annual 
grant of $15,000 to each state to conduct research in any agricultural science (Benedict 
84). This federal grant increased in the following decades. These new experiment stations 
worked together with the colleges and tried to improve communication of research and 
technology to farmers through research bulletins. For the most part it failed, and the 
federal government would not solve this problem until the development of the 
agricultural extension system in the early twentieth century (Hurt 193). The Smith-Lever 
Act of 1914 authorized an extension service within the land-grant colleges system. It 
provided funding for extension agents that had the “responsibility of demonstrating 
practical agricultural methods that applied to field and home and helping farm men and 
woman learn about new techniques through the dissemination of publications” (Hurt 
256).  
After the Civil War, the South could no longer stand against the tide of 
modernization northern states wanted. In 1861 Abraham Lincoln signed legislation that 
would authorize the creation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The 
Department was especially authorized to “acquire, test, and distribute new and valuable 
seeds and plants” and to conduct “practical and scientific experiments” (Hurt 190). 
Before the creation of the USDA, the U.S Patent Office had performed this role. The 
USDA was also given the task of collecting agricultural statistics and publishing it to the 
public. This was a very important step for the advancement of the American farmer. The 
“scientists, technicians, and officials of the department were primarily dedicated to 
making two blades of grass grow where only one grew before” (Hurt 190). They also 
focused on medicine and chemicals. Generally the USDA dedicated itself and its 
resources to agricultural improvements and the advancement of new technology. In this 
early period they did not do anything directly involving the financial situation of farmers. 
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 At the end of the 19th century, the land-grand university system came of age. By 
the early 1900s, the standard agricultural disciplines had been established (Cochrane 
105). These disciplines included soils, agronomy, plant pathology, horticulture, animal 
husbandry, veterinary medicine, and economics applied to agriculture. At the beginning it 
was the USDA that still was the leading force of agricultural research in America. But 
when the USDA started to be more active in farm price supports after the 
institutionalization of agricultural policies in the 1930’s, the colleges became the 
”preeminent agricultural science-producing agencies in America” (107). Together the 
USDA and agricultural colleges created an environment of technological development 
that made the extreme growth in agricultural output in the 20th century possible.  
 
1.6  Institutionalization of Agricultural Policies 
The founding of the USDA created an early framework that would later be filled by 
different programs coming out of the New Deal. Most of the acts and regulations 
concerning agriculture had been conducted on local levels up to the beginning of the 20th 
century. In the 1920s Congress passed some farm legislation, but none of it was 
comprehensive and none did much to solve the major problems farmers faced. The 
political philosophy of laissez faire had not led to any comprehensive federal 
involvement in price regulation. The Great Depression had hit farmers hard, and it 
became evident that something had to be done about the financial situation farmers were 
in. On May 12, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA), the “capstone of the farm lobby’s ten-year battle for farm relief” 
(Hansen 78). Title 2 in that bill was the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act that was soon 
followed by the Farm Credit Act of 1933. It provided credit to farmers in dire straits and 
created the Farm Credit Administration to administer farm programs.  
This legislation was put together through compromises by the central actors in 
agriculture. For a long time different general farm organizations had lobbied on farm 
policy. One of these policies was called the McNary-Haugen plan. It was introduced 
several times in Congress and was finally passed by Congress in 1928 but was vetoed by 
President Coolidge. It proposed to limit agricultural sales to keep prices high. It called for 
the total output of each crop to be divided into two parts, one for domestic and one for 
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foreign markets. Crops were to be sold in the domestic market to generate prices that 
would give farmers a fair exchange value (Cochrane 118). Crops produced to foreign 
markets were to be dumped or sold for whatever price it would bring. The federal 
government would buy surpluses and sell them overseas and the losses would be covered 
by fees to agricultural producers. The legislation would crate a federal agency to support 
and protect farm prices. The Agricultural Adjustment Act did not incorporate the basic 
features of the McNary-Haugen plan that the farm organizations had advocated. What it 
did was to establish a platform on which future legislation would be built. 
Title 1 of the Agriculture Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to raise 
agricultural prices. It also granted him broad powers to fulfill this mandate (78). The new 
Act allowed the USDA to collect taxes from processors and distribute it back to farmers 
who cut back on production of corn, cotton, hogs, rice, milk, wheat and tobacco (78). 
These were the seven “basic” commodities. It also gave the Secretary power to “mediate 
the terms of marketing contracts and to enforce them (if need be) by licensing firms in the 
industry” (78). This directed the responsibility of price regulation, farm income and farm 
security in the hands of the federal government. The AAA made “payments to farmers 
amounting to over one billion dollars in the two years 1934 and 1935” (Cochrane 141). 
Successful or not, in January 1936 the AAA was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court.  
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 established a working 
relationship between the USDA and producers of perishable crops (Wessel 76). In 1938 
Congress passed a new Agricultural Adjustment Act. It “defined government agricultural 
policy and, along with some sections of the Agricultural Act of 1949, has remained the 
permanent congressional authorization for agricultural programs” (76). This permanent 
legislation remains the organic legislation amended from time to time, under which many 
farm programs of price and income support are administered (Cochrane 142).  
The AAA provided for a farm program open to participation by all farmers in the 
United States. It was designed to assist farmers to produce abundantly and to protect 
agriculture against the price collapses that had penalized heavy production (Ibid.). It 
created methods such as acreage allotments, commodity loans, and marketing quotas to 
provide order and stability. It sought to create a “national granary” for use in years of 
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shortage. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938  incorporated much of the general 
structure of the original Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and features of the Soil 
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 (Wessel 79).  
Most of the legislation before the 1938 Act had relied on the concept of parity. 
Parity was an index of the purchasing power of one unit of an agricultural commodity 
and represented the price needed to give a bushel of corn or a pound of cotton (or 
whatever) the same buying power as it had in the period 1909 to 1914 (Hansen 78b). The 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 imbedded this principle in statute, and the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) took possession of crops when the market price 
failed to exceed the loan rate (Wessel 80). By 1940 the CCC was choking on stored 
commodities. The CCC would continue to store up large amount of commodities in the 
decades to come. 
 The effects of World War II on American farmers were increased demands and 
higher prizes. It helped pull farmers out of the hard times they had suffered during the 
Great Depression. With higher prizes and bigger surpluses, the demand for farm policy 
reform increased. To achieve this, farm groups, now organized, traveled to Washington. 
But farm groups had not always been organized well enough to advance their views. 
Chapter two will look at how farm organizations have evolved.  
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*CHAPTER TWO* 
 
The Evolution of Farm Organizations 
 
In the 18th century, American farmers were isolated independent actors in a harsh 
environment, both economically and physically. As industrialization hit America in full 
force in the 19th century, events unfolded that made agriculture go from the prominence 
of both social and economic influence to a declining minority with less and less social 
and political significance. Land acts, physical infrastructure, economic issues, technology 
and education all led, in their respective ways, to unite farmers toward the end of the 19th 
century. The census of 1870 recorded 2,659,985 farms in the United States. In 1900 this 
number was 5,737,372, an increase of 114 per cent (Benedict 85). Nevertheless, by 1870 
the number of people “gainfully employed in agriculture dropped below the number in 
other occupations for the first time in the nation’s history” (87). Industrialization moved 
America away form the primary to the secondary sector, and this development together 
with a huge influx of immigrants began to marginalize farmers. 
The evolution of farm policies and politics give us an understanding of why 
farmers were badly organized in the 19th century, and why they in the end started to 
organize. There were still sectional and geographical differences that made it difficult for 
farmers to unite. The farm organizations had different agendas and represented different 
groups of farmers and issues. Another big obstacle to farm relief and federal involvement 
in agriculture was political philosophy. 
At an early point, American society developed a political tradition that can be 
termed liberal. The foundations for this political culture have many similar basic 
conditions as the agrarian myth. It hails individualism and property rights as important. 
The colonies were characterized by a high degree of independence and self-sufficiency. 
The local community was the only meaningful level of government, and even then 
“government [was] far too strong and modern a label to attach to what were remarkably 
successful self-governing entities” (McKay 40). Small agrarian communities tended their 
own soil, and their own matters. In the 18th century ideas of men possessing inalienable 
rights gained support in the colonies. The social-contract theories of John Locke and 
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau were popular ideas among the elites of the time. Life, liberty, and 
property rights were, they argued, universal rights of all men. According to Locke, these 
rights should be protected by a government that gained its power from the people. These 
ideas emerged at a time when the British crown increasingly started to extend its power 
to the colonies in America.  
Another influence on the new nation was Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations 
he presented ideas that were much in line with what Americans were thinking. A 
representative government was supposed to be the watchman of the community, insuring 
that people’s rights were guaranteed. It should maintain justice and protect members from 
injustice. It should also maintain a minimal degree of public services. Apart from that, it 
should leave people alone, or let the “invisible hand” of the marketplace correct 
imbalances. To be left alone to pursue wealth was a major reason why the colonists 
wanted freedom from the British crown.  
Louis Hartz argues in his book The Liberal Tradition in America that the term 
liberal is much confused and abused. The liberalism Hartz refers to is the older and more 
universal meaning of European origin. His liberal is the American democrat who 
“believes in individual liberty, equality, and capitalism and who regards the human 
marketplace, where a person succeeds or fails by his or her own efforts and ability, as a 
proper testing ground of achievement” (Hartz ix). Today the meaning of liberalism is 
understood differently. The New Deal changed liberalism to mean government 
intervention and big government. Ronald Reagan’s ascendancy and his followers’ 
denunciation of liberals have left liberalism with negative connotations. Hartz contends 
that the United States from its founding has been liberal, in the old European meaning of 
the word. The conservative reactions seen in the 20th century appears to “have been a 
particularly virulent reassertion of the liberal tradition Dr. Hartz identifies” (x).  
The political tradition that developed in the new nation and was subscribed to in 
the 19th century was the old European liberalism. The United States government pursued 
policies of laissez-faire and capitalism. The Courts were for the most part concerned with 
economical issues, reflecting a capitalist ideology in its decisions. Rural people and 
farmers were among those that believed in these things most strongly. It is within this 
ideology that agriculture policies and farm organizations developed. 
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2.1 Evolutionary Stages 
William P. Browne and Allan J. Cigler argue in U.S Agricultural Groups: Institutional 
Profiles that agriculture groups have gone through five stages of evolution. Stage one and 
two were from the very early period up until the turn of the 20th century. Stage three was 
the time-period following WW II. Stage four was from around the 1970s and stage five is 
the current. 
The first stage was an extreme local organization in isolated communities. This 
very early period saw farmers joining together out of solidarity on the local level, with 
few or no contact with other farmers outside their own geographical area. There were two 
major reasons why farmers did not organize more broadly. First of all, the political 
ideology was still that of the independent, hard-working, make-it-yourself farmer, who 
did not ask anyone for anything. Farmers wanted to be left alone in their struggle with the 
elements. Second, the geographical barriers and lack of physical infrastructure made it 
difficult for people to communicate effectively. At a time when horses were the main 
transportation device and the telephone was still decades away, organizational work 
would have been very difficult.  
The second stage saw nationally organized but still somewhat regionally distinct 
groups of farmers represented in Washington. Industrial and social developments in 
America made the mid-19th century a time ripe for farmers to become organized and also 
militant. There was a growing unrest among farmers in rural areas, mostly directed at the 
railroads, corporations, and banking interests. Farmers were also starting to become much 
more class-conscious. This period saw the coming of the big farm organizations. 
According to Murray R. Benedict the first important national organization of 
farmers started in 1867 (95). A Minnesota farmer, Oliver Hudson Kelly, a temporary 
employee of the USDA, came up with the idea of a farm organization after having 
traveled around in the South and experiencing the “poverty, ignorance and lack of social 
life in many of the farm communities” (Ibid.). The basic idea of the National Order of the 
Patrons of Husbandry was to improve farming, create recreation, and “the broadening of 
knowledge and acquaintance among farmers” (Ibid.). It took form after the model of the 
Masons, with rituals and degrees. The Order is more commonly known as the Grange. 
According to Benedict, there were Granges in all states except Nevada, Connecticut, 
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Rhode Island, and Delaware by 1873 (Ibid.). The organization was strong mostly on the 
local level and did contribute to early collaboration between farmers. Its national policy 
success came with the passing of railroad regulation and the implementation of the 1862 
Morrill Act to set up land-grant agricultural colleges. Later the Grange lost its importance 
in national farm policy, and its focus is now more on preserving “folk art, culture, and 
customs of rural life and [it] also serves as an important archive for the documents and 
history of rural communities” (Browne and Cigler 180).  
The American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) is the largest and most 
established of all agricultural interests groups (Browne and Cigler 23). It is a general 
farm organization that tries to serve a multitude of purposes and constituents. It was 
created in Binghamton, New York, in 1911 and from its beginning funded by business 
interests like Sears, International Harvester, and also the USDA. Its original purpose was 
to “promote agricultural efficiency and production” (24). As with most of the farm 
groups of the early 20th century they started out with an educational agenda. But soon, as 
almost all other agricultural groups, it moved toward a legislative and economic agenda. 
Since the end of World War II the AFBF has professed “a strong faith in the free market 
to bring about a high and reliable return on farm investments” (24). Today the Farm 
Bureau’s primary constituency tends to be the largest farmers and its legislative agenda is 
sometimes funneled through elements of the Republican Party (26).  
Independent family farmers founded the National Farmers Union (NFU) in Raines 
County, Texas, in 1902. They started out in the pursuit of “favorable federal and state 
legislation” and “helped organize a series of farmer-owned and operated cooperatives 
throughout the country” (Browne and Cigler 70). The Farmers Union has always had a 
favorable view of governmental price supports and stood in contrast to the American 
Farm Bureau. It argues that farm prices are made in Washington and has been deeply 
involved in lobbying in Congress since the early 1930s (72).  
Today the Farmers Union is tied with Democratic Party on most legislative issues. 
Since 1983, the union has funded a political action committee (PAC) that distributes 
money to congressional candidates based on their support of and commitment to the 
family farm system of agriculture (73). Rarely does the Union contribute to Republican 
candidates. These organizations, together with other farm organizations, worked for the 
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most part together up to World War II for farm financial relief and combined forces to 
pass the AAA in 1933 (Browne and Cigler xi).  
   The third stage, the period after World War II, was dominated by general 
organizations representing all sorts of farmers together, but now a new form of 
partisanship developed. The legislative battles leading up to the passage of the 
Agricultural Act of 1949 marked a change. Under the leadership of free-trader Allan 
Kline the American Farm Bureau Federation moved toward the Republican Party. From 
then on the Farm Bureau took a conservative stand on almost all issues. The National 
Farmers Union “which came to Washington on the demise of its lobby arm, the National 
Board of Farm Organizations, was avowedly Democratic and liberal” (Browne and Cigler 
xvi). Under the leadership of James G. Patton the Farmers Union often cooperated with 
the Grange and later the National Farmers Organization. The stark difference between the 
Farm Bureau’s free-trade ideologies and the price-support programs supported by the 
Farmers Union remains a fundamental distinction in agricultural policy and between the 
two large farm organizations.   
 Small regional commodity groups started to work with the generalist 
organizations and their lobby groups that had political clout in Washington. But as 
partisanship brought stalemate to the legislative process, and the need for more 
cooperation between the commodity groups became apparent, they joined forces in the 
founding of the National Farm Coalition (Ibid.). The period after World War II marked a 
time of extreme agricultural growth, and many farmers started to realize that the changing 
environment of farming had to be met with changes in political organizational structure. 
The generalist groups, which in most cases were concerned with ideology first, could no 
longer “effectively speak for increasingly specialized- and thus unique- producers 
“(Ibid.). This was especially true in a period when “farm bills dealt with major 
commodities selectively, provision by provision, rather than in comprehensive fashion to 
equitably allocate farm financial supports (Ibid.). The third stage is also known as the 
conflict stage. 
 The period from the 1940s to the late 1960s also saw an increasing number of 
multinational agribusiness companies involved in American farm policy. The 
agribusiness industry finances, markets, transports, distribute, processes, manufactures, 
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and sells agriculture commodities and food and equipment (Hurt 388). This long chain of 
production gave life to numerous trade associations, like the Corn Refiners Association 
and the Fertilizer Institute. Only a few of these are generalist organizations, like the 
Nation Grain and Feed Association. Private firms like Cargill, Monsanto, and Archer-
Daniels-Midland lobby on their own, especially when an industry is divided on a policy 
question (Browne and Cigler xx). Not all agribusiness organizations lobby, but focus on 
being watch dogs and provide information on trade issues. In general, these organizations 
seek to determine appropriate strategies for increasing domestic and, in particular, 
international trade (Ibid.).  
The coming of agribusiness also changed how many farmers operated. Food 
companies offered contracts that guaranteed a market and a satisfactory price for a certain 
amount of vegetables, fruits, poultry, or swine (Hurt 388). It turned many farmers into 
wage laborers, and this development triggered a need for labor organizations. The 
relationship between farmers and agribusiness are often tense. Hurt argues that the low 
wages in jobs the agribusiness offered “ensured rural poverty, which contributed to social 
problems, such as a spousal and alcohol abuse, drug addiction, school dropout, and crime 
of various sorts” (390). The increasing negative focus has led these companies to be 
increasingly sensitive to their image. In 2002, Cargill, America’s largest privately held 
company introduced a new logo intended to bridge the gap between farmers, food 
processors, and consumers (Ibid.). Cargill wanted people to know they cared about 
nourishment, growth, and helping consumers.  
Stage four saw the general farm organizations decline to the intensely focused, 
narrow issue interests of the commodity groups. These groups represented mostly one 
commodity, like for example American Soybean Association, Florida Texas Sugar 
Growers, National Association of Wheat Growers, National Corn Growers Association, 
and National Cotton Council of America. The smaller commodity groups entered the 
political game and to a large extent took over the political clout that the generalized farm 
organizations had benefited from.  
These organizations were numerous and smaller with fewer staffs and members 
than the large generalist organizations. Commodity groups, in general, wanted price 
support and other cost-incurring or cost-saving programs from the federal government. 
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Their focus was on their commodity alone, and that meant they had few incentives or 
little opportunity to address the complicated, comprehensive problems of the expanding 
range of agricultural issues (Browne and Cigler xvi). These were left up to the general 
farm organizations like the Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union, but “ for a short time in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, commodity groups were felt to reign absolutely supreme in 
agriculture” (Ibid.). The increasing number of multinationals that have complex and 
fragmented interests contributed to create even more specialized farm organizations. 
The current and fifth stage has witnessed an accommodation of more and more 
participants and the continued addition of more provisions to farm policy. The 2002 farm 
bill was the first farm bill to have an own provision for energy. In the 21st century energy 
and bio-diesel have become new big provisions. The farm bill has grown in size, both in 
terms of dollars and programs. The farm bill is no longer just in the interests of farm 
legislators, but also urban legislators.  
The proliferation of so many diverse interests has led to an extremely complex 
legislative process in agricultural policymaking. In the early 20th century there were just a 
few large general farm organizations. In the early 21st century there are thousands of 
specific farm and non-farm groups involved in agriculture with diverse interests. 
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*CHAPTER THREE* 
 
Agriculture Policies from 1938 to 2002 
 
Chapter three will analyze the evolution of farm policies since 1938, and some of the 
surrounding political and socio-demographical changes that have influenced farm policy. 
The few generations of farmers who have lived and worked in the agricultural sector 
since 1940 have gone through sweeping changes. 
 The Great Depression and the Dust Bowl had devastating effects on American 
farmers. The new, depression-born interventionist government led by President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt attempted to protect farmers’ investments in their farms (Bonnen 19). The 
New Deal farm programs marked the beginning of federal farm-policy involvement. As 
the depression had shifted to prosperity, the federal government has continued its heavy 
involvement in agricultural policy. The policies adapted from the 1930s to mid-1950s 
were mainly supply management to “reduce output as a means of increasing product 
prices without unacceptably large Treasury costs” (Pasour 115).  
 
3.1  Controlling Supply 
By the early 1940s the CCC was choking on stored commodities. A wartime act had 
requested increased production of certain crops. The Steagall amendment from 1941 
mandated a 90 percent parity support for these crops. After World War II officially ended 
on 31 December 1946, 90 percent parity support was extended to the end of 1948 
(Wessel 80). After World War II there was a huge increase in domestic and foreign 
demand for food. The Marshall Plan and other assistance programs contributed to 
increasing demands for food production. Farmers and consumers in general started to 
oppose price controls: consumers in hope that grocery bills would decline, farmers 
because they believed that price controls prevented them from earning more money (Hurt 
104).  
Farmers developed increasingly different interests. Cotton farmers wanted high 
price supports and strict acreage limitations. Midwestern farmers feared that Southern 
lands taken out of cotton would be converted to corn production (Hurt 104). The 
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geographical differences grew increasingly wider among farmers and their organizations. 
But farmers had one thing in common: They did not want to go back to the days without 
government farm programs. The idea of totally abandoning price support was given little 
thought by Congress in the postwar years. The debate that evolved was between high 
fixed support for agricultural prices and the institution of a lower, flexible support 
system.  
President Harry Truman wanted to give farmers a “fair deal”. But he warned that 
he might be voted out of a fair deal and into a Republican deal (Hurt 105). The end result 
was a continuation of high wartime price supports. The Agricultural Act of 1949 
extended price supports for the determined basic crops at 90 percent of parity and 
nullified the revisions of the parity formula, and increased the loan rates corresponding to 
different levels of estimated supplies. It also established mandatory support prices (at 
various parity levels) for dairy products, tung, nuts, potatoes, and wool (Orden 56). The 
Act of 1949 was also the second part of permanent farm legislation together with the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.  
In the early 1950s the new Secretary of Agriculture, Charles F. Brannan, proposed 
to abandon the parity method and replace it with direct payments. Included in his 
proposal were also income-support limits and soil conservation programs. His idea of a 
partisan program for farmers was not automatically attractive to politicians in 
Washington (Hansen 121).  In general, his main proposal was to shift farm support away 
from price support to income support. Many saw these direct payments as welfare 
payments, and they were opposed by the strong Farm Bureau, which together with the 
Grange and the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives gained enough votes in 
Congress to kill the Brannan plan (Hurt 109). The plan died in the early 1950s, but many 
of its main themes would come back in later farm legislation.  
  President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, 
was an anti-interventionist and championed a farm policy based on a free market. He won 
support from the Farm Bureau, which was “increasingly dominated by competitive 
Midwestern producers of corn and other feed grains who were least dependent on the 
government programs” (Orden 57). Farm policy was now becoming increasingly more 
partisan and difficult to achieve. The Agricultural Act of 1954 replaced the support rates 
 32 
fixed at 90 percent of parity with varying rates and a minimum parity level of 82.5 
percent (57). Secretary Benson was given the power to further implement lower support 
levels. Continued high price supports after the War had led to huge surpluses in the CCC. 
Again America was faced with piling food surplus and the problem of maintaining high 
farm prices and income (Pasour 117). 
 
3.2 Surplus Problems 
The flexible price support scheme in the 1954 Act seemed inadequate to deal with the 
mounting surplus. Congress responded by passing the Agriculture Act of 1956 known as 
the Soil Bank. Under this program farmers were paid to take cropland out of production. 
The Soil Bank was an alternative to acreage allotments and marketing quotas. The goal 
was to limit output to keep prices high. The program was designed to shift some cropland 
out of cultivation and into forage, parks, etc. It aimed at limiting the total output of all 
crops so that farmers did not start overproducing secondary crops not included in the 
acreage allotment scheme. But the government programs found it difficult to counter 
farmer’s adaptation to new legislation. The program was voluntary, and as the 1950s 
progressed it seemed that the Soil Bank was failing. Thomas R. Wessel points out in his 
chapter “Agricultural Policy Since 1945”: “The price support mechanism was not high 
enough to allow smaller farmers to stay in the industry and not low enough to induce 
large producers to voluntarily decrease the acreage they planted” (86). The result was 
lower farm income which squeezed out small-scale farmers. 
 In 1940 farmers in the United States totaled 30.5 million who lived on 6.1 million 
farms that averaged 175 acres in 1940. In 1950, the farm population was down to 23 
million on 5.3 million farms that averaged 216 acres. In total, the farm population in the 
USA declined from 23.2 percent to 15.3 percent. At the same time the total population 
increased, but per capita food consumption remained relatively constant (Hurt 120). 
Although farm numbers were going down, farm productivity was going up.  
In the 1950s, many economists and politicians argued that small-scale farmers 
were a “hindrance to the consolidation of farms and improved efficiency through high 
capitalization” (Hurt 116). The coming of agribusiness and the trend of consolidation was 
by many farmers seen as a big threat, and rightly so. Congress answered their worries by 
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declaring in 1960 that the government would support “the family system of agriculture 
against all forms of collectivization … in full recognition that the system of independent 
family farms was the beginning and foundation of free enterprise in America” (Hurt 118). 
But for many small-scale (and medium-size) farmers these words were hollow.  
 A stricter and mandatory supply control measure was put to the vote among wheat 
farmers in late 1963. Over a million farmers voted, and a 52 percent majority rejected it 
(Orden 63). The rejection was orchestrated by the Farm Bureau, which did not welcome 
strict intrusive price support mechanisms. In 1964 Congress passed legislation for 
voluntary acreage divisions and a complicated wheat certificate program designed to 
support commodities at different rates depending on whether the product was sold on the 
domestic or foreign market (Wessel 87). The Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 sat loan 
rates near world price levels and continued direct cash payments tied to production 
quantities for wheat and cotton (Orden 64). The act put into legislation the Brennan idea 
of income maintenance, but did not end price supports.  
The 1965 farm bill debate revealed an increased bipartisanship in Congress. 
Nineteen Republicans voted for the bill, including five from Kansas, all four from 
Minnesota and both from South Dakota (Hansen 154). This was the largest number of 
Republicans to vote on a Democratic farm bill since 1954. The bipartisan cooperation 
deepened and spread after 1965. This trend was linked with two other developments in 
the mid-1960s that had huge impact on farm policy. 
 First, the 1965 legislation attempted to bring some stability to the policy-making 
process by establishing a comprehensive four-year program covering most commodities 
(Wessel 88). Before 1965 there had been multiple programs and single-crop acts 
frequently amended. By establishing a farm omnibus bill, Congress had made a 
framework in which all farm (and non-farm) programs could be placed.  
Second, President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced the food stamp program in 
1964. It “helped cement an alliance of urban and rural congressmen in support of 
agricultural legislation” (Wessel 87). The incorporation of this program, together with 
other programs over the next decades, helped agricultural legislation sustain an uneasy 
coalition between farm, state, and city politicians (87). R. Douglas Hurt argues in his 
book Problems of Plenty, that “indeed, farmers remained one of the most powerful 
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groups in American politics because farm-state congressmen often joined with their 
urban counterparts to gain support for agricultural programs in return for the backing of 
urban programs” (132). Critics of federal farm policy argue that the food stamp program 
should be detached from farm policy, together with a series of other programs. It has yet 
to happen, since farm, state, and city politicians still find its presence a big advantage. 
These two developments in the 1960s cemented logrolling and bipartisan cooperation as 
important elements in farm policy-making.  
Representatives in Congress learned how to take advantage of the possibilities the 
farm bill presented them. Urban Democrats “played the inside game, brokering urban 
votes for the farm program and rural votes for urban projects, most prominently food 
stamps” (Hansen 199). On the other hand, suburban Republicans “played an outside 
game, using amendments on the floor to pry particularly vincible commodity programs 
out of their protective coalitions” but steered away from political important commodities 
and “zeroed in on the politically vulnerable crops grown in smaller constituencies, like 
tobacco, sugar and peanuts” (Ibid.). Farm organizations managed to forge links with 
other interest groups that were then getting stronger. In a classic legislative logroll they 
agreed to a mutually beneficial package in which farm supports and spending on food 
stamps and other nutrition programs would be vetoed forward together (Orden 70). This 
strategy would characterize future farm legislation.  
 By the mid 1960s, less than five percent of America’s population earned their 
income from farming. Farms were getting bigger, more technological advanced, and 
more efficient. Small farmers were being squeezed out by agribusiness and large-scale 
farmers. At the same time it became increasingly difficult to construct agricultural policy, 
and achieving legislative majorities became more complex, more participatory, and less 
certain (Wessel 88). Although the process was marked by a larger degree of 
bipartisanship than many other policy sectors, producing a farm bill did not become 
easier.  
The 1965 farm bill was nearing renewal in 1970. The Nixon administration 
proposed legislation that reflected conservative commitments to lower price supports, 
less restriction on production, and renewed emphasis on moving agricultural surpluses 
into the world market (Wessel 89). Congress insisted on keeping a higher price support 
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than the Administration. Direct cash payments were continued as a means of supporting 
farm income. Direct payments remained above 20 percent of total net farm income 
(Orden 67).  
The Agricultural Act of 1970 ended acreage allotments. To qualify for price 
support farmers had to set aside some of their land. They were free to do whatever they 
wanted with the remaining land. Urban legislators, worried about high farm subsidies, 
“demanded and gained a limit of $55,000 in total payments an individual could receive 
under the act” (Wessel 89). World markets in the mid-1970s were again demanding 
American food, and commodities in the CCC program began pouring out of the country. 
This sudden demand, combined with previous acreage allotment programs, contributed to 
renewed food shortage in the world. And like in the 1950s, this reinvigorated proponents 
of a free market agricultural policy.  
 
3.3 Towards Direct Payments  
The Agricultural and Consumer Production Act of 1973 introduced a whole new system 
of direct payments called target price. Under the target-price method of crop subsidy, 
participating farmers received a government-determined target price for their crops. The 
farmers either sold the product at the market price (the price at which the guaranty 
supplied by farmers at the target price equals the quantity demand) or gave it to the CCC 
storage at a specific loan rate (Orden 119-120). The government then paid the farmer an 
amount, known as the deficiency payment, to ensure that the farmer received the target 
price for his crop (120). This system remained important in the 1996 farm bill and in a 
somewhat modified form in the 2002 farm bill. Urban congressmen managed to lower the 
limit of individual payments from $55,000 to $20,000 (Wessel 89).  
Many Republicans, backed by the Farm Bureau, saw farm subsidies as making 
farmers dependent of government income support. Their ideological conviction of the 
superiority of the free market to control supply and demand made farm subsidies an 
important sector to reform. Increasingly farm policy was seen as a semi-socialistic sector 
with huge “welfare” spending. The bill marked a shift toward more direct payments and 
production encouragement. The new legislation looked like it was working as long as 
America was able to keep enough exports to keep surplus low. But as the volatile world 
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food production started to recover from shortfalls in the early 1970s, combined with 
increased domestic production in the same period, prices started to tumble. With falling 
farm prices, the Democrats rushed to the scene. 
 President Gerald Ford had vetoed legislation to raise the target price and refused 
to introduce new agricultural legislation. Wessel argues that his refusal probably helped 
explain his defeat in 1976 (90). The new President, Jimmy Carter, came up with his own 
plan for agricultural policy. He agreed to modest increases in target prices and established 
a ‘farmer owned’ reserve to keep surplus production off the market. Carter also proposed 
a major expansion of federally subsidized crop insurance to replace direct government 
disaster payments (Wessel 90). Democrats in Congress (especially the leadership in the 
agricultural committees) were not impressed with the modesty of Carter’s plan (Hansen 
155). The Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 contained a compromise between the 
Administration and Congress on target price. It also expanded disaster insurance. All in 
all, the 1977 farm bill was essentially a continuation of the 1973 Agricultural and 
Consumer Protection Act.  
 According to Hurt, the axiom of the 1970s was “get bigger, get better, or get out” 
(134). Farm enterprises had now established themselves and were making huge profits, 
enabling them to buy up even more farms. Increasingly large farms were tapping into 
farm subsidies, and small scale farmers found it difficult to compete. Net farm income 
declined from $34.3 billion in 1973 to $25.5 billion in 1975, while average living costs in 
America increased. As farm policy seemed unable to cope with maintaining an 
acceptable farm income, many farmers found work other places. Those who stayed had 
no other “choice than to increase production in order to lower unit costs and thereby 
maintain a profitable business” (Hurt 134). The average farm in 1970 was 373 acres, at 
the end of the decade it was 426. Individual farms were getting more productive, but 
from 1970 to 1980 their numbers declined from 2.9 million to 2.4 million (134).  
In 1980 Ronald Reagan came into office with an agenda to cut government 
spending. David Stockman, his budget director, signaled a wish “to mark farm program 
spending for sharp reductions” (Orden 72). President Reagan’s proposals were extreme. 
He proposed to cut the level of projected farm spending together with the omnibus farm 
bill that included essentially all commodities. The omnibus bill “would be subject to 
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explicit expenditure limitations set by a congressional budget resolution” (72). This 
would give representatives a reduced opportunity for any huge pork barrel bargaining, 
but did little to change the practice of logrolling.   
The Reagan administration wanted to eliminate income support through target 
prices and deficiency payments that had been introduced in the early 1970s. The 
Administration also wanted to further lower price-support loan rates, not raise loan rates 
like most farmers wanted. Reagan also promised to end the grain embargo against the 
Soviet Union (Wessel 91). The Reagan administration changed how farm policy was 
produced. The Office of Budget and Management (OMB) now actively intervened at the 
expense of the Department of Agriculture in setting spending limits on agricultural 
programs (92). The president’s Council of Economic Advisors also became more 
involved. With the new budgetary processes, the House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees dramatically increased their influence in determining agricultural policy. 
This budgetary system made an already complicated process even more complicated. The 
result was a “near-complete breakdown of cooperation, replaced by a system of 
intemperate attack and counterattack that nearly ended with no agricultural bill reported 
out of the House Agricultural Committee” (Wessel 92). In the 1940s and most of the 
1950s agricultural policy had been for the House and Senate Committee alone. In the 
1980s, almost all of Congress was involved in agricultural policy-making. 
Many of the proposals from the Reagan administration did not gain support 
among Democrats and Republicans in Congress. The Food and Agricultural Act of 1981 
was one of the most short-lived agricultural acts since 1949. The new farm bill provided 
nominal increases in target price levels of 6 percent annually (Orden 72). It soon became 
apparent that the shift toward a market-based farm policy was failing. The 1981 farm bill 
had anticipated huge exports, but now the CCC was piling up surplus and annual 
expenditures increased. The Reagan administration retreated and in January 1982 
Agricultural Secretary John Block announced new acreage-reduction programs (72).  
The Reagan Administration also announced the payment-in-kind (PIK) program. 
It was designed to reduce cultivated acres in return for payments derived from the huge 
stores of commodities in the government’s possession. An unexpected drought caused 
more farmers than expected to sign up for the PIK program, and forced the government to 
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buy supplies from farmer-owned reserves to cover PIK transfers (Wessel 93). Around 82 
million farm acres were retired in 1983 (Little 405).  
The overall economic situation for farmers in the early 1980s declined 
significantly. Already in the spring of 1978 several hundred members of the American 
Agriculture Movement (AAM) took a tractorcade to Washington, D.C., and received 
wide, favorable media coverage (Danbom 255). The organization fell apart later after 
several violent and disastrous protests. Net farm income decreased significantly, and land 
values started falling in 1982 and continued to fall through the mid-1980s. In January 
1985, over 370,000 American farms were reported to be in serious to severe financial 
stress (405). The farm debt that totaled $60 billion in 1972 increased to $216 billion in 
1983 (Hurst 138). The total population of farmers also kept decreasing. In 1985 only 5.3 
million people, 2.2 percent of total population, comprised the farm population (138). In 
this period several Hollywood films featured themes of struggling farmers’ fight against 
foreclosure and natural disasters, and Willie Nelson launched a series of Farm Aid 
concerts together with Neil Young (Danbom 256).  
As the Agricultural and Food Act of 1981 was set to expire, Congress started 
debates over a new farm bill. As in 1981, the Senate was controlled by the Republican 
Party, and the House of Representatives by the Democrats. The debate was mainly 
between those who wanted aid to farmers by restoring U.S. competitiveness with lower 
loan rates versus those who preferred a more determined use of supply controls (Orden 
74). The extreme reforms Regan had introduced in 1981 to move farmers away from 
government dependency were “dead on arrival”. The debate was not whether or not the 
government should help farmers, but how and how much. 
The Food Security Act of 1985 fixed target prices for two years, then permitted 
only modest (2 to 5 percent) yearly declines in the last three years of its five-year 
duration (Orden 75). In the years following the 1985 farm bill, Congress passed 
legislation maintaining target prices at the 1985 level. The 1985 farm bill also gave 
discretion to the secretary of agriculture to lower loan rates by as much as 25 percent, and 
to “keep them in the range of 75 to 85 percent … in order to make U.S. farm exports 
more competitive in world markets” (Orden 75). Deficiency payments were kept to 
insure farm income stability. The Reagan administration also vigorously pursued foreign 
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markets to relieve surplus production (Wessel 94). A new program called the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was introduced aimed at permanently removing 
cropland from production.  
Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry argued that the 1985 farm bill was a “slow but 
decisive transition to market-oriented farm policy” (Wessel 94). It was politically 
important for Republicans to form the image that they were transforming farm policy to a 
more market-oriented policy, but the fact was that the basic core of the farm bill did not 
do much to reform farm policy. It was more a continuation of previous farm bills.  
In their book Policy Reform in American Agriculture: Analyses and Prognosis, 
Orden et al. claims that the 1985 farm bill “led to a sharp increase in farmer dependence 
on government program participation, more cash payments, more acreage set aside, and 
more trade distortions” (76). They argue that the illusion of government stepping out of 
farm policy found in previous farm bills was now fading. Orden et al. conclude that the 
farm lobby had won the political struggle and ask how they could succeed yet again to 
extract “such generous benefits from the political system?” (77). Two explanations are 
offered. 
First, the mid-1980s saw a huge financial crisis for farmers. During this period 
farmers, farm groups, and others did what they could to express the severity of the 
economic situation rural America was facing. Some argued that the image portrayed of 
almost half of American farmers going out of business was exaggerated. It was a 
deliberate tactic used by farmers to build broad public support for farm relief. Farmers 
also managed to successfully argue to the public that the government had done much to 
create the difficult financial situation. This influenced Congress to increase farm program 
spending. In 1986, when farm programs totaled $26 billion, respondents to a survey were 
willing to spend even more federal funds to alleviate whatever unfair circumstances 
farmers faced (Kramer 12). 80 percent of respondents in some polls were positive to 
increased expenditures on farm programs, despite a budget deficit that made many 
Americans believe that military and other domestic programs should have been cut (12). 
The family farm had been threatened by the government and big business, and people 
seemed to sympathize with the farmers and were willing to meet farmers’ needs.  
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Second, the environmental lobby was introduced in the 1980s. Although the 
partnership between environmental and farm interests had some obvious differences both 
partners found cooperation effective. The advantages seen by some “farmer groups from 
idling land to boost prices dovetailed neatly with the interests of environmentalists in 
idling land to reduce soil erosion, groundwater contamination, and loss of wildlife 
habitats” (Orden 77). This assured the passage of the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) which was a long-term paid land retirement scheme. Environmentalists celebrated 
it for the long-term effects land idling would have, but farmers understood that a large 
long-term paid land retirement would lessen the need for unpaid annual ARP set-aside 
requirements (Orden 77).  
A good example of logrolling in Congress happened in 1992. The conference 
committee charged with working out the differences between the House and Senate fiscal 
1992 appropriations bill for the Interior Department faced a problem. The House wanted 
to raise fees for live stocks grazing on public land by more than 400 percent. The Senate 
had attached a rider to its bill, proposed by Republican senator Jesse Helms of North 
Carolina, which forbid the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to spend federal 
money to “promote, disseminate, or produce materials that depict[ed] in a patently 
offensive way sexual or excretory activities or organs” (Kernell 253). In a classic 
logrolling the conference committee struck a bargain. The House would not vote for the 
grazing fee if the Senate did not vote for Senator Helm’s proposal. “Porn for corn” is an 
excellent example of politics in Congress: “Conservative western ranching interests made 
common cause with the liberal urban arts community though they scarcely shared 
common purpose” (253). 
Other interests like the poor, labor, consumers, environmentalists, animal rights 
activists, and the like have all been included into farm policy (Ciegler xvii). This process 
has not been easy or smooth, but the proliferation of interests have introduced a wide 
array of actors that together have brought sufficient collective influence together to 
ensure the continued passage of farm-specific legislation within the context of a more 
broadly defined agricultural policy (Ibid.). This collective influence by the farm lobby 
has been seen as almost impossible to break. 
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The Food Security Act of 1985 was set to expire in 1990. The Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 fixed target prices at the 1990 level and ended the 
practice from previous farm bills that made farmers participate in all or most programs 
authorized within the legislation to be eligible for others (Wessel 94). The 1990 farm bill 
sat loan rates at 85 percent and continued the CRP. The bill was passed during the GATT 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round, and during a huge domestic budget deficit of $161 
billion (Orden 100). The 1990 farm bill was enacted for budget reasons and largely 
outside the influence of the ongoing GATT negotiations (101). The effects of the 1990 
farm bill did not yield much cost reductions because of higher than expected costs of crop 
disaster payments and CCC spending. In general, it was a continuation of previous farm 
bills and brought little new to the table.  
 
3.4 Towards a Free Market 
Conditions for the 1996 farm bill were different from those of previous farm bills. The 
Republican Party had gained control of Congress in the November elections in 1994. 
Some 40 years earlier, a Republican Congress had managed to lower high fixed price 
supports. But expectations for agricultural policy reform were low. In the 1980s a 
Republican controlled Senate had gone against the Reagan administrations proposal for 
radical reform of agricultural policy. The difference between the conditions in Congress 
this time around was a surge of ideological partisanship. New Republicans were not just 
Republicans, but “revolutionary” Republicans with an agenda to change the federal 
administration, primarily by huge cuts in federal spending programs. Reagan had tried to 
cut farm spending in the 1980s, but now the initiatives came from Congress. President 
Clinton was a supporter of status quo in farm policy.  
As many as “seventy-three freshmen legislators converged on Washington to 
implement the mandates of the ‘Contract with America,’ a ten-point program the 
Republican House candidates had endorsed prior to the elections” (Orden 126). It did not 
take long for the agricultural committees to find bipartisan cooperation more difficult 
than it had been. Traditionally the agricultural committees had been among the more 
bipartisan committees in Congress. As the 1990 farm bill was about to end in 1996, new 
proposals for farm policy came from different actors. 
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The Clinton administration wanted to cut spending and balance the budged, but 
was afraid to cut too deep into the farm bill. The new Secretary of Agriculture, Dan 
Glickman, announced that he would be an “advocate for agriculture” (127). In all, the 
administration supported modest changes in policy. Republican Richard Lugar, the new 
chair of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, proposed drastic 
cuts in agricultural spending in order to help balance the budged. These cuts were 
rejected early as too severe.  
The new chair of the Committee on Agriculture, Republican Pat Roberts, 
representing a district in Kansas, was a devoted supporter of agricultural programs. The 
followers of the “Contract with America” wanted food stamps to be taken out of the farm 
bill and instead turn it to the states in the form of a block grant. Roberts managed to strike 
a deal that would retain food stamps as a federal entitlement inside the farm bill. He 
“deployed a strategy to convince the Republican leadership that holding its majority in 
the House of Representatives after the 1996 elections might depend on taking a 
supportive approach to agriculture in the new farm bill” (Orden 130). One of the major 
reasons why the Reagan administration had failed to reform the 1985 farm bill was that 
Republicans in Congress worried about re-election.  
The House Budget Committee initially targeted agricultural spending for cuts as 
severe as those proposed by Lugar and rejected by the Senate (130). The debate had been 
devoted to spending caps on the farm bill. The Republicans had shown unity in their goal 
to cut spending, but this unity would “splinter among competing regional and commodity 
interests when specific policy options had to be considered” (Orden 131).  
An unexpected option came out of the House. It proposed planting flexibility and 
a decoupling of income support that had been proposed already in 1985 but had been 
‘dead on arrival’ then. It was thus surprising that this option suddenly turned viable in 
mid-1996. Decoupled payments are government payments to farmers that are not linked 
to the current levels of production, prices, or resource use. When payments are 
decoupled, farmers make production decisions based on expected market returns rather 
than expected government payments. Payments would be in the form of checks in the 
mailbox. Previously this had been viewed too much as welfare, a notion many farmers 
were not pleased with. Direct income schemes like nonrecourse loans and deficiency 
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payments had the element of direct payments, but these payments relied on target prices, 
acreage used, and productions. This scheme would totally decouple government 
payments from production and acreage. This option was “revolutionary” in the sense that 
it would give full planting flexibility and a descending federal payment to farmers over 
seven years regardless of commodity supplies or market prices (Wessel 95). After that 
period, the idea was that farm subsidies would stop completely and American agriculture 
would start operating in a free-market economy. 
After the introduction of this option, other bills from both the Senate and the 
House came into the process. Most of these options consisted of more or less variations 
of current farm legislation, from huge to small budget cuts. The farm bill “guidelines 
from the Clinton administration, the Cochran bill in the Senate, and the Emerson-
Combest bill in the House all maintained the existing support mechanisms” (Orden 139). 
The decoupling option, called “Freedom to Farm”, was championed by Pat Roberts, who 
had to everyone’s surprise suddenly turned around. To achieve this he circulated a letter 
from Speaker Newt Gingrich (Georgia), Majority Leader Richard Armey (Texas), and 
Majority Whip Tom DeLay (Texas) indicating that unless the Agricultural Committee 
reported sweeping reforms, agricultural policy might be changed through the leadership’s 
control of the budget process (Ibid.).  
After long debates over the various bills, it seemed like discussion would go into 
over-time. In late 1995, the Republican leadership had gone head to head with the Clinton 
administration, culminating in a federal government stand-still. They could not afford yet 
another delay. To get a farm bill through Congress, the Republican leadership started to 
lower the spending restrictions on the farm bill. Gingrich had for a long period stood 
firmly on spending cuts, but when it came down to it he acknowledged that he lacked the 
votes he needed for reconciliation (Orden 145). After some bargaining, he House 
majority passed the budget reconciliation bill by a 227 to 203 vote (Ibid.).  
What followed were new debates in both the House and the Senate. The House 
passed the Agricultural Market Transition Act, approved by the committee with 
unanimous Republican support (Orden 157). It received three Democratic committee 
votes. In the Senate the Agricultural Committee approved a bill that was characterized by 
more bipartisan cooperation than the House bill. To achieve bipartisan support for the 
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Senate bill the Republicans allowed retention of the 1949 permanent law, a concession 
that Democrats claimed was a key victory for maintaining a safety net for farmers (Orden 
158). This meant that if no farm bill was produced when the old one expired, the 1949 
permanent legislation with parity price supports would become law, ensuring continued 
farm program spending. 
Although the two bills coming out of the House and Senate were different in both 
scope and detail, the climate was now more relaxed than it had been. People who had 
been worried that they would be unable to produce a farm bill in time now began to see 
the light at the end of the tunnel. What came out of the conference was titled the Federal 
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act. The FAIR Act was “scored as saving 
$2 billion from December CBO budget baseline” (Orden 164). It was important for the 
Republican leadership to brand the farm bill as both a reform and as cost saving. They 
could now claim that they had achieved budget discipline. An article in the New York 
Times featuring the signing of the bill was titled: “Clinton Signs Farm Bill Ending 
Subsidies”. The final bill was passed in the House of Representatives by an 
overwhelming 318 to 89 majority and in the Senate by 74 to 26 (164). President Clinton 
signed it into law, saying that it “fails to provide an adequate safety net for family 
farmers” and that he would submit legislation to Congress next year “to strengthen the 
farm security net” (Associated Press, “Clinton Signs”).  
Wessel argues that American farmers have always gambled successfully on 
“Congress’s willingness to provide government assistance when prices fell, regardless of 
the agricultural program then in force” and that in 1996 “farmers reasoned that they could 
take advantage of government payments during a period of relatively high commodity 
prices and still find relief in the future if low commodity prices reappeared” (95). During 
the debates on the 1996 farm bill commodity prices went up. It was predicted that market 
prices would pass the current target price, meaning that government payments to farmers 
would decrease. The seven year plan of decreasing annual direct payments to farmers 
would with high market prices give higher government payments to farmers than the 
1990 legislation (or a modification of that policy). Ironically, Roberts and the Republican 
leadership used this as an argument for passing the FAIR Act. In an election year many 
politicians were comfortable with going for the alternative that would give farmers most 
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money, even though in the long run government payments would stop completely. But 
some did complain that the farm bill might have tasted good when you drank it, but then 
you would die.  
Orden et al. claims that prior to the 1996 FAIR Act almost all scholars were 
geared to “an explanation of continuity in U.S. farm policy, not policy change” (175). 
Most policy analysts neglected “the influence of party control in Congress on the content 
of U.S. farm policy” (175). Analysts saw agricultural policy as a deadlocked system 
where logrolling and bipartisan coalition building could not be broken up, especially 
since President Clinton was an advocate of farm policy continuity. David Orden et al. 
offers two main explanations to why Congress in the end adopted the Freedom to Farm 
approach that early on looked to be “dead on arrival”.  
Party control of Congress was important, although most politicians involved in 
farm policy have stronger ties and loyalties to commodity groups and regions than to 
party. The “apparent power of commodity and regional loyalties over party differences 
also reflects successful recruitment and cultivation of Congress members by narrow 
commodity-based political action committees” (Orden 178). Orden et al. goes on arguing 
that “party loyalties do not dominate in debates among producer groups, but they emerge 
as important when the enactment of legislation comes at issue” (178). Early in the 
process members of Congress take care of their own personal issues reflected by where 
they come from and who supports them. In this battle small commodity groups that 
otherwise would not build coalitions big enough to pass legislation on the floor gain 
considerable influence. When time comes for a floor vote, no coalition of farm groups 
can build an effective majority. Party loyalty and party discipline become important at 
this stage of the farm bill because only party coalitions are big enough to win a majority. 
Gingrich and the Republican leadership managed to build a Republican coalition based 
more on party line than anything else in 1996.  
The 1996 FAIR Act reflects long-lasting Republican ideas on farm policy. In 
broad terms, the Democratic Party tends to support a significant domestic policy role for 
the federal government while the Republican Party tends to favor less government and 
more of a role for the private sector (Orden 179). The FAIR Act sought to move farm 
policy into a market-based economy, consistent with the Republican ideology. Orden et 
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al. argues that the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 was not enough in itself to 
change farm policy. Republicans had previously rejected farm policy changes. But it did 
bring a significant movement in congressional preferences away from price support 
programs and toward policies that did not constrain farm production or agribusiness 
marketing activities (Orden 181). What triggered the policy change were high commodity 
prices that enabled central farm politicians to sell it to their constituencies.  
 According to Orden et al. the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 combined 
with higher market prices were the two major conditions that gave birth to the 1996 FAIR 
Act. They offer five other alternative explanations: (1) the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture, (2) federal budget pressure, (3) the cumulative structural modernization of 
agriculture, (4) diminished potency of the farm lobby, and (5) emergence of newly 
dominant ideas in agriculture. They dismiss all these as not adequate to help explain the 
changes that occurred in the FAIR Act. They conclude that “the most important reforms 
in the FAIR Act simply would not have been legislated had the farm bill debate taken 
place in 1997-98 instead of 1995-96” (204). This is a valid assumption. The special 
partisan ideology of the Republicans in the mid-1990s with their strong determination to 
cut spending and achieve fiscal responsibility helped make conditions in Congress 
unusually attractive for a free market reform. It suspended much of the normal 
acknowledged conditions of farm policy-making. Combined with high prices and 
optimistic projections the Republican takeover of Congress managed to upset the 
consensus of traditional commodity subsidies that had existed prior to the FAIR Act.  
The FAIR Act importantly did not abolish the permanent legislation of 1938 and 
1949, and although the FAIR Act was perhaps the most sweeping reform in agricultural 
policy since its institutionalization, it did not end subsidies, but changed them. As long as 
the reform promised subsidies for a period of seven years, most people involved saw the 
chance of changing the policy if it did not work out to their advantage. If the farm bill 
had promised payment stops after only two years, more people would have been 
skeptical. What happened next is good evidence that Orden et al. were right in their 
assumption that the FAIR Act would never have come to life without high prices in the 
summer of 1996. 
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3.5       Backtracking and Emergency Relief 
In 1998 farm income started to drop due to a fall in commodity prices. The President 
supported emergency crop disaster relief expenditures of $500 million and instructed his 
secretary of agriculture to use existing CCC authority to buy $250 million of wheat for 
food aid donations (Orden 206). These extra expenditures were all off-budget emergency 
assistance to farmers. Democrats rushed to the floor to remove FAIR Act loan caps and 
thus raise price-support levels and provide farmers with a “safety net”. In 2000 alone, 
“farmers earned $32.4 billion in government subsidies- about 40 percent of their income” 
(Hurt 398).  
Republicans, too, showing that the 1996 FAIR Act spending cuts were fragile, 
rushed to be more generous toward farmers. Their plan was for “special decoupled 
‘market loss payments’ to supplement the income relief and new decoupled payments” 
(Orden 206). President Clinton vetoed this as not generous enough.  As low prices 
persisted in 1998, Congress and the administration delivered unbudgeted new support to 
farmers in numerous ways, enough to keep net cash farm income near its 1996 level, 
despite low prices.  
Republicans also sought to increase exports as a way of increasing prices. In 1998 
Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, and Chairman of the Agricultural 
Committee, rushed through the Senate a bill to allow farmers to sell wheat to Pakistan 
(Rosenbaum, “Common Ground”). Republicans wanted to exempt food exports from the 
sanctions the United States imposed on India and Pakistan after those countries 
conducted nuclear tests in May. Senator Tom Harkin, on the other hand, concluded: “I 
simply do not believe you can trade your way out of a farm disaster. I think the 
Government has got to step in” (Ibid.). He also argued that the 1996 farm bill was like 
Holy Scripture to Republicans and that changing it would prove that they were wrong 
(Ibid.).  
Farmers had gambled on government support if prices fell, and Democrats and the 
President were more than willing to help. The FAIR Act itself was not changed, and the 
additional expenditures were unbudgeted. The increased decoupled payments were seen 
as “de facto abandonment of full decoupling” (Orden 207). It indicated that farmers and 
the Congress were unwilling to stay the course and take the political punches needed to 
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end subsidies. For each of the years from 1998 to 2001, Congress responded to low 
market prices by supplementing the lump sum contract payments with huge amounts of 
temporary disaster relief for U.S. farmers (Pasour 315). Although the FAIR Act ended 
target-price programs, it did continue the nonrecourse loans (the program in which a 
farmer could loan money from the CCC with his crop as collateral). When the 1996 farm 
bill was about to end in 2002, it was apparent that there would be changes in farm policy. 
The FAIR Act had resulted in huge unbudgeted spending for farm relief because the Act 
had failed to provide an adequate “safety net” for farmers when prices fell.   
The FAIR Act was not set to expire before September 2002, but because of the 
unbudgeted spending and presumed failure of the FAIR Act, discussions on re-writing 
agricultural policy began in early 2001. 
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*CHAPTER FOUR* 
 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
 
Both the Republican Party and Democratic Party have traditionally supported farmers 
and have been sympathetic to their view. Where they differ is on how to achieve a 
successful agricultural policy. It is more a debate on the means rather than the goal, 
although supporters from both sides would perhaps disagree. In this chapter policy 
reform or “change” will be used not necessarily to describe a change to the better, but a 
change from what exist. Change (or reform) away from the FAIR Act would therefore 
mean a return to more traditional commodity subsidy programs.  
A farm bill covers a wide range of programs including food stamps, rural 
development, conservation, commodity subsidies, nutrition programs, research, energy 
policy, and animal rights. Debates over the new farm bill were long and difficult and 
resulted in a return to pre-1996 policies. From being reported out of the House 
Agricultural Committee in the summer of 2001, it was not signed into law before May 
2002. During this long process, the federal surplus projections changed from positive to 
negative, and America began the War on Terror.  
With a Democratic majority in the Senate, and a narrow Republican majority in 
the House of Representatives, many proponents of traditional commodity subsidies hoped 
to redraw the FAIR Act from its free-market direction. By 2001 many critics had dubbed 
the Freedom to Farm Act the “Freedom to Fail Act”. Between 1996 and 2001 Congress 
appropriated big annual subsidies to distressed farmers, and when debates began on a 
new farm bill in 2001, many were ready for a change (Orden, “Reform’s Stunted Crop”). 
 Those who wanted a free-market approach to farm policy wanted to improve but 
not radically alter the FAIR Act. They argued that subsidies only went to big corporate 
businesses, not family farmers, and that current subsidies encouraged overproduction that 
kept prices low. They found common cause with environmentalists who wanted less 
money for commodity subsidies and more money for conservation programs and the 
poor. By directing more money into conservation, less land would be cultivated, leading 
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to less overproduction. For many members of Congress conservation became the solution 
to many of the problems facing the agricultural sector.  
Despite huge tensions President George W. Bush signed the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act of 2002 into law on May 13, 2002. But before the main debate on 
the farm bill began a smaller but just as contested debate was fought over emergency 
payments. 
  
4.1  Emergency Payments 
The FAIR Act had received considerable attention. The reason was that it was believed to 
have the potential to reform farm policy and end farm subsidies as they had been known 
since federal farm programs were introduced in the 1930s. As discussed in chapter three, 
one of the major reasons why the FAIR Act was passed was that Democrats and farm 
groups had calculated that they would receive higher payments from the fixed payment 
scheme in the FAIR Act than any counter-cycle program. But as prices fell sharply in 
1998 the fixed payment program provided less support to farmers than what had been 
available from older programs. Critics of the FAIR Act were not happy with this 
outcome. When prices collapsed in 1998 lawmakers were eager to appropriate extra 
support to farmers (Orden, “Reform’s Stunted Crop”). In 1998 Congress approved $5.7 
billion, in 1999 $8.6 billion and in 2000 $7.1 (Shenon, “Senate Approves”). Since the 
first emergency payments there was mounting pressure for a bigger and more lucrative 
farm bill. 
The Republican House had passed a $5.5 billion emergency bill, but Tom Harkin, 
the Senate Agricultural Committee Chairman, argued that this was not enough. A larger 
amount was necessary to finance programs for smaller farmers who were ineligible for 
the special subsidies for row crops: corn, wheat, soybeans, rice and cotton (Becker, 
“Senate Rejects G.O.P”). Harkin’s bill triggered a response from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., 
the White House budget director, who said he would recommend the president to veto 
any bill larger than $5.5 billion (Becker, “Farm Bill Advances”). Harkin insisted that 
“without these programs … thousands of farmers could go out of business” and that 
“[w]e need to help all the family farmers all over America, not just those in the big farm 
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states” (Becker, “Senate Rejects G.O.P”). The extra $2 billion would go to conservation 
programs and the growers of special crops.  
Senator Richard Green (Dick) Lugar from Indiana, the ranking Republican on the 
Agriculture Committee, argued that the current subsidies did not give enough help to 
small farms. Still, he argued that more supplemental aid before the fiscal year ended was 
not the way to reorder farm policy. Lugar used numbers provided by the USDA saying 
that the net worth of the nation’s farms was up 3.2 percent in the last five years. Although 
met with large resistance in the Senate and a looming veto threat, the Senate passed a 
$7.5 billion emergency bill 52 to 48 (ibid).   
The $7.5 billion bill had to be signed by the time Congress left for recess or else 
Congress would lose authority to spend money. The $7.5 billion bill passed the Senate 
early in the week, and time was running out. Senator Lugar resubmitted his $5.5 plan, 
arguing it was the only practical alternative. Lawmakers from New England threatened to 
oppose the bill if it did not include an expansion of the New England dairy compact. 
Majority Leader Tom Daschle from South Dakota said that there was no time for 
maneuvering and that they had to act fast (NYT, “Senate Republicans”). As Democrats 
and Republicans were fighting over extra spending, the White House insisted that Bush 
would veto any bill over $5.5 billion. Democrats accused the White House of abandoning 
farmers who had been casualties of falling commodity prices. The Senate Democratic 
leaders finally backed down after they had lost a procedural vote for quick passage of 
their plan. Senator Harkin concluded: “The gun was held to our heads and the White 
House refused to compromise” (Shenon, “Senate Approves”).  
Despite veto threats Senator Daschle said he would fight to find the extra money 
needed after the summer break. He described the President as “willing to expand 
government programs only so long as they benefited his wealthy corporate supporters” 
(Ibid.). Bush and Republican supporters of the $5.5 billion bill argued that there was no 
need for larger subsidies because “some livestock and crop prices had increased in recent 
months, easing what had been a crisis for many farmers” (Ibid.). Harkin remained 
convinced that the Republican bill was totally inadequate to meet the needs of farmers 
across the country and that the subsidies were providing just enough “to keep them in the 
basement” (Ibid). Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman also said that there was 
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evidence of “easing” to the downturn. The heated debate over the emergency payments 
would be a prelude to the farm bill debate later that year. 
   
4.2 Budget Politics and Timelines 
For many environmentalist and their supporters in Congress it was important to have new 
legislation because many of the conservation programs would have to shut down without 
new and better funding (Fonder). Falling prices and the failure of the FAIR Act had left 
many farmers pushing Congress to pass a new farm bill in 2001, especially when signs 
were showing warnings of a dwindling federal surplus, and because the emergency 
payments were lower than expected. Not all agreed, and some agriculture lobbyists and 
members of Congress, especially people calling for reform and a continuation of the 
FAIR Act, thought the debate could wait until 2002. After the summer recess Congress 
and the President came back to Washington prepared for what was deemed one of the 
more virulent budget debates in several years. 
 Government analysts projected that the federal surplus would be much smaller 
than what had been expected. The new numbers left Congress and the White House 
haggling for months over what cuts had to be made, which programs to cut and where to 
increase spending. Senator Robert C. Byrd from West Virginia, chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, said: “Lady Luck seems to have taken a hike,” and warned of 
a possible “13-car pileup” in the budget that fall (Becker, “Senate Rejects G.O.P”). On 
the floor Senator Byrd warned that because of the tax cut and the sluggish economy 
politicians in Congress were poised to spend the Medicare surpluses, disrupt the debt-
retirement efforts and dive right back into the deficit doldrums (Ibid.). The Bush 
Administration, seeking support for its tax cuts used the victory over the farm emergency 
spending bill to suggest that under Bush Congress would be more fiscally responsible 
than it had been before. 
 The political stakes were high after the summer break. Democrats were one vote 
in majority in the Senate, and the House was narrowly controlled by the Republicans. The 
news of the dwindling surplus and the Social Security problem came as a surprise to 
many members of Congress. Bush had achieved his $1.3 trillion tax cut earlier that year 
and just months after economic projections had been looking bad. House Democratic 
 53 
leader Richard A. Gephardt argued that the way the farm bill issue was resolved would 
have a lot to do with the 2002 election (Alvarez). The full House and one third of the 
Senate was up for election in 2002.  
 The big challenge for Congress was to pass the 13 bills to finance next year’s 
government programs. Everybody had promised not to tap into the Social Security 
surplus. Bush said that he wanted Congress to make two priorities: education and military 
spending bills. Congress responded by stating that it would be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to do so at the exclusion of the rest (Ibid.). The ranking Democrat on the 
Appropriations Committee, David R. Obey, said: “There isn’t anything left over”. The 
combination of an economic slowdown and the tax cut had scooped off the table 
everything needed to deal with long-term problems (Ibid.). 
 The Bush administration was more optimistic about the dwindling surplus than 
Congress. Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., the director of the White House Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), said on Meet the Press that they were dealing with historic, gigantic 
surpluses under any numbers and that spending in the president’s budget would go up 
over $100 billion (Alvarez). Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts responded by calling 
that view “divorced from reality”, and that it was “so wrong on the fundamental facts” 
that it really underscored the nature of the confrontation that was about to take place 
(Ibid.). As debate was heating up, it became evident that some programs would suffer. 
Spending on the farm bill looked gloomy with the White House stating that money had to 
be found before the bill could be passed (Ibid.).  
 Spending for the farm bill did not become easier after the 9/11 attacks. America 
stood still for weeks, but in late September Agricultural Secretary Veneman announced 
that the Bush administration was uncertain whether there was enough money to finance 
the $171 billion House farm bill. This raised the possibility that farm subsidies might be 
the first major program to feel the pinch of the new wartime budget (Becker, “Agriculture 
Secretary”). The $171 billion 10-year House farm bill had been reported before the new 
budget numbers and before the 9/11 attacks. Secretary Veneman admitted at a Senate 
Agricultural Committee hearing: “I can’t tell you where the budget is going to go with 
regard to anything” (Ibid.). This did not comfort anyone. 
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Senator Lugar said it would be irresponsible to even consider such a huge 
spending bill in the middle of a war and ridiculed the arguments that had come after the 
9/11 attacks that a $20 billion a year subsidy for grain and cotton was necessary in the 
war effort. As time passed, worry among agrarian legislators grew about how much they 
would be able to spend on the farm bill. 
 Senator Kent Conrad from North Dakota, chairman of the Budget Committee, 
pleaded Secretary Veneman to tell him how much money would be available. He argued 
that the farm economy was in dire trouble, and if money was not available there would be 
“a race to the auctioneer” (Becker, “Agriculture Secretary”). Veneman responded that it 
would be up to the OMB to decide if there was money available and promised that the 
administration would issue its response to the House before the bill was debated.  
Secretary Veneman also said in the hearing that there was some good news for 
American agriculture. Farm income would be at an all-time high of $61 billion in 2001, 
and farmland had risen in value by 21 percent. That stood in stark contrast with what 
many argued in the Senate, including Conrad, who announced: “I’ve never seen such a 
sense of despair among farmers” (Ibid.).  
Proponents of increased subsidies were eager to pass a farm bill before the 
Christmas break, but it looked gloomy as House debate was scheduled for early October, 
and nobody really knew if there was enough money available. Their efforts were also 
tempered by the fact that the current legislation would not expire until September 2002, 
leaving a possibility for Congress to postpone the farm bill until then. But this did not 
discourage proponents of a farm bill in 2001. 
  
4.3 The House of Representative Debates 
In September 2001, Larry Combest, chair of the House Committee on Agriculture, 
reported a $171 farm bill over ten years named Farm Security Act of 2001. This was a 
$73 billion increase in spending from the last farm bill. The bill was co-sponsored by the 
Democratic ranking minority member Charles Combest (from the neighboring district to 
Combest in Texas). They had drafted a farm bill that would give higher subsidies than the 
current legislation and even new commodity subsidies. It would do much to change farm 
policy away from the FAIR Act direction of a free-market approach.  
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The Farm Security Act of 2001 was nick-named the Texas Hurricane by 
opponents because the bill was perceived as moving too fast and was by opponents feared 
to be devastating to American farmers. It would continue the traditional practice of high 
commodity subsidies, and provide little to conservation and the environment. 
Amendments were attached to the bill, introducing new commodity subsidies, including a 
new $3.5 billion peanut subsidy. The Combest bill became the rallying point for those in 
agriculture who sought to maintain the traditional policy instruments. 
Combest argued that the major commodity subsidies should be more predictable 
for farmers and championed a system with farmers receiving less money when their crops 
fetch higher prices (Becker, “Unlikely Allies Press”). These counter-cyclical payments 
(CCP) would provide higher payments when market prices fell below a certain level 
(target price). This would again tie agricultural subsidies to historical production levels. If 
market prices were above target prices, payments would be less. It would give farmers 
more predicable income and provide subsidies when prices fell. A bigger and more 
traditional bill was seen by many supporters as necessary to solve the problems many 
farmers had encountered after the failed FAIR Act. To “beef up” the farm bill would 
solve the problem of having to appropriate extra funds to farmers each year (Orden, 
“Reform’s Stunted Crop”). 
 The Combest bill did not have any subsidy cap for individual recipients, and it did 
not specify how much money would go to conservation. In June 2001, an aide of 
Combest told the New York Times:  “When the environmentalists discovered the farm 
bill, they made it trendy. Now the conservation programs are more oriented to Eastern 
farmers”. The aide also added: “Mr. Combest prefers the more traditional point of view 
of protecting soil banks that would give more money to the Western areas” (Becker, 
“Unlikely Allies Press”).  
The Farm Security Act was attacked by many legislators from non-farm states 
who argued that it represented the old way of doing things. Critics claimed that 
Combest’s traditionalist views would sock the taxpayers for nearly $20 billion annually 
in farm subsidies that were advertised as helping the family farmer but in fact were given 
mainly to agribusiness (NYT, “Helping Farmers”). Many people argued that the 
increased subsidies would continue the old way of supporting agribusiness and therefore 
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encourage further consolidation in the industry, crop surpluses, and lead to low prices 
(Ibid.). Because of the low prices, demand for new subsidies and emergency relief would 
be down the road. Some of the critics of the Combest bill were fellow Republicans and 
the Bush administration. 
 
4.4 The White House against House Republicans 
The Bush administration came indirectly out against the House proposal sponsored by 
Combest. The Administration did not in clear writing state that the bill should be 
amended or that it would be vetoed, but gave strong indications that it was not pleased 
with the House bill. The administration argued for more conservation and international 
trade over an existing approach that was too generous to wealthy grain and cotton farmers 
(Becker, “Administration Seeks”). President Bush supported ‘green payments’ to farmers 
who practiced land, water and wildlife stewardship (Abbott).  
The 120-page Bush platform was a huge blow to proponents of commodity 
subsidies and a boost for non-rural legislators and reformers who wanted more 
conservation. The Bush administration claimed that the current $20 billion annual 
subsidy program would distort the market, push land prices to artificially high levels and 
jeopardize trade agreements (Ibid.). A leading argument by the White House was that the 
farm bill would benefit more people if the focus of the current farm proposal from 
Combest would shift from only commodity subsidies to conservation, access to foreign 
markets, expanded research into pest and disease control, and better infrastructure (Ibid.). 
Secretary Veneman, a free trader, stressed the importance of not producing a farm 
bill that would be in conflict with international agreements. Combest insisted that his 
proposal was in line with what the Administration wanted. Although his proposal was far 
from being in line with the Administration’s view, it would buy Combest time since the 
OMB statement clearly came as a surprise to both him and his supporters. Ms. Veneman 
had told the World Trade Organization in June that “$10 billion in farm subsidies in the 
1998 to 1999 marketing year were ‘trade distorting’” (Becker, “Harkin and Lugar”). 
Combest attacked her for this, concluding that her attitude was “the equivalent to a 
unilateral disarmament that cede[d] ground and gain[ed] nothing in return” (Ibid.).  
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As the Bush Administration and Republicans in the House were fighting over the 
Combest bill, Republican Senator Richard Lugar joined in, arguing that the Combest bill 
was misleading and that it was mostly a division of the spoils for the major commodity 
crop producers and that many of the safety nets that already were in place for farmers 
actually stimulate overproduction and depress prices (Abbot). Lugar and the White House 
joined forces, much to the displeasure of many farm-state Republicans. It seemed that the 
Republican Party was geographically split between rural and non-rural legislators with 
the White House taking the side of the latter group. 
That the Bush Administration was supporting conservation did not surprise just 
Republicans, but also environmentalists like Ken Cook, president of the Environmental 
Working Group (EWG). He said: “We’re all very pleasantly surprised,” and that “this 
could be a watershed in agriculture policy if the administration follows through with 
specific proposals for the new farm bill” (Becker, “Administration Seeks”). Ken Cook 
and the EWG played a very special part in the farm bill debate. In late 2001, Ken Cook 
and his EWG launched a web page that was to be known as “the web page” in 
congressional debates.  
The EWG is a non-profit organization whose main goal is to champion 
environmentalism in farm policy by showing what subsidies go to whom. Ken Cook 
argued that the main purpose of the web page was to show that the bulk of subsidy 
payments go to a disproportionately small group of individuals, including many who are 
not actively engaged in farming (Perkins). For many reformers in Congress the EWG 
became an important tool. To many traditionalists in Congress, the EWG made it difficult 
for them to appeal to the family farm as a support for traditional high commodity 
subsidies, since the web page clearly showed that most subsidies went to big farmers 
(www.ewg.org). 
When the New York Times and the Washington Post published articles about the 
web page, it soon became very popular. The New York Times wrote that it “not only 
caught the attention of lawmakers, it also helped transform the farm bill into a question 
about equity and whether the country’s wealthiest farmers should be paid to grow 
commodity crops” while most small farms received nothing and were going out of 
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business (Becker, “Web Site Helped”). The web page was especially important in the 
Senate debate whether to limit individual subsidies.  
Although it was embraced by many, supporters of the Farm Security Act of 2001 
reacted negatively. Larry Combest accused the group of trying to eliminate all support for 
farmers. He said in an interview: “This is a conservation group that would like to take 
every dollar in a farm bill and spend it on environmental programs, have no farm 
programs at all” (Ibid.). His statement reflected a feeling among traditionalists that they 
were under attack from conservationists and non-farm interest. Cook, on the other hand, 
argued that the web page just showed the public what farmers already knew. As Combest 
and his followers were in full conflict with their own Administration, House Republicans 
and Democrats drafted an amendment that reflected some of the Administration’s views 
on conservation. 
 
4.5 Toward more Conservation  
The Boehlert-Kind-Gilchrest-Dingell amendment was a bipartisan amendment sponsored 
by two Republicans and two Democrats from Eastern states. Their goal was to give 
conservation an important place in the farm bill. They wanted to provide a fair 
distribution of federal assistance payments to small agricultural producers and also work 
to protect wildlife habitat, reduce sprawl onto agricultural land, and provide open spaces 
(Kind). They argued that the current commodity payment system only rewarded mass 
producers since payments were linked to production levels.  It failed to help the majority 
of American farmers. The result was that three-fourths of all farm program funding went 
to less than one-third of the producers and that most farmers who received these 
payments were in just 15 heavily agricultural states (Ibid.).  
 Supporters of the Boehlert amendment argued that the 1996 FAIR Act, which had 
attempted to separate subsidies from production, had failed. The Boehlert amendment 
was designed to support farmers and the environment by diverting $5.4 billion per year 
from subsidies to conservation. Instead of diverting acreage from one crop to another as 
the discredited (FAIR Act) allotment system did, it would pay farmers to put more land 
into conservation programs (Ibid.). By doing so it would, according to them, reduce 
overproduction, keep prices high, and also save the environment. 
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The Boehlert amendment would shift $2 billion from commodity payments to 
payments for participation in voluntary conservation programs. In effect, the amendment 
would totally replace the conservation program in the Combest bill (the Farm Security 
Act). In total, their amendment would shift $20 billion of subsidy payments to 
conservation programs which would spread $55 billion for environment and conservation 
programs to more farmers in more states (Becker, “As House Prepares”). According to 
www.familyfarmer.org the amendment was supported by more than 225 groups, but was 
met with hostility by the House Agriculture Committee leaders who mounted an all-out 
campaign of intimidation and misinformation, including a threat to withhold nutrition 
assistance money if the amendment passed (Family Farmer, “Farm Bill”).  
Richard Lugar voiced his support of the Boehlert amendment in early October, 
saying: “They [were] trying to upset the apple cart of the current committee.” Lugar 
noted that their amendment had many similarities to the amendment he had presented 
himself in the Senate (Fonder). Realizing the mounting opposition to his farm bill, 
Combest threatened to pull the $170 billion bill if the Boehlert amendment was adopted. 
Spokesmen for the Agricultural Committee warned that the chairman had several options 
if it were adopted (Ibid.). According to the leadership in the House Agricultural 
Committee sponsoring the Combest bill, 40 percent of the programs in the farm bill 
would be “gutted” if the conservation amendment were adopted. Kind responded to these 
attacks by arguing: “This [didn’t] have to be anything nasty and personal and vicious” 
(Ibid.). But tensions were building as the House was preparing to debate the bill in early 
October. 
Some factions inside the Democratic Party wanted to change farm policy away 
from the heavy reliance on commodity payments. They wanted more money for 
conservation that would shift more subsidies from the traditional receivers in the South 
and Midwest to the East. Democrats who supported traditional commodity subsidies 
wanted less to conservation and more focus on commodity subsidies. The Democratic 
Party was geographically split in its view on the direction of farm legislation just like the 
Republicans.  
Conservation was embraced by many factions, providing very unlikely allies. A 
coalition of more than 100 environmental and hunting organizations from the Sierra Club 
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to the National Rifle Association was pressing to add conservation as a major act in the 
farm bill. Conservation measures aimed at recovering millions of acres of wetlands, 
prairies, grassland and forest and protecting the wildlife that lived on the land (Becker, 
“Unlikely Allies Press”). These conservation programs were almost lost during the 
Republican revolution in the 1990s.  
The FAIR Act had originally excluded financing of conservation, but Rep. 
Sherwood Boehlert of New York had offered an amendment in 1996 to reinstall the 
programs and had won by 372 to 37 votes. This had established the divide between 
Eastern and Western farm states over financing (Ibid.). Boehlert commented in an 
interview in June 2001 that conservation used to be considered the purview of the 
Midwest and its eroded soil, but now with its expanded programs it had worked wonders 
for Eastern farmers (Ibid.). 
Previously, most legislators from non-rural states had been mainly interested in 
the farm bill because of its food stamp program. Now they saw a chance to receive more 
money from farm subsidies. Their arguments for a change from a commodity to 
conservation focus fell nicely together with the rising awareness of environmentalism and 
the argument that too much of the subsidies were going to big corporate farmers. The 
EWG web page became an important tool to win support. 
 Previous conservation programs were designed so that farmers could voluntarily 
line up for cash payments in return for taking their land out of production. By 2001 
farmers had put aside more than 35 million acres as nature reserves and another million 
to wetlands. In 2001, farmers and ranchers had applied for $3.7 billion in payments for 
setting aside an additional 68 million acres, but the program had run out of money 
(Becker, “Unlikely Allies Press”). Arguing for more financing, environmentalists said it 
would help the environment, slow consolidation of farms since farmers could hold on to 
their farms, sustain wildlife, and slow encroachment of suburbs into the countryside. In 
Congress legislators responded to their arguments. 
 The group of environmentalists, together with fishing and hunting groups, was 
dubbed the hooks-and-bullets crowd. In Congress, this group found allies among the 
legislators from states where farmers received a small portion of the $20 billion annual 
subsidies for the major crops. In June, 2001, more than 120 House members wrote to the 
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Agricultural Committee leadership, asking for more support for their conservation 
programs. The proposal was rejected by the leadership. It was now clear that the Boehlert 
amendment would not be accepted and incorporated into the Combest bill (Becker, 
“Unlikely Allies Press”).  
 The geographical split in Congress was more visible in the 2002 farm bill than in 
the 1996 farm bill. The Senate was a good example of this. A group of 43 Republican and 
Democratic senators from New England and the Mid-Atlantic states formed an informal 
caucus in support of farm conservation programs. Its political pull was significant in the 
Senate farm bill, where conservation ranked third in payments, behind corn and wheat 
subsidies (Ibid.).  
 The “eggplant caucus” was organized by Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat from 
Vermont, and got its name after a leading New Jersey farm product. The purpose of the 
caucus was for senators from Virginia to Main to really dig into the commodity subsidies 
and convert it into conservation measures that would give payments to their home states. 
The “eggplant caucus” wanted to actively reform farm policy. Spokesman for Senator 
Leahy, David Carle, stated: “Its immediate focus was to stress that Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic states whose agriculture interests are different from those of the mass 
commodities of the Midwest deserves a seat at the table” (Morgan). One of their first 
successes was the $7.5 billion emergency bill passed by the Senate which had 
emphasized conservation measures. 
 But the success of the caucus was evidence of a lager trend in the farm bill debate. 
It became clear that the eggplant coalition was only a part of a bigger effort from many 
directions to broaden the benefits from farm programs to the whole of the USA, not just 
the Midwest and South. Two of the main champions for this change were Harkin and 
Lugar.  
 Both Lugar and Harkin came out against the Combest bill in the House, criticizing 
it as “mired in old, failed methods of supporting farmers” (Becker, “Harkin and Lugar”). 
The farm bill drafted by Harkin would shift the focus away from commodity subsidies to 
the promotion of trade, conservation efforts, rural development, and environmental 
protection. The fundamental difference between the bill coming out of the Senate and the 
bill proposed by Combest was that the Senate bill wanted to “spread” the money in the 
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farm bill to benefit more than Midwestern farmers. It wanted to do more to help the 
family farmers. 
Figures released by the USDA in August 2001 reported that farm income would 
reach a record high of $61 billion in 2001 and that land prices had gone up by $4.6 billion 
in the last year (Becker, “Harkin and Lugar”). This made it possible for Senator Harkin to 
question whether Congress should continue to support every bushel, bale, and pound that 
was being produced in the USA (Ibid.). Lugar and Harkin argued effectively in the 
Senate that if income was higher than ever, and production abounded, the time was right 
for more money to be spent on conservation and the environment. Although most of the 
big agricultural organizations supported the Combest bill, the Harkin bill found allies in 
President Bush, the environmental lobby, and some farm organizations backed by small-
scale farmers. 
The Bush administration indicated that it would not support the Combest bill, 
although by late September it had yet to endorse any bill. It did not take too long before it 
did, sparking harsh reaction among House Republicans. The Administration made a 
somewhat surprising move in a memo from the OMB in October 2001. A month before, 
secretary Veneman had promised to give the House its opinion before debates in the 
House. Now she offered the Administration’s opinion just days before the House debates 
began. The Bush Administration came out against the Republican-sponsored House bill, 
saying it would give too much money to commodity subsidies and not enough to 
conservation efforts (Becker, “White House Criticizes”).  
The OMB released the Bush administrations views urging the House to rewrite its 
farm bill proposal and make it “better for rural America, better for the environment, and 
better for expanding markets” (Ibid.). The Bush proposal would shift some $19 billion 
from crop subsidies to conservation projects. The Administration’s views triggered an 
open conflict in the Republican camp, with House members feeling betrayed by the 
President. Larry Combest responded to the announcement by stating: “For you to come 
now at the last minute is an insult. How could you dare do this to us?” (Ibid.). The 
Administration’s position made the rift between farm and non-farm Republicans wide, 
and nobody seemed to be much in the mood for healing. The House bill was scheduled 
for debate in early October of 2001. 
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4.6 The Texas Tornado 
The Rules Committee resolution on the Farm Security Act of 2001 was reported to the 
House on October 2. It was passed the day after, and the general debate on H.R. 2646 
(Farm Security Act of 2001) began in the House with Ray LaHood as the Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole.  
 With the support by the Bush administration and Senate legislators, the Boehlert 
amendment sponsors looked optimistic regarding its passage. The Administration’s 
support of the Boehlert amendment came as a surprise to many Republican legislators in 
the House, although indications of this had been present for months. Combest had indeed 
filed an amendment before the debates on the floor, which would give the agriculture 
secretary authority to cut subsidies if these violated trade agreements. Previously 
Combest had claimed that his farm bill was in line with international agreements. By 
adding this amendment he and his co-sponsors had hoped to gain support from the White 
House, or at least appease the Administration enough for it to stay out of the debate 
(Becker, “White House Criticizes”. 
They had failed, and on the first day of debate “speaker after speaker rose to 
denounce what they considered a cowardly betrayal” by the White House (Ibid.). Rep. 
Jim Nussle, the Iowa Republican who was chairman of the Budget Committee, stated that 
Secretary Veneman needed a wake-up (Ibid.). In addition to denouncing the White House 
position, the House Agricultural Committee leaders began a tactic of intimidation. 
Charles W. Stenholm, a co-sponsor of the Combest bill, sent an e-mail message “to the 
offices of Democratic lawmakers warning that if they did not vote for the bill, their 
favorite programs, especially food stamps and nutrition programs, would be undercut” 
(Ibid.). Larry Combest kept insisting that he would pull his whole bill if the Boehlert 
amendment was passed. If the whole bill was pulled the likelihood of any farm bill 
passed in 2001 would look very dim, to the concern of many legislators, many of whom 
supported the Boehlert amendment. 
 The debate in the House continued with 33 amendments considered on October 4. 
The most important one was the Boehlert-Kind-Gilchrest-Dingell Amendment. After an 
intense three-hour debate it failed by a recorded vote of 226 to 200. This was a huge 
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victory for the House Agricultural Committee leaders and a blow to supporters of the 
Boehlert amendment. Ron Kind said after the defeat: “Even though we lost this vote, it 
sends a clear message that people want a policy that would benefit farmers in all parts of 
the country and helps the environment” (Becker, “House Rejects”).  
According to Elizabeth Becker in the New York Times the measure was defeated 
primarily by lawmakers from the traditional farm states who “considered the measure a 
threat to the current subsidy programs that largely reward only farmers of cotton, wheat, 
corn, rice, and soybeans” (Ibid.). The victorious Combest said after the vote that if the 
Boehlert amendment had passed it would have devastated agriculture. On October the 5, 
the H.R. 2646 bill won passage by a vote of 291 to 120 (THOMAS, “H.R.2646”). 
 For Combest and his co-sponsors the passage of the Farm Security Act of 2001 
was a victory for all farmers in America. It had survived attacks from non-farm 
legislators and non-farm interests. Rep. George Miller, Democrat of California, said on 
the floor that “[t]he future for farmers is about forging an alliance between urban and 
suburban areas and rural communities, to include the other half of America” (Becker, 
“House Rejects”). But to many farm legislators this attitude was seen as a threat to farm 
programs. Gil Gutknecht, Republican from Minnesota, reflected this by commenting that 
the farm bill was in fact a farm bill, not an environmental bill (Ibid.). In the end, 
traditional farm policy had prevailed against changes encouraged by non-farm legislators. 
The Texas tornado had won passage in the House, but would meet resistance in the 
Senate. 
   
4.7 The Senate Takes on the House Bill 
Traditionalists arguing for increased farm subsidies often draw on the Jeffersonian 
imagery of the family farm. During the Senate debate, Congress was reminded of dairy 
farmers “rising at dawn to make sure city mothers have fresh milk for their children”, and 
grain farmers were praised for “providing Americans with the safest and least expensive 
food in the world” (Becker, “Ideal Farms”). Opponents of the traditionalists’ view argued 
that the old way of doing things causes overproduction that keeps farm prices low, 
aggravating farmers’ financial situation, not improving it.  
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The debate had evolved into an ideal farm vs. industrial farm debate about how to 
view farm policy and the agricultural sector. Was agriculture a special sector in need of 
special federal treatment, or was it just like any other industrial sector? Those pushing for 
a free-market reform used the EWG web page which showed that most subsidies went to 
big corporate farmers, arguing that the programs were nothing but cooperate welfare. 
Traditionalist arguing for higher subsidies claimed that more subsidies were needed to 
save the family farmers and rural America.  
The Combest bill now faced review by Senate leaders and the administration 
officials who had said they were determined to transform agricultural policy. Their goal 
was to puncture myths about rural America and bring farm policy in line with 
international trade agreements and in line with modern agricultural economics (Becker, 
“Ideal Farms”). They attacked the traditional view of the farm sector as a special sector.  
It became increasingly difficult for traditionalists to fend off arguments from 
reformers. The EWG had led many urban lawmakers to question why a sum of $171 
billion was being set aside for farmers in a program that favored the largest farmers 
(Ibid.). Rep. Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, asked: “Are farmers more noble 
than plumbers, or the welfare mother who has to go back to work and isn’t qualified for a 
dime?” He added: “This is a debate about corporate welfare for farmers that is finally 
boiling over” (Ibid.). This attitude was new in the agricultural policy debate and was 
gaining momentum. 
In a letter to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, a group of major farm 
organizations claimed that rushing a bill could well result in policies and programs that 
did not effectively address current needs (Brasher, “Farm Groups Support”). They cited 
assurances from the Bush administration that the president would consider more spending 
on the legislation over Christmas if the legislation was shelved. The farm groups 
represented farmers who raised corn, soybeans, cattle, hogs, poultry, fruits, and 
vegetables (Ibid.). Some of the more important groups were the American Soybean 
Association, the National Corn Growers Association, and the National Pork Producers 
Council (Monoson). Missing from the letter were farm groups representing wheat and 
cotton growers, the two major beneficiaries of the Combest bill. The American Farm 
Bureau Federation and the National Farmers Union were also missing from the letter.  
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 Although the Bush administration called for a delay in passing the farm bill, 
offering to sweeten the deal if it was done, Daschle insisted that the current farm bill (the 
FAIR Act) was inadequate and wanted to pass a farm bill in 2001. His spokesman 
declared that no bill that year would put producers in a bad position for another year 
(Brasher). The reassurance that the White House had given the farm groups was thin. A 
spokesman for Secretary Veneman stated that if Congress produced a good, sound farm 
policy, then the appropriate funding should follow (Ibid.). But this did not reassure 
Harking and Daschle.  
Tom Harkin admitted that he felt pressured by the Democratic leadership to 
produce a farm bill in 2001 (Monoson). Agriculture Committee member and Budget 
Chairman Kent Conrad also said that a bill needed to be completed before Congress 
adjourned. Some members and pundits speculated that the Senate would be unable to 
pass a farm bill and reconcile it with the House bill in time before Congress adjourned. A 
way to solve this problem was for a senator to introduce the House bill in the Senate. 
Byron L. Dorgan, Senator from North Dakota, said that it was a viable possibility if the 
Senate was unable to mark up a bill in the committee (Monson). Lugar and others 
threatened to filibuster any such measure. But Harkin reassured everyone that the 
committee would write a bill. He also dismissed the looming threat of a presidential veto, 
arguing that they did not threaten the House bill, so chances for a veto to a Senate bill 
more in line with the president’s view were small. 
Richard Lugar introduced an amendment to the farm bill in the middle of October 
that would give subsidies to farmers based on need rather than acreage. The Bush 
administration and Secretary Veneman praised Lugar’s bill. The bill would extend federal 
aid to more farmers, improve conservation efforts, and help international trade. It would 
also increase spending on nutrition and food stamp programs (Becker, “Senator’s Farm 
Plan”). Lugar said he sought to “level the playing field for all working farmers” (Ibid.). 
Lugar’s main argument was for legislators in Washington to concentrate on the War on 
Terror after the 9/11 attacks. But since the House had already passed a farm bill and was 
moving forward with it, he offered his $75 billion, five-year plan as an alternative. His 
bill guaranteed up to 80 percent of the income of qualified farmers. Farmers who earn 
smaller sums of money would receive more than those who made more than $250,000.  
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 Lugar used his background to gain support of his bill. He was the only working 
farmer on the Senate Agricultural Committee. He stated: “I have an interesting 
perspective … I know the programs actually fit for a real farmer and not for someone 
who is an advocate for farmers or who has constituents who are farmers” (Ibid.). His 
program would also increase spending on food stamps and have more conservation 
measures. By adding this to his bill, he counted on suburban and urban legislators to give 
their support.  
The White House responded that although the Lugar plan was worth around $80 
billion, it was not beyond the Administration’s limit on spending, giving hope to those 
who wanted higher spending. Senator Kent Conrad from North Dakota criticized the 
Lugar bill, claiming that it would change the traditional farm-bill emphasis, which would 
in the end hurt full-time farmers. The proposal would be an “unmitigated disaster” and 
would mean an “elimination of farm-programs” that would turn “all farm programs into a 
voucher program available to anyone who has driven through a rural area” (Monoson).  
 An alternative bill was sponsored by Senators Harry Reid of Nevada and Patrick 
Leahy of Vermont. According to a New York Times editorial, the bill would greatly 
increase spending on conservation programs aimed at encouraging farmers to restore 
“wetlands, improve habitat for threatened species, and hold the line against sprawl by 
preserving open space” (“The Eggplant Rebellion”). It would also make these incentives 
available for all farmers everywhere. This bill was supported by many in the “eggplant 
caucus”.  
 Tom Harkin presented his farm bill in early November. The five-year farm bill 
tried to bridge the gap between the interests of big grain and cotton farmers and the 
smaller farmers. The Harkin bill would retain most of the subsidy system in place but 
would increase money devoted to conservation. Harkin had for a long period argued for a 
shift in policy to more conservation and that it should benefit more farmers. This had 
contributed to high expectations among conservationists. The Harkin bill left some 
disappointed. Still, Harkin had promised conservation measures, and his bill provided it. 
 Harkin’s plan would increase spending on conservation by nearly 20 percent 
making it a cornerstone in his bill. Harkin argued that the Congressional Budget Office 
estimates showed that his measure would spend $44.5 billion on conservation. The House 
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measure would spend $37.3 billion. The Lugar bill would give $43 billion to 
conservation. Even though he had the plan allocating most money to conservation, he 
was met with displeasure from Ken Cook of the EWG who stated: “If Harkin were a 
Republican, he’d be hammered” (Norman, “Some conservationists”). Cook also argued 
that although the Harkin bill was not what advocates had hoped, he could count on their 
support since many conservationists would be afraid of losing an ally. 
 The Bush administration kept calling for a delay of the farm bill to next year. This 
made Senator Tom Daschle and 23 other Democratic senators ask Secretary Veneman to 
meet with them to determine whether the White House would prevent passage of a 10-
year $171 billion measure (Becker, “Senators Offers Farm”). She declined their request, 
suggesting a bipartisan meeting including Harkin, Lugar, and ranking members of the 
Senate Agricultural Committee. Veneman argued that the problem was a lack of 
consensus over farm policy, not any roadblock put down by the White House.  
The Democratic leadership was not happy with Veneman declining their offer, 
accusing the Administration to halt a farm bill that had to be produced in 2001. There 
were raising concerns, especially from a group of lawmakers from the Midwest and 
South, that the $171 billion set aside in 2001 for a 10-year farm measure would disappear 
if Congress failed to pass a bill in December (Ibid.). The administration wanted a solid 
and good policy. Harkin said on November 2: “I believe my bill represents a change of 
policy in the right direction. It may not include everything on everyone’s wish list, but it 
is balanced” (Ibid.).  
  In early November the biggest general farm group, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, came out claiming that American agriculture needed a farm bill in 2001 to 
stabilize the farm economy, satisfy lenders, and provide certainty for producers (Estrada). 
They argued that having the five-year farm bill in place would make it easier for farmers 
to secure financing and plan their crops and pressed for a fast passage of a farm bill in 
2001. The Farm Bureau warned that if the farm bill was delayed, a similar emergency 
payments package to the $5.5 billion already approved in 2001 would be necessary in 
2002.  
A survey released in the middle of November 2001 found that more people got 
food from private charities over the course of the year than participated in the federal 
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government food stamp programs (Becker, “Shift From Food”). The FAIR Act had 
dramatically scaled back the food stamp program. The survey had found that more than 
seven million people were served at emergency feeding sites in a given week, and more 
than 23 million people at some point in the course of a year obtained food from food 
pantries, food kitchens, and shelters (Ibid.). A similar survey had found that the number 
had been 21.4 million in 1997. During the same time period, 17.7 million people had 
used federal food stamps, a drop from the 21.9 million who had received food stamps in 
1997, according to the USDA. The survey showed that the cuts in the FAIR Act had 
dramatically increased the number of people going to private soup kitchens. 
 The FAIR Act had cut the food stamp program by $26 billion over six years. The 
House bill sponsored by Larry Combest wanted to increase spending by $3.6 billion over 
ten years. Not surprisingly, the two proposals in the Senate would increase spending by 
$6.2 billion or $10 billion. The Senate composition made a large food stamp program a 
lucrative sweetener to gain support for a farm bill. Although the “eggplant caucus” 
pressed for higher spending on the program, it did not become a much debated issue since 
most legislators realized both the political and social need for increased spending. 
 Another concern raised in the Senate debates was the issue of a cap on individual 
subsidies. Harkin’s plan would limit an individual from receiving more than $100,000 in 
direct farm subsidies each year. The House bill had no real limits. On November 16, the 
Senate Agriculture Committee approved an $88 billion farm bill that placed no limits on 
subsidies. Democrats from the farm belt blocked any reduction of payments to grain and 
cotton farmers leading Republicans to complain that if the measure passed it would lead 
to overproduction. (Becker, “$88 Billion Farm”).  
Tom Harkin had to relinquish his cap to achieve passage of the bill. He claimed 
that they had produced a very broad and balanced farm bill (Ibid.). Richard Lugar 
complained that the bill was as bad if not worse than the House bill because of how the 
bill favored the wealthiest (Ibid.). Though defeated in committee, Lugar announced that 
he would offer his farm bill on the open floor of the Senate. With the passage of the 
Harkin bill, the alliance between House Republicans and Senate Democrats from the 
farm belt could celebrate their success in blocking reformers effort to change farm policy 
(Ibid.).   
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Everyone in Washington, the President as well as Congress, wants to appear to be 
good friends of farmers. But Republicans in the Senate, with the support of the White 
House, kept threatening a filibuster of the farm bill unless Democrats agreed to move on 
the president’s economic stimulus package (Ibid.). They gambled that a failure of a farm 
bill in 2001 would hurt Democrats more than it would hurt Republicans in the upcoming 
election in 2002.  
 As time was running out, the debate was getting heated. White House press 
secretary Ari Fleischer said that the president thought it was odd that the Senate was 
abandoning all Americans and focusing only on one segment of America, even if that 
segment was as important as farmers (Ibid.). Farmers were getting worried that no 
legislation would be passed. This attitude was supported by the major farm groups and 
represented by many Democrats who kept accusing the Bush Administration and 
Republicans of selling out family farmers.  
 In early December the debate began on the Senate floor. A move by Republicans 
to block consideration of the bill was defeated by a vote of 73 to 26 (Brasher, “White 
House Critical”). Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, heavily involved in the farm bill, 
opened for several days of debate to hammer out differences and gain a majority. 
Democrats were tinkering with their legislation in hopes to build a majority that could 
defeat the Republican alternative favored by the Bush Administration One of the 
measures was to move more money into conservation (Ibid.). 
 Pat Roberts of Kansas and Thad Cochran of Mississippi sponsored the Republican 
alternative on the Senate floor. It would give farmers money in fixed annual payments 
rather than crop subsidies. This measure was much like the scheme in the FAIR Act. It 
also allowed for subsidized saving accounts similar to those provided under Canada’s 
farm assistance program (Brasher, “White House Critical”). But the main argument 
among many senators opposed to the farm bill was that after the 9/11 attacks the 
Congress had more serious issues at hand than debating a farm bill that would not expire 
before September 2002. Lugar complained that the only reason for passing a $171 billion 
farm bill in 2001, when a country was fighting a war on terrorism and facing budget 
deficits, was to allow fellow lawmakers to position themselves as friends of the farmer in 
the 2002 election (Becker, “Senate Opens Debate”).  
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On December 6, Larry Combest urged the Senate to pass the Harkin bill quickly 
to allow enough time for a compromise between the House and Senate bills to be worked 
out before the year’s end. Senators opposed to the farm bill kept trying to prevent its 
passage. After a long debate on the floor, and two attempts at a motion of cloture, the 
third attempt to limit the debate only got 54 out of the 60 votes needed (Barton, “Farm 
bill in the freezer”). Accepting that limiting the debate would be necessary to pass it in 
time for a conference committee, Daschle announced that he was pulling the bill. This 
result disappointed the farm lobby and many farm-state lawmakers but was celebrated by 
opponents of the farm bill in both the House and the Senate. Blanche Lincoln, Democrat 
of Arkansas, stated: “For the life of me, I can’t figure out why the Republicans don’t 
want a bill. I think the president got to them” (Ibid.). 
But all did not look grim to the supporters of a new farm bill. It remained possible 
that Congress could grant the money for the bill the next year. Congress would have to do 
so before a new budget resolution was passed. That would happen either in April or May. 
But the OMB projections were still looking bad, and that would influence the farm bill 
debate. 
A lobbyist for the Farm Bureau also reacted with dismay: “[We have] a lot of 
farmers on the way to see their lenders … Some are going to be forced out of business. 
They are going to have a hard time making cash flow” (Ibid.). One of the few 
Republicans arguing for a farm bill in 2001, Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas, commented 
that the Senate bill had become very partisan. Anne Keys of the EWG declared that there 
had to be some calculation among Republicans that not producing a farm bill in 2001 
would hurt Democrats more than Republicans in the 2002 election (Ibid.). Lugar and 
other legislators opposing the Harkin and Combest bills were pleased to see them 
postponed, arguing that it would give people a lot more time to produce a good and sound 
farm bill. The farm bill debate in 2001 ended with no legislation. The debate was starting 
all over again in 2002.  
 
4.8 Ideal Farm vs. Industrial Farm 
The Senate resumed its session in late January. According to Richard Lugar, the boosters 
of the Daschle-Harkin farm bill, supported by almost the entire agriculture lobby, would 
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demand the bill’s swift passage (Lugar). He offered an alternative bill that would give an 
alternative safety net. It would give each farmer a federal payment equaling six percent of 
total farm receipts. This would allow a farmer to pay a full premium for whole-farm 
insurance that would give assurance of 80 percent of an average income taken over a 
five-year period (Ibid.). Lugar argued that his plan would benefit more farmers, more 
family farms and be much less expensive than the Harkin bill. 
 The Harkin bill would add $73.5 billion over 10 years on top of the $98.5 billion 
that it would take to maintain the old programs. According to Lugar it would also distort 
food prices, frustrate innovation, confound American efforts to reduce protectionism 
abroad and gain new markets, and only benefit a selected few big farmers in a selected 
few farm states. Interestingly, Lugar argued that the reason why the farm bill was so big 
was that Congress could hinge on a few races in heavily subsidized agricultural regions, 
and that if not a lavish farm will was produced, they would risk being labeled the ‘anti-
farm party’ and “targeted with sentimental imagery associated with farm failures” 
(Lugar). He ends his article in the New York Times by stating: “We can bring vitality 
back to rural America without perpetuating the spiral of counterproductive subsidies” 
(Ibid.). 
 The Daschle-Harkin bill came under attack from many directions. In a 
Washington Post article, George Will dubbed the farm bill an “assault on fiscal integrity” 
and criticized Tom Daschle for his efforts to address the recession in rural America. 
Many supporters of the Daschle-Harkin bill rose to its defense. Leland Swenson, 
President of the National Farmers Union, countered the criticism from the Washington 
Post arguing that “Sen. Daschle ha[d] been a champion of family farmers and ranchers 
throughout his career” and that his efforts “in the Senate to pass a farm bill before the 
holiday recess last fall should be commended, not condemned” (Swenson). In the Senate, 
the Agricultural Committee started debate over spending caps on individual farm 
subsidies. 
 Tim Johnson, Democrat of South Dakota, said that it was “truly an astonishing 
debate when [legislators were] told that limiting subsidies to $275,000 should be 
regarded as pulling the rug out from under farmers” (Becker, “Senate Votes to Cap”). 
Southern senators, led by Blanche Lambert Lincoln from Arkansas, argued that big 
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farmers had greater expenses and should therefore receive larger payments. According to 
the EWG, the South benefited most from large subsidies. The big support for a cap on 
subsidies made Lincoln ask how big a farm should be to get the Senate’s approval (Ibid.).  
The amendment demanding a cap on individual subsidies was written by Senator 
Byron L. Dorgan, Democrat of North Dakota, and Senator Charles E. Grassley, 
Republican of Iowa. Grassley responded to Lincoln by asking where it would stop if 
Congress did not put a cap on individual subsidies (Ibid.). Their amendment would save 
$1.3 billion, which would go to food stamps and agricultural research. The fact that the 
extra money would go to food stamps was an extra incentive for non-rural legislators to 
vote for the amendment. 
 On February 8, the Senate voted to put a spending cap on subsidies at $275,000 
by a vote of 31 to 66. This spurred a harsh reaction from Senators from the districts 
gaining the most from subsidies. Tim Hutchinson, Republican of Arkansas, said that it 
was nothing less than war on Southern farmers (Becker, “Senate Votes to Cap”). 
Although most Southern senators were displeased, many applauded the measure as a 
victory for family farmers and as one of the most significant changes in agricultural 
policy in 25 years.  
Tom Harkin asserted after the vote that they had achieved a real victory (Ibid.). 
The House bill had no cap on subsidies, but would keep the old limit of $550,000 a year 
for individual subsidies. Although pleased with a cap, Senator Lugar argued that it was a 
very modest amendment and that he had looked it up on the web site (the EWG) and 
found that only five farmers in Indiana would be affected by the limit (Ibid.).  
 A week later the Daschle-Harkin bill was up for the vote in the Senate. The bill 
passed by 58 to 40 with nine Republicans joining the Democrat majority. Some 
Democrats, mostly from the South, broke ranks. The bill would put $22 billion into 
conservation programs, doubling the spending. It would also yield a $275,000 subsidy 
cap to individual farmers. In total it would be a five-year $44.9 billion bill that would also 
double spending on food stamps, ensuring that the USDA’s nutrition program was the 
second-largest federal program combating poverty (Becker, “Senate Passes $44.9”).  
 The Senate bill was met with enthusiasm from environmental groups, farm 
groups, and advocates for the poor. A New York Times editorial argued that the “Senate 
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bill’s most enthusiastic supporters call it the most important environmental measure since 
the Clean Water Act of 1972. That might be a slight exaggeration, but not by much. For 
its conservation virtues alone, the Senate version deserves to prevail” (“The Senate’s 
Useful”). But not everyone was happy. 
Lugar did not vote for the bill, arguing that it did not go far enough to change 
agricultural policy. He was backed by the President. Bush argued that the bill would yield 
high spending the first five years, but leaving programs under-funded in the years to 
follow. (Becker, “Senate Passes $44.9”). Fiscal conservatives argued that it was too 
expensive and that it was nothing but corporate welfare (Ibid.). But the bill had won 
passage in the Senate, and now a long and difficult conference committee reconciling the 
House and Senate bills was set to start. 
 
4.9 The Conference Committee 
The House appointed Republicans Larry Combest (Texas), John Andrew Boehner (Ohio), 
Robert William Goodlatte (Virginia), Richard William Pombo (California), Terry Everett 
(Alabama), Frank Lucas (Oklahoma), Saxbuy Chambliss (Georgia), Jerry Moran 
(Kansas), and Democrats Charles Stenholm (Texas), Gary Adrian Condit (California), 
Collin Clark Peterson (Minnesota), Calvin M. Dooley (California), Eva M. Clayton 
(North Carolina), and Tim Holden (Pennsylvania) to the Conference Committee. The 
Senate appointed Democrats Tom Harkin (Iowa), Patrick Leahy (Vermont), Gaylord 
Kent Conrad (North Dakota), Thomas Andrew Daschle (South Dakota), and Republicans 
Richard Green Lugar (Indiana), Jesse Helms (North Carolina), and William Thad 
Cochran (Mississippi) (THOMAS, “H.R. 2646”). The Committee was almost exclusively 
made up by legislators from states that benefited greatly from traditional commodity 
subsidies, and had few representatives championing conservation and food stamps. It also 
had a large group of Southern legislators that were particularly against a cap on 
individual subsidies. 
The Committees first goal was to agree on spending. In mid-March they settled on 
a tentative agreement that would leave $46 billion for commodities over 10 years, but 
would cut money for conservation. Harkin announced that he had worked to include more 
funding for conservation programs in the Senate bill, and that he still felt the conservation 
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agreement was something that the conference committee could work with (Norman, 
“Panel OKs”). In all, the $73.5 billion was divided up by setting off $6.4 billon for food 
stamp and nutrition programs, $3.3 billion for programs such as rural development, trade 
and research, and $46 billion for commodities (Ibid.). 
Having settled how to divide the money, the Conference Committee moved on to 
more challenging issues. The House had opened a debate on whether to give support to 
the Senate $275,000 limit to individual farmers or not. The effect of the EWG web page 
on the Senate debate was evident in the House. In a nonbinding vote by 265 to 158 the 
House gave the conference committee a strong message to keep the Senate limit on 
individual subsidies. The measure was sponsored by 20 groups including Taxpayers for 
Common Sense, the Environmental Working Group, the Sierra Club, and the Sustainable 
Agriculture Coalition. But the conference committee ignored the measure (Becker, 
“House Backs Plan”). Instead it offered a compromise with bigger spending on food 
stamps and a new dairy program.  
After nearly a month of negotiations, the conference committee said on April 26 
that it was close to a final agreement on a six-year farm bill. Although it did not give any 
details, it looked like the Senate had lost its battle for a $275,000 limit per farmer. On 
April 27 the House and Senate agreed on a farm bill numbering almost 700 pages.  
Combest said after the agreement that the winners in the bill were the American 
farmers (Becker, “Accord Reached”). The final outcome of the subsidy cap was a 
compromise that would limit payments to $360,000, but with enough exceptions to make 
it a symbolic compromise, important for the Senate conferees. Tom Harkin said that it 
was not a meaningless payment limit (Ibid.). However, conservationists were angry at the 
result. Ken Cook of the EWG asked why they even bothered doing a Senate bill, but 
concluded that the issues of payment limits and fairness and better conservation programs 
would not go away (Ibid.).  
The Bush administration was pleased with the increased spending on food stamps 
and the measure to reinstate food stamps for legal immigrants. Although the 
Administration had pressed for a delay, it had not been very vocal throughout the debate, 
especially since it became clear at an early stage that legislators would not support any 
effort to reduce spending on the farm bill.  
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In an article in the Washington Post, Rep. John Boehner, Republican of Ohio, and 
Rep. Cal Dooley, Democrat of California, voiced their strong opposition to the final bill. 
They had both been on the conference committee. They argued that the 1996 FAIR Act 
was together with the welfare reform in 1996 the most important reform in the 1990s. 
The FAIR Act had detached farm subsidies from production, but the 2002 farm bill 
would again base subsidies on production. This would mean a total alternation of the 
1996 farm bill. Boehner and Dooley argued that with the passage of the 2002 farm bill 
the most likely scenario was that in two years they would be overwhelmed by surplus 
agricultural production, low commodity prices, and excessive government payments 
(Boehner). But alternatively they could send the bill back to the Conference Committee 
to be redrafted after the November midterm elections when the political environment was 
less volatile (Ibid.). In the meantime Congress could pass emergency payments. Ron 
Kind, Democrat of Wisconsin, offered a motion on the House floor to send it back to the 
Conference Committee. In an editorial this measure was given support by the New York 
Times. It failed by a vote of 251 to 172 (“House Passes the Farm”).  
On May 3 the House approved the compromise by a large margin of 280 to 141. 
President Bush said he would sign it as soon as it was passed by the Senate (Becker, 
“House Passes”). On May 9 the Senate passed the compromise by a vote of 64 to 35. 43 
Democrats, 20 Republicans and 1 independent voted for the bill. Seven Democrats and 
28 Republicans were opposed (Clymer). Although met with opposition, the conference 
bill had won large majorities in both the House and the Senate. After more than one year 
of debate, and almost one month of conference committee negotiations, on May 13, 
President Bush signed the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. After signing 
the bill he announced: “It’s not a perfect bill. I know that. But you know, no bill ever is” 
(Allen). Many members of Congress felt the same. 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, also known as the 2002 
farm bill, was estimated to cost $190 billion over 10 years, increasing the programs 
already in place by at least $83 billion. The legislation would be renewed after six years, 
in 2008. The subsidy cap to individual farmers was set at $360,000, down from the 
ceiling of $460,000, but with enough loopholes that many could receive higher payments. 
It also provided higher commodity support prices, more spending on food stamps, and 
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made food stamps available for legal immigrants. It provided new subsidies to New 
England’s dairy farmers and new subsidies to peanut farmers, who would receive $4 
billion in direct checks (Allen).  
A new important commodity program was implemented consisting of a three-
piece safety net. First, the farm bill would continue the current marketing loan program 
with increased loan rates for all crops except soybeans. Second, the farm bill would 
continue the direct payments for income support, not tied to production. Third, a counter-
cyclical payment was re-instated giving farmer payments when the effective price for a 
covered commodity fell below the set target price. Farmers would also be able to update 
their base acreage using 1998-2001 planting records (Grassley). This would again tie 
production to payments like pre-1996 policies. If world prices were higher than the target 
price, farmers would receive no payments.  
The final bill included ten titles: Conservation, Trade, Nutrition Programs, Credit, 
Rural Development, Research and Related Matters, Forestry, Energy, and Miscellaneous 
(USDA, “The 2002 Farm Bill”). The 2002 farm bill was the first farm bill to contain a 
separate title concerning energy.  
It would be wrong to call the FAIR Act a full reform of farm policy since it did 
not fully succeed in ending farm subsidies, although it went as far as any farm legislation 
has done. Payments from the 1996 farm bill were still high, even without emergency 
payments. The big difference was that most of the payments in the 1996 legislation were 
decoupled, fixed payments, aiming at completely weaning farmers of any federal 
payments scheme. The 2002 farm bill continued some of these decoupled payments in 
some programs, but also established target price programs to provide farmers with a 
safety net. This, together with the much higher spending, was a reversal of the FAIR Act. 
The thought behind the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 was not to 
reform agricultural policy, or end subsidies, but to reinstate traditional programs to 
provide farmers with a needed federal safety net. The result was a farm bill that would 
take agriculture away from a free-market reform-driven policy to the more traditional 
way of supporting farmers, even though some of the free-market programs were 
continued. Traditionalists in Congress had won against those seeking to continue the free-
market direction that the FAIR Act had started. 
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*CHAPTER FIVE* 
 
Explaining the Politics of the 2002 Farm Bill 
 
Chapter five offered key events leading up to the passing of the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002. This chapter will analyze why the 2002 farm bill changed farm 
policy away from the free-market direction of the 1996 farm bill to more traditional price 
support legislation. 
In their chapter about the uncertain future of farm policy, Orden et al. argue that 
reform advocates who “hope to consolidate and extend the market-liberalizing gains or 
budget certainty sought by the FAIR Act in 1996 will face a formidable challenge when 
the next farm bill is written” (Orden 197). They were right in their predictions. The 
following chapter identifies seven factors that can help explain the outcome of the 2002 
farm bill: (1) Interest groups, (2) logrolling, (3) party control of Congress, (4) the 2002 
election, (5) international trade agreements, (6) commodity prices, and (7) previous 
agricultural legislation.  
 
5.1 Interest Groups in Agriculture  
Interest groups have gone through different stages of evolution as analyzed in chapter 
three. The current stage has witnessed an accommodation of more participants and 
introduction of more provisions in farm policy. Lately farm policy has attracted an 
increasing interest from urban legislators who are interested in conservation programs. 
Previously it was common for urban legislators not to take an active part in forming farm 
policy, and when they did it was to ensure a good food stamps program. The proliferation 
and accommodation of interest groups interested in farm policy, together with more 
provisions in farm policy, have resulted in an array of groups involved in the policy-
making process. 
 In their book Plowshares & Pork Barrels E. C. Pasour Jr., and Randal R. Rucker 
identify at least six interest groups that are heavily involved in determining the agenda for 
agricultural legislation. (1) The research and education movement that dates back to the 
pre-New Deal era. The USDA and States instituted extension services that operate in 
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every state associated with the land-grant colleges. This is “important in maintaining 
support for the continuation and increase of government research, education and 
extension efforts in agriculture” (55). (2) Certain groups support the “income-support, 
price-support, production-control, and other farm programs inherited from the New Deal 
era” (55). Included in these groups are e.g. the American Soybean Association, the 
American Farm Bureau and others. (3) A big group is the agribusiness groups, including 
farm supply and marketing cooperatives. (4) The network that is made up of the Farm 
Service Agency (FSA), the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and Rural 
Development offices that administer the farm programs. (5) A fifth group consists of 
individuals that are interested in food stamps, environmental issues, and other consumer 
issues. Don Paarlberg named this the new agenda to indicate this new influence of small 
farmers, racial minorities, the poor, farm workers, etc. (6) The last group are the 
consumer groups “and other groups that some might argue represent the public at large” 
(56). This group recognizes that most of the farm subsidies benefit only producer groups 
and not the family farm. The Environmental Working Group became an effective but not 
completely successful tool for this group in 2002. Over time the impact of the 
Environmental Working Group web page and its agenda might have a more substantial 
influence on farm policy. Put together these six groups are all involved and contribute to 
current farm policy-making. But how do interest groups involved in agricultural policy 
manage to gain such strong political clout? 
In his book Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby 1919-1981, John 
Mark Hansen argues that by consulting with policy advocates from their districts, 
lawmakers decide their policy stands that will bolster or impede their prospects for 
reelection. The policy advocates provide legislators with electoral intelligence and 
supportive propaganda, earning support from the legislator. In congressional hearings 
different commodity interest groups testify providing essential information to legislators 
in their decision-making. Since farm policy is so complex members of a committee 
cannot gain full oversight and must rely on information passed on by farm groups. 
Hansen argues that the power over information is one of the main reasons why farm 
interest groups have such a central place in farm legislation.  
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Hansen also claims that only farm groups that sustain their competitive advantage 
will be given the opportunity to build consulting relationships with legislators. For 
example, the consumer lobby in the 1970s only had competitive advantage as long as 
food prices were high, and as soon as food prices started to fall in the late 1970s, the 
consumer lobby lost their access because their issue failed to re-occur. The new 
conservation lobby is gaining access because its cause is tied to the ever continuing issue 
of commodity prices. Conservationists argue that over-production of crops produces low 
commodity prices. The problem with over-production can be solved by setting off land 
that is being cultivated into conservation programs. 
A dominant explanation to why such a small group of farmers manage to have 
such huge political clout is based on public-choice theory. Public-choice theory involves 
the application and extension of economic models to political choices. This economic 
theory of politics emphasizes the action and choices of individual decision makers. For 
example, farm legislation is the sum of individual choices and not a collective decision. 
Groups do “not live, cannot choose, and are unable to act apart from the lives, choices, 
and actions of the individual members who make them up” (Pasour 37). Each individual 
is assumed to be purposeful and acting out of self-interest.  
Many public choice theorists argue that farm organizations are still powerful, 
despite their declining memberships. They argue that political power comes primarily 
from organizations, and that the declining number of farmers can even make it easier for 
these groups to maintain their power because they do not become fragmented and weak, 
but focused and strong (Orden 226). A negative demographical development does not 
necessarily mean less influence. Economic benefits for a small group can be achieved 
through political action at a relatively low cost. This creates an economic incentive to use 
the political process to obtain wealth transfers (Pasour 57).  
The American Farm Bureau Federation argued for the passing of a farm bill in 
2001. After Republican Senators blocked the 2001 farm bill the Farm Bureau argued that 
farmers would as a consequence run out of business. The National Farmers Union went 
out in support of Senator Daschle’s efforts to pass the bill in 2001. Through local offices, 
congressional hearings, and the media the farm lobby contributed to establish a sense 
among legislators that there was an acute crisis in rural America. This was reflected in the 
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committee debates where many legislators shared the concern. In 2002 many House and 
Senate legislators seeking re-election in rural districts and states had to be on the friendly 
side of their respective commodity interest groups. The mood the farm groups had 
created had an impact on Congress and motivated many legislators to rewrite farm 
legislation in 2001.  
Groups lobbying for conservation consisted of a wide range of interests from the 
Sierra Club to the National Rifle Association. Their attempt to introduce a larger 
conservation amendment in the Farm Security Act was brushed aside by the agricultural 
committee leadership in the House. The Boehlert amendment that included a substantial 
conservation program was attacked by the committee leadership and defeated. 
Conservation groups had more success in the Senate where the “eggplant caucus” 
supported their views. The Senate bill had a much larger conservation program than the 
House bill, although much of it was taken away in the conference committee. But the 
conservation lobby managed to put conservation on the agenda and achieved a larger 
conservation program than ever before. 
Pasour and Rucker correctly points out that most of the interest groups represent 
growers of sugar, tobacco, peanut, cotton, and wheat and feed grain, not fruit, vegetables, 
poultry, and livestock. The fruit, vegetables, poultry, and livestock group have not been 
so dominant in farm lobbying compared with other commodity groups. But their presence 
was noticeable in the 2002 farm bill where livestock interests managed to persuade 
Senator Harkin to include an amendment to prohibit meat packing companies from 
owning their own livestock. Dairy interests lobbied successfully to include new subsidies 
to New England’s dairy farmers. Public choice theory has to a large extent been 
successful in explaining why small groups of agriculture are able to use the political 
process to increase their own wealth, but has been less successful in explaining why a 
sizable proportion of U.S. farmers have made little or no success in restricting 
competition through political action (58). But some alternative explanations have been 
offered. 
Bruce Gardner has found that producer groups with high costs of generating 
political influence receive less support, and that an increase in the social cost of 
transferring income to producer groups reduces government support (Pasouor 58). 
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Poultry and livestock farmers are from areas with many urban legislators in the East. 
Many fruit and vegetable farmers are from areas in the West and South where the old 
commodity groups are dominant. Their efforts to gain political influence are therefore 
much stronger than that of cotton interests in the South or grain interests in the Midwest. 
Since these groups have had low influence historically, they are more vulnerable to 
attacks from people who argue that the federal government should not subsidize 
producers. Those commodity interests who have subsidies already in place can more 
easily maintain them.  
Proliferation of interest groups has produced an array of organizations with an 
interest in keeping farm bills the way they are (Orden 226). Interest theorists argue that 
farm policy is the lifeblood of farm organizations. Without it they will cease to exist, so it 
is in their self-interest to keep it alive and maintain the status quo. The USDA is 
important for the continuation of farm programs. Decision-makers in the USDA will seek 
to expand the agency because power and money is often closely correlated with agency 
size. This is also true for the congressional agricultural committees. Legislators from 
farm states tend to dominate the committees. The chairman is most often from a big farm 
state. These legislators tend to support government programs because they represent 
districts where the commodity is affected. A larger farm program would increase their 
power in Washington and secure re-election. 
Orden et al. claims that reform advocates have for years hoped for a policy change 
based upon a long, slow erosion of farmers’ political influence in Washington and that 
“reform advocates had in the past consistently overrated the influence of this 
demographic factor” (189). There is little evidence in the 2002 farm bill to indicate any 
weakened farm lobby despite a persistent negative demographic development. The farm 
bill proposed by Lugar did not gain any substantial support, nor did any other bills that 
contained a free-market approach. The Farm Security Act did not come from urban-based 
farm program critics, but out of the House Agricultural Committee, heavily influenced by 
the farm lobby. In the conference committee farm interest won head-on against urban 
interests. The result was a huge increase in spending and new commodity subsidies.  
Although the commodity lobby lost the 2001 farm bill battle, they successfully 
lobbied for a bigger and more lucrative farm bill in 2002. Despite a declining number of 
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farmers the farm lobby is still strong. Environmental groups managed to put conservation 
on the agenda, and the producer groups had some success proving that although producer 
groups have high costs of generating political influence, they can receive enough support 
to win through with their agenda.  
 
5.2 Logrolling 
According to Pasour and Rucker there exists a systematic bias toward expansion of the 
role of government in agriculture. The interplay between interest groups, the USDA, and 
the legislative committees in Congress tends to advance the interests of narrowly focused 
groups at the expense of the public at large. The result has been a dramatic increase both 
in the growth of government and in government spending (Pasour 69). Without the 
maintenance of a federal farm program the USDA and the agricultural committees in 
Congress would lose their significance. The incentive to keep farm programs in place 
thus become vital not just to the people legislators represent but also to legislators. In 
addition the structures of Congress make it easy for a committee to pass spending bills 
without much fiscal accountability. The 2002 farm bill was passed despite signs of a 
dwindling budget surplus.  
The problem with collective action makes budget discipline without any 
constitutional amendment difficult to achieve. The powerful agricultural committees in 
Congress are mainly occupied by legislators from rural districts. The incentives for 
legislators to pass lucrative farm bills are stronger than the cost of not doing so. It would 
pay more in the form of re-election for a legislator from a rural district to help pass a big 
farm bill than going against a farm bill hoping that his constituency would appreciate his 
fiscal responsibility. This is especially true for Democrats. The full House of 
Representatives and one-third of the Senate were up for election in 2002. Legislators 
from rural districts in need of support from farm interests would have had an extra 
incentive to gain extra subsidies to their respective commodities in their districts. Since 
everyone wanted their share few were worried about fiscal responsibility.   
Incorporation of many new elements in the farm bill and more coalitions between 
farm and non-farm sectors have increased the power of farm organizations because the 
result often produces more logrolling in Congress. Theorists who stress policy feedback 
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point to the resilience of farm organization and farm legislation. It is easier to preserve 
legislation than to create or end legislation in Washington. Farm policies that started with 
the New Deal have tended to perpetuate themselves, by giving farm organizations new 
resources, new incentives to engage in lobbying, and an easier lobbying task (Orden 227).  
The budget reforms in the 1960s combined with the introduction of food stamps 
and other nutrition programs have led to a situation where rural legislators trade votes 
with urban legislators. In the 2002 farm bill House Democrats from farm states joined 
forces with Republicans from farm states in the House Committee to draft a lucrative 
farm bill. The Senate consists of more urban legislators and was more skeptical of 
commodity subsidies and wanted more money to go to the poor and conservation 
programs.  
The Senate had passed an amendment with a cap on individual payments. In the 
conference committee Eastern senators were offered subsidies to new dairy and peanut 
programs and more spending on food stamps. This was enough to please many urban 
senators and the cap on subsidies was watered down to a merely symbolic cap.  
 
5.3 Party Control of Congress 
Many legislators in key positions in the 107th Congress were from rural states. Speaker in 
the House of Representatives was Dennis Hastert, Republican from Illinois. The district 
he represented collected $554 million in subsidies from 1996 to 2000, according to the 
Environmental Working Group (Groppe, “falling in number”). The House majority leader 
was Richard Keith Armey, Republican from Texas. According to the EWG webpage 
Texas was the state receiving most subsidies in the time period between 1995 and 2003 
(EWG, “subsidies by state”). The majority whip Tom DeLay was also a Republican from 
Texas. Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota was the majority leader, and also served on 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. Kent Conrad of North 
Dakota chaired the Senate Budget Committee. Senator Robert C. Byrd from West 
Virginia was the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.  
The House Committee on Agriculture was chaired by Republican Larry Combest 
of Texas. It had 27 Republican members and 21 Democratic members. The Democratic 
ranking minority member was Charles W. Stenholm of Texas. The Senate Committee on 
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Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry consisted of 10 Republicans and 10 Democrats and 
was chaired by Tom Harkin, Democrat of Iowa. Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, 
was the ranking minority member. According to the EWG web page Iowa was the second 
biggest receiver of farm subsidies from 1995 to 2003 (EWG, “Subsidies by State”). 
The makeup of the 107th congress made former Agricultural Secretary Dan 
Glickman comment: “Some of the most effective leaders in Congress are people involved 
in agricultural issues” (Groppe, “falling in number”). One traditional explanation to the 
outcome of farm policy was that the seniority system in the Senate gave a lot of power to 
Southern agriculturalists who supported commodity programs. Although the seniority 
system has been radically modified, it still matters greatly who is the chair. In 2002 farm 
interests were in powerful positions not only in the Senate but also in the House of 
Representatives. 
Many policy analysts had neglected the influence of party control prior to the 
1996 farm bill. Orden et al. write that Browne (1988) acknowledges an early history of 
party influence in U.S. farm policy debates, but concludes that “the influence of party 
within the Agricultural Committees of Congress had long since been replaced by the 
influence of bipartisan coalition building” (175). The Republican Party has historically 
been a proponent of a free-market policy, and the Democratic Party of high price 
supports. But since the Democratic Party controlled the House of Representatives from 
January 1955 to December 1994, the importance of party control was neglected for that 
period. Orden et al. show how important party control was for the passing of the 1996 
FAIR Act in Policy Reform in American Agriculture: Analyses and Prognosis. They 
conclude that with a Democratic majority in both houses the bill would never have 
passed.  
  Congress was split after the 2000 election. The time period of the making of the 
2002 farm bill is between early 2001 and May 2002 when the bill was written into law. In 
January 2001 the Republican Party had 221 representatives in the House and the 
Democratic Party 211. In 2001 the Senate was split 50-50. But during the summer of 
2001 James Jeffords switched sides from the Republican to the Democratic caucus. It was 
not until after the 2002 farm bill was signed that the Republican Party again gained a 
majority in the Senate in late 2002. During the farm bill debate the Republican Party had 
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a small majority in the House and the Democratic Party a marginal majority in the 
Senate. 
In the course of the 1996 farm bill debate the Republican Party and the 
Conservative Right made considerable efforts to create a special partisan atmosphere 
where party unity was especially important. By late 2001 this partisan atmosphere had 
given way for more bipartisanship. Democrats had taken electoral gains and the 
“Contract with America” had in many ways failed. The agricultural committees in 
Congress are known to be among the most bipartisan committees, and were therefore 
more inclined to resist the hostile partisan climate. The terrorist attacks on New York and 
the Pentagon in September 2001 brought legislators from both aisles together and 
contributed to a less partisan atmosphere at the time of the farm bill debate. 
Senator Trent Lott complained that the Senate bill in 2002 was the most partisan 
bill in memory. But the voting record showed that it was more geography than party unity 
that determined the vote. Western senators voted against it because of restrictions on 
water and packing houses. Southern senators voted against it because of the subsidy cap 
(Becker, “Senate Passes”). The two Republicans from Maine broke ranks to vote for the 
increased conservation measures. Tom Harkin’s colleague from Iowa, Republican 
Charles E. Grassley, voted with the Democrats in support of the limits on subsidies and 
an amendment to prohibit meat packing companies from owning their own livestock 
(Ibid.). One reason for its passage was that the eggplant caucus, including among others 
Charles E. Schumer and Hillary Clinton, both of New York, supported it. This was the 
first time many of the non-rural senators had taken a real interest in farm policy. 
 There are at least two sets of factors that can be used to determine that a change in 
legislative outcome is produced by a shift in party control of Congress. One is that party 
control has a noticeable role in policy. Party control is more than just voting majorities. It 
is important because of the powerful authority that majority leaders possess. In 1996 the 
Republican Party had control of both the Senate and the House. This gave them a 
powerful agenda-setting authority. The FAIR Act was drafted by the Republican 
chairman of the House Agricultural committee. In 2002 things were very different. 
Senator Harkin was the chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee and the principal 
author of the Senate bill, and co-sponsor Daschle the majority leader. The farm bill that 
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came out of the House Agriculture Committee was co-sponsored by Stenholm from 
Texas. That the House Agricultural Committee was so heavily influenced by legislators 
of both parties from Texas was important since it contributed to providing a bigger 
support for traditional commodity legislation. 
 The second factor is that rank-and-file party members in Congress must first 
comply with the policies expressed by their party leaders. In 1996 Republicans were 
strongly united behind the party leadership, voting in lockstep with one another and with 
the leadership over 90 percent of the time (Orden 177). The 2002 House bill sent to the 
conference committee was passed by 151 to 58 by the Republicans and 139 to 61 by the 
Democrats. The conference bill was passed by 141 to 73 by the Republicans and 137 to 
68 by the Democrats. It was passed by a total of 280 to 141 votes (THOMAS, “H.R. 
2646”).  
It is clear that the strong unity behind the party leadership in 1996 was gone in 
2002 both in the Republican and the Democratic Party. The voting records indicate a 
geographical split between rural and non-rural legislators. The Senate farm bill sent to the 
conference committee was passed by 58 to 40, with 2 not voting. Only two Democrats 
voted against the bill, Lincoln of Arizona and Corzine of New Jersey. Although the 
Senate farm bill vote in 2001 showed signs of Democrats voting in party unity, there is 
little evidence that there was any strong party unity or disciplined voting along party lines 
in the 2002 conference bill. It was passed by 64 to 35 with one not voting. This time 
seven Democrats voted against the bill (THOMAS, “H.R. 2646”).  
 Arguments can be made that party does not matter any longer in farm policy. 
Orden et al. argue that inside the agriculture committees in Congress, whenever narrow 
commodity issues are at stake, “party differences tend to be trumped by regional 
loyalties” (177). Members of the committees will more often be representatives of the 
commodity from their district than party. They use as an example the shift of the once 
Democratic solid South to where the Deep South is now solidly Republican and argue 
that the House and Senate agricultural committees “endorsement for highly protective 
policies for southern commodities has scarcely been altered by this shift in party alliance” 
(Ibid.).  
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 Orden et al. claims that party control is important when the vote is brought to the 
floor. In 1996 Republicans showed a clear willingness to be loyal to the party when 
voting on the floor. Only Democratic senators showed any signs of strong party unity 
when voting on the bill sent to the conference committee. But despite this, party control 
still matters in farm policy. A shift in the balance of power from the Democratic Party to 
the Republican Party in 1995 brought a significant movement in congressional 
preferences away from the traditional commodity programs to free-market policies. The 
shift of balance back to a less partisan and a split Congress after 2001 brought the 
preferences back to traditional commodity programs in the agriculture committees. This 
was especially important in the House Committee where many legislators from Texas and 
other states that were huge beneficiaries of commodity subsidies held key positions. 
 
5.4   The 2002 Election  
Richard A. Gephardt nailed the mood in Congress in 2001 regarding the election in 2002: 
“The way this is resolved will have a lot to do with the next election” (Alvarez). Many 
predicted that legislators in Congress from farm districts and states would be evaluated 
based on their handling of the farm bill. In the Senate 20 Republicans and 14 Democrats 
were up for election in 2002. Four Republicans retired leaving open seats. The election 
was to become far more influenced by the War on Terror and other issues than 
agricultural ones. But when the Senate Republicans managed to stop a farm bill in 2001, 
many speculated that the Republican leadership had orchestrated it because they 
calculated that it would be more damaging to the Democrats not to pass a farm bill in 
2001 than to the Republicans.  
For the final outcome of the farm bill it was important that legislators with an 
interest in being a good friend of the farmer sought to pass a lucrative farm bill prior to 
the 2002 midterm election. During the Senate debate Richard Lugar complained that the 
reason why the farm bill was so lavish was because Congress could hinge on a few races 
in heavily subsidized agricultural regions in the upcoming mid-term election. If 
legislators did not manage to produce a big and sound farm bill they would risk being 
labeled the ‘anti-farm candidate’. It intensified the collective action problem and 
contributed to silence those seeking moderation on spending. 
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5.5      Trade Agreements, Commodity Prices, and Previous Legislation 
The issue of trade agreements did not seem to have any significant influence on the 
passing of the 2002 farm bill. Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman told the World 
Trade Organization in June 2001 that American farm subsidies in the years 1998 and 
1999 were ‘trade distorting’ (Becker, “Harkin and Lugar”). Larry Combest complained 
that it was the same as a unilateral disarmament that ceded ground and gained nothing in 
return (Ibid.). The attitude in the House Agricultural Committee was to write a good farm 
bill for American farmers without much concern about international agreements. In an 
amendment to the House bill the Agricultural Secretary was given authority to cut 
subsidies if they violated trade agreements. But the pressure of keeping the farm bill in 
line with international agreements came only from the White House. But the Bush 
administration had been put on the sidelines already at an early stage of the farm bill 
debate. International agreements were mostly ignored and did not have a big influence on 
the outcome of the 2002 farm bill. 
Commodity prices were the factor that made the FAIR Act possible in 1996. The 
importance of commodity prices in the 2002 farm bill did not have such a direct effect as 
in 1996. There were two views on commodity prices in 2001 and 2002. On the positive 
side, the net worth of the nation’s farms was up 3.2 percent in the last five years (Becker, 
“Agriculture Secretary”). Free-traders like Richard Lugar used this fact in their 
arguments. Secretary Veneman reported that farm income would be at an all-time high of 
$61 billion in 2001, and farmland would rise in value by 21 percent (Ibid.).  
But most of this increase had gone to the big farms, not the family farm. The farm 
lobby supporting small farmers and its politicians in Congress gave voice to this concern 
in the farm bill debates. Family farmers were struggling while the big corporate farm 
businesses were doing well, but even they complained about the current conditions. The 
fact that the FAIR Act had started to provide less payments to farmers after prices fell in 
1998 meant that many started to see the FAIR Act as a failure already then.  
If the FAIR Act had succeeded and commodity prices had not fallen below 
market-price so that old programs would have been more beneficiary, the situation in 
2001 could have been different. International markets contributed to the fall of 
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commodity prices. Because of this, the FAIR Act was labeled a failure, and 
agriculturalists started to paint a bleak future for American farms if nothing was done. 
Senator Conrad said in a hearing: “I’ve never seen such a sense of despair among 
farmers” (Becker, “Agriculture Secretary”). Other politicians agreed with him.  
The failure of the 1996 farm bill was a significant factor in the shift away from the 
free-market policy of the FAIR Act to a more traditional policy in the 2002 farm bill. 
After the FAIR Act was written into law some speculated that it represented more than 
the clashing of two policy ideas, but that it in fact represented a victory for marked-
oriented policy ideas. Orden et al. uses Peter A. Hall’s theories of policy change. Hall 
argues that a “growing discrepancy between policy outcome and objectives can trigger 
either a first-order change (in policy instrument settings), a second-order change (in 
instruments), or a third-order change (in ideas, goals, and objectives)” (190). There have 
been several first and second-order changes, but no third-order change in agricultural 
policy. Orden et al. concludes that the FAIR Act was not a third-order change, but more 
the result of special political condition, party control, and market conditions. The fact that 
the 2002 farm bill changed agricultural policy away from the direction the 1996 farm bill 
had sought is evidence that the FAIR Act was not a third-order change but an arbitrary 
policy-outcome born out of special conditions during the 1996 farm bill debate.  
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*CHAPTER SIX* 
 
The Agrarian Myth 
 
A factor like the agrarian myth is left out of transaction costs analysis, public choice 
theory and structural analyses, and make them inadequate to completely understand the 
outcome of agriculture policy. Orden et al. conclude that both interests and institutions 
are critical to policy change in agriculture, and that the traditional explanations still were 
valid concerning the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act. But they also argue that “more elusive” 
is the arguments that farm organizations continue to exercise power over policy outcomes 
by promoting ideas (227). Chapter six will analyze how the agrarian myth has influenced 
agricultural policy. 
Jan Wojcik summarizes the arguments used in farm policy in his book The 
Arguments of Agriculture. The free-market (or cheap food) policies argue: Forget 
sentimental, old-fashioned images of farming. Treat farmers as a prosperous industry. 
Withdraw all protective subsidies. Force inefficient farmers off the land and retrain 
marginal, uncompetitive farmers for other work. On the other hand, you have the 
protectionist (or good farm) policies that argue: Honor traditional farming values. Treat 
farming as a special industry. Measure short-term economic needs against long-term 
sustainability, protect farming environmentally and preserve rural culture. Protectionists 
(or traditionalists) often use the agrarian myth to argue that farming should be a special 
industry and thus deserves special treatment. Many free-market advocates (or reformers) 
seek to inform the public of the myth’s falsehood in order to reform farm policy. The 
agrarian myth is a vital part of farm policy. But what is the agrarian myth? 
First of all, why are myths important in a society? Primary values are learned by 
human experience. These primary values are passed on from generation to generation and 
also extended to other members of society through social interaction. Primary values 
structure and disseminate “specific social values into long-lasting and patterned belief 
systems that establish a nation’s character and enhance its stability” (Bonnen and Browne 
9). Ideas and myths form an understanding of collective values among its citizens. They 
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build a common platform on which political consensus can be achieved. No society could 
work without this common platform. 
The agrarian myth has been central to American political history. Agricultural 
scholars have criticized this myth because of it lack of realism. Agriculturalists have 
communicated the simple image of the farmer. Selective belief systems “evolved and 
served to sustain segments of a geographically isolated and economically vulnerable 
society by developing unifying, utopian images of contemporary social issues and 
interests” (10). Agrarianism was central to the political momentum of populism at the 
turn of the 20th century. The agrarian myth stills persists today even with a farm-based 
political majority long gone (Ibid.). According to Bonnen and Browne, it persists because 
most people have little if any experience and knowledge of agriculture and its economic 
issues, and because those in agriculture have enormous stakes in romanticizing its social 
role when seeking widespread support. That is why legislators in Congress spend time in 
hearings, when seeking support for their farm programs, telling tales about farm wives 
getting up in the early hours of the morning to provide milk to the youths of America.  
Dictionary.com offers a definition of myth that is relevant for this thesis: An 
unproved or false collective belief that is used to justify a social institution. The agrarian 
myth is a collective belief. As we will see, historian Richard Hofstadter and other 
scholars dismiss the agrarian myth as nothing but a myth. Nevertheless, the agrarian myth 
is important and today it is used to justify federal subsidy programs to farmers. 
The agrarian myth as manifested in America was created at the very beginning of 
the Republic by the elites of the time. It was especially influenced by Thomas Jefferson. 
The agrarian myth is a set of beliefs and values that see the farmer as the incarnation of 
the simple, honest, independent, pure, hard working, and happy democratic human being. 
The agrarian myth has since then developed and transcended into other areas of 
American life.  
At the time of the first official census in 1790, more than 90 percent of the 
population were engaged in farming, or classified as rural. The early years of the United 
States was a time of an astounding increase of the population. From 1790 to 1801 the 
population increased with 35 percent to a total number of 5.3 million (Maier 284). 
Around 75 percent of the population lived in rural areas making their living as farmers in 
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1800. Only five percent lived in cities. The rest were living in towns and villages. The 
year Jefferson was elected president rural people outnumbered city people by more than 
15 to 1 (374).  
From its very beginning, America was rural and a country of farmers. Although 
demographics changed rapidly during the 19th century, agriculture was still a large 
occupation in America. With such a presence agriculture became a cornerstone in the 
foundations of the new nation.  
 
6.1 The Colonial Period and Agrarian Roots 
The first successful English colony in America was Jamestown, which was located on the 
Chesapeake Bay.  It was established by the Virginia Company of London to be an 
agricultural commercial enterprise aimed at making profit in the new land. The colony 
produced cattle, hogs, tobacco, and other crops for domestic consumption and for export. 
The colonial period followed with the establishment of more successful colonies. Over 
the next hundred years the eastern seaboard and its close interior were settled as more 
people saw opportunities in the New World. The key element to both commerce and 
survival was agriculture. 
Many of the free men who came to America brought with them institutional and 
social ideas from Europe. In America many found that some of these ideas, like the social 
contract theories of John Locke, could actually be realized. Democratic values like 
freedom, liberty, and equality became central tenets for many who saw European 
societies as belonging to the past. When the British Crown started to increasingly infringe 
on these values by imposing taxes without representation and introducing acts like the 
Proclamation of 1763, banning American settlements west of the Appalachian 
Mountains, many colonists were ready to revolt. The leaders of this revolt were mainly 
farmers. One of them in particular was to form the idealism of the “new world” in an 
agrarian image standing out against the industrial, corrupted, aristocratic Europe. His 
name was Thomas Jefferson. 
Thomas Jefferson was a Virginian planter, inventor, philosopher and politician. 
He was the principal author of the Declaration of Independence and had a central part in 
the founding of the United States. He celebrated farmers for their centrality in a good 
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society, their political virtue, and their superior morality. In a letter to John Jay in 1785, 
Jefferson wrote: “Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the 
most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country 
and wedded to its liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds” (Browne 1990 7). For 
the elites at the time of the revolution the non-commercial, self-sufficient aspects of 
American farm life were an ideal.  
In his book The Age of Reform Richard Hofstadter argues that “[w]riters like 
Thomas Jefferson and Hector St. Jean de Crèvecoeur admired the yeoman farmer … for 
his honest industry, his independence, his frank spirit of equality, his ability to produce 
and enjoy a simple abundance” (23). Hofstadter identifies some of the component themes 
of the agrarian myth. The hero was the yeoman farmer who lived on a farm and was the 
incarnation of the simple, honest, independent, healthy, happy human being (24). One of 
the main pillars to support the agrarian ideology was the evident nature of farming. 
Without food human kind could not exist. Therefore all other occupations were inferior. 
Agriculture was pure, basic, and good. The farmer was the ideal man and the ideal 
citizen.  
Farming represented a craft in which people fought against nature and used their 
bodies as tools. Living out in the wilds in natural surroundings and extracting nature’s 
gifts were aspects of farming that gave it a very positive psychical appeal. The 
idealization of the farmer was not just of the psychological appeal of working in the soil, 
but also moral. It was “the central source of civic virtue; it was not merely secular but 
religious, for God had made the land and called man to cultivate it” (Hofstadter 25). The 
imagery of the farmer also represented a stark contrast to the conception of the old world 
of nobility, greed, and artificial luxury. Living on a farm was associated with the natural 
and a traditional society. Cities, on the other hand, were bastions of greed, hunger, decay, 
classes, and aristocracy. This made the farmer “society’s hero” in the early decades of the 
United States (Danbom 66).  
 
6. 2 Origins of the Agrarian Myth 
Hofstadter argues that the origin of the agrarian myth is found in literature. By the late 
18th century, industry in Europe and especially England had come in full force. Many 
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authors reacted to this development and its consequences by writing of things dating back 
to the agrarian past. According to Hofstadter, this literature was “almost universally 
accepted in America during the last half of the eighteenth century” (25). The literature 
that became so influential was inspired by works dating back to Aristotle, Cato, Cicero, 
Virgil, and Horace. From the poetry and romantic literature came the agrarian myth and 
“such men as Jefferson and Crèvecoeur, Thomas Paine, Philip Freneau, Hugh Henry 
Brackenridge, and George Logan propagated the myth” (26).  
Historian Henry Nash Smith writes that the “conventional praise of husbandry 
derived from Hesiod and Virgil by hundreds of poetic imitators, the theoretical teaching 
of the French Physiocrats that agriculture is the primary source of all wealth” and that 
“radical writers like Raynal [made] the farmer a republican symbol” (128-129). These 
ideals as interpreted by Americans like Jefferson were important. Those that wrote about 
modern developments in their native country in Europe reacted to events that were 
irreversible, and authors before them had written about their contemporary times as they 
were, times that could not be recreated.  
But in the new world there was a chance of a new beginning. It made the agrarian 
romantic literature even more popular in America. As the agrarian ideology developed it 
became a key element in the progress of American history, influencing many aspects of 
American life. Agrarianism was coupled with the ideals of democracy, freedom, 
patriotism, nationalism, American identity, the frontier, the Protastant work ethic, and 
played a vital role in politics.  
 
6.3 The Agrarian Myth in America 
Thomas Jefferson and his followers saw the yeoman farmer as the ideal civic man. 
Benjamin Franklin said that agriculture was the “only honest way”, and even Alexander 
Hamilton conceded that “cultivation of the earth, as the primary and most certain source 
of national supply … has intrinsically a strong claim to pre-eminence over every other 
kind of industry (Hofstadter 27, 28). In Europe most farmers did not own their own land. 
Locke had argued for land ownership. One of the main purposes of government was to 
protect this right. The property of working landholders had “a special claim to be fostered 
and protected by the state” (27).  
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The concept of farmers owning and working their own land also gave farmers a 
special dignity not present in Europe where most farmers worked on land owned by 
landlords. In a liberal democracy the independent farmer was the cornerstone, according 
to Jeffersonians. They essentially lifted the yeoman farmer to stand as an example of the 
quintessential American citizen. Jefferson and many of his contemporaries were 
themselves farmers. An educated farmer society with the ideal of the simple life on the 
farm was seen as perfect ground for a democracy to flourish. Cities, on the other hand, 
were the avenues of greed and moral decay. Power was abused in cities. Democracy 
could not flourish in such conditions. 
In his book Farming and Democracy Alfred Griswold claims that there is a 
romantic appeal to the family farm as the symbol of the good life in America. It stands 
for democracy in its purest and most classic form. Writing in the mid-1940s, he 
concludes that “democracy is somehow … bound up with the fate of the agricultural 
community whence it emerged and that both may be sinking in an industrialized, 
collectivistic wave of the future” (4). The idea of small farms as a fundament for 
democracy is something that can be dated back to Aristotle. Today politicians often draw 
upon the agrarian myth about rural America as a stronghold of the good life.  
Agrarianism was something that made Americans stand apart from Europe, and 
something that helped bind the new fragile nation together. Danbom argues that the 
lifestyle of most American citizens made them “independent, virtuous, and patriotic” and 
that this enabled Americans to a “degree of immunity to the problems suffered by many 
republics” (68). The rural lifestyle of family farms that most Americans in the early 
Republic shared was one of the components in a common identity. The ideals of the 
agrarian myth were tied to democracy and as an extension of that to what was perceived 
as being American: an independent and free man that believed in the core values of 
democracy. Being a farmer was American. The American Revolution as interpreted by 
Jeffersonians was a fight by the pure farmers of America against the soldiers of the 
mighty industrial British Empire. The victory helped tie the agrarian myth to patriotic 
sentiments and republican idealism. 
In their book Inventing America Maier et al. writes that “agriculture and 
expansion constituted the essence of Jefferson’s vision of the young republic” (287). 
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Jefferson believed that a way for America to have a competitive advantage over Europe 
was to expand its territory and keep settling new areas of land. Since expansion was one 
of the premises of the agrarian myth to Jefferson and his allies, policies of the new 
republic were aimed at expanding the territory of the United States. When Jefferson was 
elected president he executed the Louisiana Purchase, almost doubling the land area of 
the United States. In the late 19th century Frederick Jackson Turner presented his frontier 
thesis arguing that the frontier had made a huge impact on the nation’s psyche. The 
unlimited access to land had produced a mindset of optimism and opportunity. The 
further the frontier reached, and the further people moved away from the coasts, the more 
they shredded themselves of European ways and became Americans. 
Historian Henry Nash Smith writes about the connection between the West and 
agriculture in his book Virgin Land. He contend that from the “time of Franklin down to 
the end of the frontier period almost a century and a half later, the West had been a 
constant reminder of the importance of agriculture in American society”. This reminder 
had “nourished an agrarian philosophy and an agrarian myth that purported to set forth 
the character and destinies of the nation” (259). Smith also maintains that the agrarian 
myth has had a strong influence on politics. The skepticism of industrialization and cities 
imbedded in the myth had impeded cooperation between farmers and factory workers in 
more than one crisis of American history (259).  
The West and the agrarian myth has been a strong couple in American history. 
They reinforced each other since their foundations were so similar. One of the core 
character traits of the yeoman farmer was that he worked hard. This was also influenced 
by the Protestant work ethic. 
Some of the earliest immigrants to America were the puritans who established 
themselves in New England. The Puritans “celebrated industriousness as a godly virtue, 
and understood work as a religions obligation” (Maier 69). They believed that God 
expected people to work hard. As a result the New England colony was much more 
productive than the Chesapeake colony. This work ethic has had a huge impact on 
America. People have from the very beginning believed that if they work hard enough 
they will succeed. If they do not succeed, it is because they are not dedicated enough. 
Bonnen and Browne argue that the agrarian myth “vested Jefferson’s hardworking 
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yeoman with legendary superiority stemming from the prevailing Protestant ethic of hard 
work as a measure of moral worth” (12). Today supporters of farm programs use this in 
their arguments to remind people of the link between Jefferson’s hardworking yeoman 
and today’s farmers.  
 
6.4 The Agrarian Myth: Reality vs. Fiction 
Scholars have occupied themselves by trying to identify the romantic map of Jefferson’s 
ideals and apply them to the stark realities of American history. Even though Hofstadter 
dismissed the agrarian myth, he “recognized the powerful influence that the countryside 
had on [American] life” (Danbom Preface X). The sheer size of the literature on the topic 
should give us a good indication of the presence of the myth, not only in academia, but in 
society as a whole. Although much of the foundations of the agrarian myth are gone, its 
influence still persists in American life. It does not matter if its foundations are fictional 
as long as its influence is real. 
In their article “Agrarianism in American Society” Michael G. Dalecki and C. 
Milton Coughenour claim that due to the lack of a national data base several issues 
concerning the agrarian myth have been matters of conjecture rather than proof (61). 
Their study indicates that public opinion among Americans generally supports the family 
farm, agrarian fundamentalism, yeomanship, and the naturalism of a farm life style. 
Belief in agrarian fundamentalism is associated with “progress, individualism, moral 
integrity, democracy, and being practical and efficient” (Ibid.). Agrarian fundamentalism 
is primarily associated with values that reflect American society as a whole. Today we 
can witness some of these positive connotations in how the agrarian past is romanticized 
in popular culture. 
 
6.5 The Agrarian Myth in Popular Culture 
David B. Danbom writes that it is “noteworthy that the hundreds of communitarian 
experiments that sprang up in the forty years before the Civil War were virtually all rural 
in nature” (68). These were by and large utopian experiments. Artists of the time like 
Asher B. Durand painted pictures “convey[ing] a sense of the beauty, peacefulness, and 
wholesomeness of rural life (Meier 374). These pictures have become very popular. 
 99 
Another example of this tradition is Winslow Homer who captured the 
romanticized ideals of the Jeffersonian tradition. By the mid-1850s companies started to 
mass produce lithographs of agrarian pictures and “did much to romanticize the agrarian 
tradition after it ceased to be the primary influence on American life and politics” (374). 
The writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau on transcendentalism 
reflected its reverence for nature. As modernization grew and agriculture’s relevance 
dwindled the populist movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries subscribed to the 
ideals of Jeffersonianism. The agrarian myth and the family farm were central to a score 
of painters, writers, and politicians throughout the 19th century.  
The harsh struggles of farmers in the 19th and 20th centuries were incorporated as 
a central tenant of the agrarian myth. Most often it is portrayed as farmers fighting 
against foreclosure and consolidation driven by national and international forces outside 
the control of hard working farmers. The imagery of farmers as victims is often used by 
agrarian interest to build support to federal farm programs.  In the Grapes of Wrath by 
John Steinbeck a farm family struggles during the Great Depression. The imagery of the 
farmer as a victim of money and industry is much like the imagery Jeffersonians drew in 
the early days of the United States. The success of the Grapes of Wrath is an indication of 
Americans’ love for the agrarian myth. Many children learn about the agrarian myth in 
their education and romanticize it through books and TV series. 
 
6.6 The Agrarian Myth in Politics 
Most of the participants at the Convention in Philadelphia were farmers, and although not 
all shared Jefferson’s ideals of the yeoman farmer, they all recognized agriculture to be 
central to the economy. The first president, George Washington, and all presidents from 
1790 to 1877 were of rural origin (Renck 2). It became important for politicians to show 
that they in one way or the other had rural roots.  
W. Burlie Brown has shown that the appeal of the yeoman as a symbol of 
honesty, integrity, democracy, and statesmanship is deeply rooted in America. He writes 
that from Andrew Jackson to Dwight D. Eisenhower the “voter has been assured that 
almost every major party candidate was a son of the soil” and that he was “called from 
the plow to save the state” (Renck 23).  
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When President Bush signed the 2002 farm bill, he did so wearing a cowboy hat. 
He said: “The farm bill will strengthen the farm economy over the long term. It helps 
farmer independence, and preserves the farm way of life for generations. It helps 
America’s farmers, and therefore it helps America” (USDA, “Farm Bill 2002”). It also 
helped President Bush that he looked like a farmer, and that he came across as a big 
supporter of the farm way of life. 
In 1995 pollster Dick Morris told President Clinton that people wanted to see him 
hiking in the country rather than mingling with celebrities. It is important for presidents 
to have a connection with the countryside because by doing so they show that they 
embody the authentic American tradition of self-reliance, family values, and community 
spirit (Economist, “Heartbroken”). One of the key elements of President Bush’s victory 
in 2000 and 2004 was his ability to communicate this image to the American people.  
Hofstadter points to the fact that the agrarian myth played a vital role in the first 
party battles. The people supporting Jefferson appealed “again and again to the moral 
primacy of the yeoman farmer in their attacks on the Federalists” (Hofstadter 28). During 
the campaigns the ideals of the agrarian myth were presented to the voters. Through 
political campaigns and art the agricultural myth became known to the common people 
and not just the educated elite. Strategically the significance of appealing to common 
people by playing on the myth became more and more important. Hofstadter argues that 
the myth had become national creed by the early 19th century, and “even the conservative 
party, the Whigs, took over the rhetorical appeal to the common man, and elected a 
President in good part on the strength of the fiction that he lived in a log cabin” (28-29).  
With the proliferation of interest groups in Washington, politicians have 
accommodated new farm interest groups into the policy-decision making. Public choice 
theorists argue that the current political system leads to logrolling and a never-ending 
spiral of increased spending. The interests involved in maintaining the status quo, like the 
USDA, the Agriculture congressional committees and farm interest groups, make other 
politicians “very aware of the large transaction costs of making fundamental change” 
(Bonnen and Browne 23). But in addition to this, agrarian interests also pull around 
themselves the protective mantle of the agrarian myth.  
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According to Bonnen and Browne, the myth not only keeps agrarian interests in 
power by generating widespread public support, it “enhances power because agrarianism 
links farm groups together in jointly protecting their otherwise unrelated, narrow policy 
benefits” (23). This political accommodation ties the fate of non-farm policy goals to that 
of commodity legislation because these interests have a stake in passing farm bills and 
also preserving a lot of the agrarian myth. Public choice theory successfully explains the 
structures that give farm interests strong influence in farm policy, as analyzed in chapter 
five. The role of the agrarian myth is that of the non-structural cementing factor of the 
continued role of farm interests in agricultural policy-making by providing a protective 
cloak that farm interests can use when attacked.  
 
6.7 The Agrarian Myth and the 2002 Farm Bill 
It seems that the agrarian myth still has widespread appeal. The 2002 farm bill was a 
huge victory for traditionalists supporting farm programs. During debates legislators 
drew on the agrarian myth’s appeal of hard working farmers fighting against forces 
beyond their control. But the 2002 farm bill also gave warning signs. The myth is 
effective only as long as it is perceived as benefiting the family farmer and contributing 
to rural development. It can be argued that traditionalists will have a greater problem in 
portraying the current subsidy system as a system benefiting the family farm with the 
new influence of the Environmental Working Group web page and legislators taking up 
its cause. The effect of this in the long run can be an eroding support among the public at 
large as well as legislators in Washington. The effectiveness of using the agrarian myth 
as a rhetorical tool can diminish if agrarian interests no longer represent any of the ideals 
that the agrarian myth appeals to.  
This did not happen in the 2002 farm bill. The traditionalists and the protective 
cloak of the agrarian myth held out against attacks from those seeking to reform farm 
policy and debunk the agrarian myth. The failure by free-market agrarians to come up 
with a new ideology and arguments tied to their economic interests that can seriously 
counter the agrarian myth used by traditionalist helps explain why the 2002 farm bill did 
much to change farm policy back to more traditional price-support programs. 
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Those seeking reform have not been successful in conveying to the people at large 
that current farm programs do not work as they should, and that the “public are held 
captives of the agrarian past through myths” (Browne, Skees et al. 1). They have been 
unsuccessful because going against the agrarian myth is going against American ideals. 
Those who have tried have been accused of not supporting rural America. Nationwide 
surveys show that Americans will support farm payments, but only if they help small 
family farms (Hassebrook, “Will Rural America”). A poll by CBS News in 1986 showed 
that in a year “when farm programs cost some $26 billion, most respondents were willing 
to spend even more federal funds to alleviate whatever unfair circumstances farmers 
faced (Bonnen and Browne 12). As policy debates and public discussion over the 1986 
and 1988 deficits intensified, “bipartisan public support for increased farm expenditures 
remained high” (12). There are few indications that public support for farm programs 
have decreased since then. Support for farm subsidies might erode if an increasingly 
perceived image of farm policy as only benefiting the big producers continues. This trend 
was not strong in 2002 and the agrarian myth proved to be an effective protective cloak 
for those seeking lucrative commodity programs. 
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*CONCLUSION* 
 
During large parts of the 19th century farmers were only loosely organized and not too 
concerned about federal agricultural policies. In the 20th century farmers started to gain a 
common identity and organize themselves. Some of the issues on their agenda were land 
acts, economic policies, infrastructure, technology, and education on the local, state, and 
the federal level. After the Great Depression farm interests worked together and lobbied 
for federal agricultural programs that culminated in the passing of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938. Since then, agricultural policies have evolved together with the 
changing dynamics of the political environment.  
The first agricultural policies from the 1940s used traditional price support and 
supply control mechanisms. From the 1960s to the 1990s a slow but steady shift towards 
more direct payments and a free-market direction developed. In 1996 an attempt to 
completely wean farmers off federal programs successfully gained passage and if 
successful would have resulted in the 2002 farm bill being the last farm bill. This did not 
happen. So why did the 2002 farm bill increase farm subsidies and change agricultural 
policy away from the free-market direction of the 1996 FAIR Act? Some of the 
traditional factors explaining agricultural policy-outcome are still valid:  
(1) Interest groups are still strong and influential. Farm interests successfully 
managed to convince a majority of legislators that the farmers in America were in trouble 
and needed help. In a favorable political environment in 2002 farm interests successfully 
lobbied large increases in traditional farm subsidies. Other lobbies, like the 
environmental lobby, managed to use the Environmental Working Group web page and 
new-found interests among non-rural legislators to provide more funding for conservation 
programs. Groups involved in farm policy, like the United States Department of 
Agriculture and its bureaucracy, farm groups, and the Agricultural committees in 
Congress all have huge stakes in maintaining federal farm programs. Without a farm 
program all would lose much of their significance. 
 (2) Structures in Congress leave ample room for logrolling. In agricultural policy 
an alliance between urban and rural interests have developed and is deeply entrenched in 
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the political system. Many legislators have an interest in passing lucrative farm bills and 
do so because few individual legislators can be held accountable for budget discipline.  
 (3) The agrarian myth persists strongly even today and influences farm policy 
decision-making. The agrarian myth enjoys wide support because it is tied to what it 
means to be an American. In debates on the 2002 farm bill politicians and interest groups 
used the emotional attachment many Americans feel to the ‘family farm’ to gather 
support for their legislative agenda. Free-traders steadily fail to sell their argument 
sufficiently effective to beat the traditionalists’ arguments which rely on the agrarian 
myth, because going against the agrarian myth is going against American ideals. The 
agrarian myth proved to be an effective protective cloak in 2002.  
Legislation is rarely created in an isolated bubble. It is influenced by past, current, 
and future events. Those events can be decisive to the final outcome. Five factors 
explaining policy-outcome were more specific to the 2002 farm bill:  
(1) The 2002 mid-term election influenced the outcome of the 2002 farm bill. 
Republican Senators managed to stop a farm bill in 2001 because they calculated that 
Democrats would lose more than the Republicans would in terms of re-election. They 
believed that if Republicans showed fiscal responsibility and an effort to keep farm 
policy in a free-market direction, they would benefit more than the Democrats. If the 
farm bill had been passed in 2001, it would probably have contained more commodity 
subsidies and less spending on conservation and food stamps.  
(2) Party control of Congress was also important in 2002, but not in the same way 
as in 1996. Republicans were voting in unison and with party discipline in 1996. In 2002 
the vote was less disciplined, less partisan, and more geographically split. But it was 
important that Democrats, who historically have supported high price supports and 
federal subsidies, were in a much stronger position in 2002 than in 1996. The fact that the 
Democratic Party controlled the Senate and only had a small minority in the House meant 
that there was a much stronger resistance to the free-market policy idea. That the special 
partisan atmosphere that had existed in 1996 had somewhat faded by 2002 was also vital. 
Many of the politicians in key positions were heavily involved in farm policy. The 
chairman of the House Agricultural Committee and its ranking minority leader were both 
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from Texas, the state receiving most subsidies. The Senate Agricultural Committee 
chairman was from Iowa, the second highest receiver of subsidies.  
(3) Previous farm legislation was a decisive factor in 2002. Since the 1996 farm 
bill was perceived by most as a “reform” toward a free-market approach, the success or 
failure of that bill was more important than the fate of any other farm bill. The 1990 farm 
bill was a traditional farm bill with price support programs. It was not important to the 
1996 farm bill because while the 1990 farm bill was seen as a normal farm bill, the 1996 
farm bill was seen as a big change by many. It failed and many interpreted this as the 
failure of a free-market approach to farm policy. Farm interests wanted to move away 
from the “free-market experiment” to the more normal and traditional policy that 
provided a safety-net that had been there since the 1930s.  
(4) Commodity prices had an indirect effect on the 2002 farm bill. If the FAIR 
Act had been a success and commodity prices had not fallen below market-price in 1998 
so that the old programs would have been more beneficiary to farmers, the situation in 
2001 could have been different. But because of the fall of commodity prices the FAIR 
Act was labeled a failure, and agriculturalists started to paint a bleak future for American 
farms if nothing was done. Since market conditions in 2001 and 2002 were fairly stable, 
they did not have a direct effect. 
(5) Over the course of the 2001 and 2002 congressional farm bill debates 
international agreements were almost never mentioned. Although the Bush administration 
insisted that the farm bill had to be inside the framework of international agreements, 
legislators in Congress were not too concerned and complained that the Administration 
had ceded ground and had received nothing in return. The only important impact of trade 
agreements was that Combest had included in his bill an amendment that would authorize 
the Agricultural Secretary to cut subsidies if they violated trade agreements. 
During a time when America was faced with the War on Terror, a budget deficit, 
and an upcoming mid-term election, legislators in Congress worked to pass a new farm 
bill. The final outcome effectively changed agricultural policy away from a free-market 
direction. This thesis has confirmed that some of the traditional explanations to the 
outcome of agricultural policy are still valid. Logrolling, interest group influence, and the 
agrarian myth are still viable factors that influence agricultural policy. Some factors were 
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more unique to the 2002 farm bill. A change back to a Democratic control of the Senate, 
a failed previous agricultural legislation, and the 2002 mid-term election were vital 
factors explaining why the 2002 farm bill increased spending and changed agricultural 
policy. If the FAIR Act had not failed and the Democratic Party had not gained electoral 
gains prior to the 2002 farm bill debate the policy-outcome might have been much more 
in line with a free-market policy idea.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 is considered to be a continuation of 
the 2002 farm bill. A Democratic majority with the support of Republicans managed to 
override a presidential veto and passed a $307 billion farm bill in 2008. The legislation 
provides more commodity subsidies and more spending on food stamps and conservation. 
Included was also a new program to subsidize biomass crops for fuel (Stout). The 2008 
farm bill indicates that party control, interest groups, success of previous farm policy, and 
the agrarian myth are persistent and important factors explaining agricultural policy-
outcome.  
The FAIR Act was an arbitrary bill, a result born out of very special political 
conditions, and not a viable policy as long as the Democratic Party controls Congress. 
Free-market advocates have concluded that a farm bill similar to the FAIR Act is almost 
impossible to recreate in the current political environment. The consensus in favor of 
traditional farm programs looks to be a lot more consolidated today than the consensus of 
a free-market agricultural policy were in the mid-1990s. Instead of focusing on achieving 
a full free-market approach to agricultural policy, free traders focus on conservation 
measures, food stamps, and other policies that are less market-intrusive. It is very 
unlikely that federal farm subsidies will end in the near future. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
*Bibliography* 
 
Abler, David. “Vote Trading on Farm Legislation in the U.S. House” American Journal  
of Agricultural Economics 71 (1989): 583-591. 
Abbott, Richard. “The Agricultural Press Views the Yeoman: 1819-1859” Agricultural  
History 42 (1968): 35-48. 
Abbott, Charles. “Bush administration backs ‘green’ farm payments.” Reuters News  
Service. 19 September 2001. 
Ackerman, Joseph and Marshall Harris edit. Family Farm Policy. Chicago: The  
University Of Chicago Press, 1947.  
“A Disgraceful Farm Bill.” Editorial. New York Times. 16 May 2008. 
Appleby, Joyce. “Commercial Farming and the ´Agrarian Myth  `in the Early Republic”  
The Journal of American History, Vol. 68, No. 4. (Mar., 1982), 833-849.  
“Aid Farmers and Environment.” Editorial. Denver Post. 3 October 2001. 
Allen, Mike. “Bush Signs Bill Providing Big Farm Subsidy Increases.” Washington Post.  
13 May 2002.  
Alvarez, Lizette and David Barboza. “Support Grows for Corn-Based Fuel Despite  
Critics.” New York Times. 23 July 2001.  
Alvarez, Lizette. “Congress Returns to Larger Stakes in Budget Debate.” New York  
Times. 3 September 2001. 
“A More Balanced Farm Bill.” Opinion. New York Times. 3 April 2002.  
Augspurger, Mike. “Study Says Senate Vision of Farm Bill Better For Farmers.” The  
Hawk Eye. 16 March 2002. 
Banning, Lance. “Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the  
New American Republic” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 43, No. 
1. (Jan., 1986), 2-19.  
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jeffrey C. Talbert. “Interest Groups and Political Change”. In  
Bryan D. Jones ed. the New American Politics: Reflections on Political Change 
and the Clinton Administration. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. 
Barton, Weldon V. “Coalition-building in the United States House of Representatives:  
Agricultural legislation in 1973.” 141-61 in James E. Anderson, ed., Cases in  
 108 
Public policy-making. New York: Praeger, 1976.  
Barton, Paul. “Farm bill in freezer till 2002. Third bid in Senate to cap debate fails.”  
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette. 20 December 2001. 
Barrionuevo, Alexei. “Preparing for Farm Bill Cuts, or Not.” New York Times. 12  
January 2007.  
Becker, Elizabeth. “Accord Reached on a Bill Raising Farm Subsidies.” New York Times.  
27 April 2002.  
---. “As House Prepares Farm Bill, Questions of Who Needs Help, and How Much.” 
New York Times. 9 September 2001 
---. “Administration Seeks to Shift Farm Policy from Subsidies.” New York Times 20 
September 2001 
---. “Agriculture Secretary Says Wartime Budget Leaves $171 Billion Farm Bill in 
Doubt.” New York Times. 27 September 2001. 
---. “Bush Gives Tight-Fisted Support to Bigger Farm Subsidies.” New York Times.  
29 November 2001. 
---. “Congress Is Close to Final Accord on Farm Bill.” New York Times. 26 April 
2002. 
---. “Harkin and Lugar Join Forces to Take on Farm Subsidies.” New York Times. 12 
August 2001. 
---. “House Backs Plan Limiting Farm Subsidies.” New York Times. 19 April 2002. 
---. “House Passes the Farm Bill, Which Bush Says He’ll Sign.” New York Times. 3 
May 2002. 
---. “House Rejects an Effort To Redirect Farm Policy.” New York Times. 5 October 
2001. 
---. “Ideal Farms vs. Industrial Farms.” New York Times. 7 October 2001. 
---. “National Briefing: Washington: Farm Bill Advances.” New York Times. 26 July  
2001. 
---. “National Briefing: Washington: Shielding Names In Subsidy Program.” New 
York. 2 April 2002. 
---. “National Briefing: Washington: Debate On Farmers’ Payments.” New York  
Times. 18 April 2002. 
 109 
---. “Peanut Proposals Put a New Wrinkle on Farm Subsidies.” New York Times. 4 
March 2002. 
---. “Political Memo; From Puppy Protection to Feeding the Poor, Farm Bill Issues  
Incite Passions.” New York Times. 24 March 2002. 
---. “Prairie Farmers Reap Conservation’s Rewards.” New York Times. 27 August 
2001. 
---. “Raising Farm Subsidies, U.S. Widens International Rift.” New York Times. 15  
June 2002.  
---. “Senate Rejects G.O.P Effort to Limit Emergency Farm Aid.” New York Times. 1 
August 2001. 
---. “Senate Rejects Bush Call and Approves Farm Aid.” New York Times. 11 
September 2002 
---. “Senate Opens Debate on $171 Billion Farm Bill Opposed by Bush.” New York 
Times. 6 December 2001. 
---. “Senate Votes to Cap Farm Subsidies at $275,000, Citing Need to Save Program’s  
Credibility.” New York Times. 8 February 2002. 
---. “Senate Passes $44.9 Billion Farm Bill Limiting Subsidies.” New York Times. 14 
February 2002. 
---. “Senator’s Farm Plan Would Tie Subsidies to Need, Not Acreage.” New York 
Times. 18 October 2001. 
---. “Senators Offers Farm Bill, Retaining Subsidies, as a Compromise.” New York 
Times. 2 November 2001. 
---. “Shift From Food Stamps To Private Aid Widens.” New York Times. 14 
November 2001. 
---. “Some Who Vote on Farm Subsidies Get Them as Well.” New York Times. 1 
September 2001. 
---. “Treaties May Curb Farmers’ Subsidies.” New York Times. 31 August 2001. 
---. “Unlikely Allies Press to Add Conservation to Farm Bill.” New York  
Times. 18 June 2001. 
---. “U.S. Defends Its Farm Subsidies Against Rising Foreign Criticism.” New York  
Times. 27 June 2002. 
 110 
---. “Web Site Helped Change Farm Policy.” New York Times. 24 February 2002. 
---. “White House Criticizes Republican Farm Bill.” New York Times. 4 October 
2001. 
---. “$88 Billion Farm Subsidy Bill Is Approved by Senate Panel.” New York Times. 
16 November 2001. 
Benedict, Murray R., Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950. New York:  
Twentieth Century Fund, 1953.  
Berger, Samuel. Dollar Harvest: The Story of the Farm Bureau. Lexington, Mass.: D.C.  
Heath and Co., 1971.  
Bernstein, Robert A., Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior:  
The Myth Of Constituency Control. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989.  
Berry, Jeffrey M., The Interest Group Society, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 1997) 
Black, John D., “The McNary-Haugen Movement.” American Economic Review, 1928,  
pp. 405-27.  
Blank, Steven. The End of Agriculture in the American Portfolio. Westport, CT: Quorum  
Books, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998. 
Boehner, John and Cal Dooley. “This Terrible Farm Bill.” Washington Post 1 May 2002.  
Bonnen, James T., and William P. Browne. “Why is Agricultural Policy so Difficult to  
Reform?” in The Political Economy of U.S. Agriculture- Challenges for the 
1990s.Carol S. Kramer. Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., 1989.  
Brasher, Philip. “Farm Groups Support Farm Bill Delay.” Associated Press. 22 October  
2001 
---. “Trade restrictions hang over farm legislation.” Associated Press. 31  
August 2001. 
---. “White House Critical of Farm Bill.” Associated Press. 5 December 2001. 
---. “White House criticism raises new problems for farm bill already facing  
filibuster.” Associated Press. 29 November 2001. 
Browne, William P., and Alan J. Cigler.  U.S. Agricultural Groups: Institutional Profiles  
(Bibliographies and Indexes in Religious Studies). Greenwood Press, 1990.  
Browne, William P., Jerry Skees, Louis Swanson, Pail Thompson, and Laurian  
 111 
Unnevehr. Sacred Cows and Hot Potatoes. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1992.  
Browne, William P., and Charles W. Wiggins. “Interest group strength and organizational  
Characteristics: The general farm organization and the 1977 farm bill.” 109-21 in 
Don F. Hadwinger and William P. Browne, eds., The new politics of food. 
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978.  
Browne, William P. Cultivating Congress: Constitutions, Issues, and Interests in  
Agricultural Policymaking. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1995. 
---. Groups, Interests, and U.S. Public Policy. Georgetown University  
Press, 1998 
---. Private Interests, Public Policy, and American Agriculture.  
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1988.   
---. The Failure of National Rural Policy: Institutions and Interest.  
Georgetown University Press, 2001.  
---. “Farm Organizations and Agribusiness.” in Don. F. Hadwinger and Ross B.  
Talbot, edit., Food Policy and Farm Programs. New York: Academy of Political 
Science, 1982. 198-211 
---.  “Policy and interests: Instability and change in a classic issue sub- 
System” Pp. 182-201 in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, edit. Interest 
Group Politics. 2d ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986.  
Brown, W. Burlie., “The Cincinnatus Image in Presidential Politics,” Agricultural  
History. 31 (January 1957): 23-29.  
 “Bush the anti-globaliser.” Editorial. The Economis.t 11 May 2002.  
“California’s Senators Oppose $275,000 Farm Subsidy Limit.” New York Times. 12  
March 2002. 
Calomiris, Charles W., Glenn Hubbard, James H. Stock, Benjamin M. Friedman. “The  
Farm Debt Crisis and Public Policy”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
Vol. 1986, No. 2. (1986), 441-485.  
Campell, Christiana McFayden. The Farm Bureau and the New Deal, a Study of the  
Making Of National Farm Policy, 1933-1940. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1962.  
 112 
Cochrane, Willard W. and Mary E. Ryan. American Farm Policy, 1948-1973.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976.  
Cochrane, Willard W., and C. Ford Runge. Reforming Farm Policy: Toward a National  
Agenda. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1992. 
Cochrane, Willard W., ”The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical  
Analysis.” The Journal of American History, Vol. 67, No. 2. 1980, 378-379.  
Combest, Larry. “A Good Farm Bill.” New York Times 18 December 2001. 
Christenson, Reo M., The Brennan Plan: Farm Politics and Policy. Ann Arbor:  
University Of Michigan Press, 1959.  
Ciegler Allan J., and Burdett Loomis. Interest Group Politics, 6th edn (Washington, DC:  
Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002) 
“Clinton Signs Farm Bill Ending Subsidies.” Associated Press 5 April 1996.  
Clymer, Adam. “Senate Passes Major Expansion of Farm Subsidies.” New York Times. 9  
May 2002. 
Cummings, Milton C. Jr., and David Wise. Democracy under Pressure: An introduction  
to The American Political System 10th ed. Thompson Wadsworth, New York, 
2005. 
Dalecki, Michael G., and C. Miltion Coughenour. “Agrarianism in American Society.”  
Rural Sociology 57 (1). (1992) 48-64.  
Danbom, David B., Born in the Country: A History of Rural America. Baltimore: Johns  
Hopkins University Press, 1995.  
---. The Resisted Revolution: Urban America and the Industrialization of  
Agriculture, 1900-1930. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979.  
Diaz, Kevin and Joy Powell. “Booming Farm Aid Faces New Scrutiny in Congress.”  
Minneapolis Star Tribune 8 September 2001. 
“Dimming Prospects for Farm Reform.” Opinion. New York Times. 18 December 2001. 
Edwards, Everett E. A Bibliography of the History of Agriculture in the United States.  
Washington DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1930.  
“The Eggplant Rebellion.” New York Times. 12 November 2001. 
Estrada, Richard. “Bureau Pushing for Quick Farm Bill.” The Modesto Bee. 8 November  
2001. 
 113 
Everly, John. “Senate farm bill looking nothing like House version.” Dubuque Telegraph  
Herald. 20 October 2001. 
Environmental Working Group. “Total USDA- subsidies by state, 1995-2006”. Visited  
November 2008. 
<http://farm.ewg.org/farm/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=total&page=stat
es> 
Environmental Working Group. “Total USDA- subsidies in the United States, 1995- 
2006”. Visited November 2008. 
<http://farm.ewg.org/farm/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=total&page=co
nc> 
“The Fading Appeal of Farm Subsidies.” New York Times. 6 October 2001. 
Family Farmer. “Farm Bill Timeline”. Visited September 2008.  
<http://www.familyfarmer.org/sections/next.html> 
 “Farm Policy: The politics of soil, surpluses and subsidies”. Congressional Quarterly. 
Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984.  
Fonder, Melanie. “Conservationists fight Ag Committee on farm bill.” The Hill 2 October  
2001. 
Gardner, Bruce L., American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century: How it Flourished  
and What It Cost. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Gerster P., and N. Cords, “The Northern Origins of Southern Mythology,” The Journal of  
Southern History 43 (November 1977): 567-582. 
Gramp, William. “A Re-Examination of Jeffersonian Economics.” Southern Economic  
Journal 12 (1946): 263-282.  
Grassley, Chuck. “Farm Safety Net Unravelling for Family Farmers.” News Release. 12  
May 2002. 
Groppe, Maureen. “Farmers, falling in number, gain clout in Washington”  
The Environmental Working Group. 21 July 2002.  
<http://www.ewg.org/node/14952/print> 
Griswold, Alfred. Farming and Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,  
1948. 
Hamby, Alonzo L., Liberalism and Its Challengers, New York: Oxford UP, 1992 
 114 
Hansen, John Mark., Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby 1919-1981.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America, New York: Harcourt, 1991. 
Hassebrook, Chuck. “Will Rural America Have a Future?” New York Times. 14 April  
2002.  
Heady, Earl O., “The Agriculture of the U.S.” In Food and Agriculture, A Science  
American Book, pp. 77-86, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976. 
“Heartbroken.” Lexington. The Economist. 15 August 2002. U.S. Edition. 
“Helping Farmers Help Nature.” New York Times. 29 September 2001. 
Henry, Natalie. “Farm Groups Urge Daschle to Delay Farm Bill Until 2002.”  
Environment & Energy Daily. 24 October 2001. 
Hesseltine, William. “Four American Traditions.” Journal of Southern History 27  
(February 1961): 3-32.  
Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform; From Bryan to F.D.R., New York: Vintage  
Books, 1955  
---. “The Myth of the Happy Yeoman,” American Heritage 7 (1956): 43- 
53. 
Horwitz, Richard P. edit. The American Studies Anthology. SR Books, New York, 2001. 
THOMAS, Library of Congress. “H.R.2646.” Visited August 2008. 
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:h.r.02646:> 
Hurt, R. Douglas. American Agriculture: A Brief History. Indiana: Purdue University  
Press 2002.  
---. Problems of Plenty: The American Farmer in the Twentieth Century.  
Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002. 
---.  Edit. The Rural West Since World War 2. Kansas: University Press of  
Kansas, 1998. 
Kernell, Samuel and Gary C. Jacobsen. The Logic of American Politics. CQ Press,  
Washington DC, 2006. 
Kirchhoff, Sue. “Legislation May Increase Aid for Northeast.” Boston Globe. 2 April  
2002.  
Kind, Ron and Wayne Gilchrest. “Better Protection for Farmers and Their Land.” New  
 115 
York Times. 29 August 2001. 
Knutson, Ronald D., Sharron D. Knutson and David P. Ernstes. Edt. Perspectives on 21st  
Century Agriculture: A tribute to Walter J. Armbruster. Illinois: Farm Fundation 
2007. 
Kramer, Carol S. edit. The Political Economy of U.S. Agriculture- Challenges for the  
1990s. Resources for the Future. Washington, D.C., 1989.  
Krugman, Paul. “True Blue Americans.” New York Times. 7 May 2002. 
Little, Linda F., Francine P. Proulx et.al. “The History of Recent Farm Legislation:  
Implications for Farm Families”. Family Relations, Vol. 36, No. 4, Rural 
Families: Stability and Change. 1987, 402-406.  
Liddle, William. “Virtue and Liberty: An Inquiry into the Role of the Agrarian Myth in  
the Rhetoric of the American Revolutionary Era.” South Atlantic Quarterly 77 
(1978): 15-38. 
Lowi, Theodore J. et al. American Government; Brief 2006 Edition, W. W. Norton &  
Company, New York, 2006. 
Lugar, Dick. “The Farm Bill Charade.” New York Times. 21 January 2002. 
Maier, Pauline, et al. Inventing America-  A History of the United States. New York;   
W.W. Norton, 2003.  
McKay, David. American Politics & Society, sixth edition. United Kingdom, Blackwell  
Publishing, 2005 
McCune, Wesley. The Farm Bloc. New York: Greenwood Press, 1943. 
“Milk Sours the Farm Bill.” Opinion. New York Times. 23 March 1996.  
Monoson, Ted. “With an Eye on Politics, Senators Plot Strategy on Farm Bill.”  
Congressional Quarterly 22 October 2001. 
Mooney, Patrick H., and Theo J. Majka. Farmers’ and Farm Worker’s Movements Social  
Protest in American Agriculture. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995.  
Moore, Stephen. “Food Fight on Capitol Hill.” Washington Times. 17 December 2001. 
Morgan, Dan. “’Eggplant Caucus’ Cultivates Support.” Washington Post. 29 July 2001. 
“National Briefing: Washington: Farm Groups Seek Delay on Bill.” New York Times. 24  
October 2001 
Nelson, Lowry. American Farm Life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.  
 116 
Norman, Jane. “Harkin wins mixed grades.” Des Moines Register. 5 May 2002. 
---. “Panel OKs farm bill spending.” Des Moines Register. 20 March 2002. 
---.  “Some conservationists cool to Harkin farm bill.” Des Moines Register. 31  
October 2001. 
Nownes, Anthony J. Pressure and Power: Organized Interest in American Politics.  
Houghton Mifflin, 2001.  
Olsen, Mancur. “Space, Agriculture, and Organization.” American Journal of  
Agricultural Economics 67(1985): 928-937.  
Office of Management and Budget. “H.R. 2646 – Farm Security Act of  
2001”. 3 October 2001. Visited October 2008.  
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/107-1/HR2646-h.html 
Office of Management and Budget. “Summary Tables. Table S-1. Budget Totals”.  
Visited December 2008. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/tables.html> 
Orden, David, Robert Paarlberg and Terry Roe. Policy Reform in American Agriculture:  
Analyses and Prognosis. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999 
Orden, David. “Reform’s Stunted Crop: Congress re-embraces agriculture subsidies.”  
Regulations. Spring 2002.  
Paarlberg, Don. American Farm Policy- A Case Study of Centralized Decision-Making.  
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1964. 
Pasour Jr., E. C., and Randal R. Rucker. Plowshares & Pork Barrels: The Political  
Economy of Agriculture. California: The Independent Institute, 2005.   
Pear, Robert. “’Freedom to Farm’ Law Becomes Freedom to Add Subsidies.” New York  
Times 6 July 2002.  
Perkins, Jerry. “Farm Bureau criticizes Web site.” Des Moines Register. 3 January 2002. 
Peterson, Tarla Rai. “Jefferson’s Yeoman Farmer as Frontier Hero a Self Defeating  
Mythic Structure” in Agriculture and Human Values. (Winter, 1990), 9-19.  
“The Politics of Drought.” New York Times. 15 September 2002 
Renck, Ashley Wood. “The Agrarian Myth; how has it Affected Agricultural Policy?”  
Presented at Western Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, July 
28-31, 2002 Long Beach, California. 
 117 
< http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/36568/1/sp02re01.pdf> 
“Reversing Course on Farm Policy.” New York Times. 2 May 2002. 
Rohrer Wayne C., and Louis H. Douglas. The Agrarian Transition in America: Dualism  
and Change. Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969.  
Rooney, Phil. “Hagel, Nelson divided on Senate farm bill.”  Associated Press. 29  
November 2001. 
Rosenbaum, David E. “Common Ground Is Missing In Battling Plains Farm Ills.” New  
York Times. 12 July 1998  
---.  “A Nation Challenged: The Interests; Since Sept. 11, Lobbyists Put  
---. “Old Pleas in New Packages.” New York Times. 3 December 2001. 
Ross, Earle. “The Agricultural Backgrounds and Attitudes of American Presidents,”  
Social Forces 13 (October 1934): 37-43. 
Samuelson, R.J. “A Sad Primer in Hypocrisy,” Newsweek. February 11, 2002. 
Sandel, Michael J., edit. Liberalism and Its Critics, New York: UP,1984.  
---. Edit. Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Policy. Cambridge,  
Mass.: Harvard University Press/Belknap, 1996.  
Sanger, David E. “Reversing Course, Bush Sign Bill Raising Farm Subsidies.” New York  
Times. 14 May 2002. 
Schapsmeier E. and F. Schapsmeier. “Farm Policy from FDR to Eisenhower: Southern  
Democrats and the Politics of Agriculture,” Agricultural History 53 (1979): 352-
371. 
Schmitt, Peter J., Back To Nature: The Arcadian Myth in Urban America. Oxford  
University Press, 1969. 
“The Senate’s Useful Farm Bill.” Editorial. New York Times. 15 February 2002. 
“Senate Republicans Put Hold on Farm Bill.” New York Times. 2 August 2001. 
Shenon, Philip. “Senate Approves Farm Subsidy Bill President Backed.” New York  
Times. 4 August 2001. 
Skoloff, Brian. “Farmers say they’re desperate for farm bill by end of year.” Associated  
Press 30 November 2001. 
Smith, Henry Nash. “The Frontier Hypothesis and the Myth of the West.” American  
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1. (Spring, 1950), 3-11.  
 118 
Smith, Henry Nash. Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth. Cambridge,  
Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 2005. 
Stout, David. “Farm Bill, in part and in Full, Wins Passage.” New York Times. 23 May  
2008. 
Swenson, Leland. “The 2002 Farm Bill.” Washington Post 29 January 2002. 
Tweeten, Luther., and Stanley R. Thompson. Agricultural Policy for the 21st Century.  
Ames: Iowa State Press, 2002. 
U.S. Census Bureau. “Fact Sheet United States”. Visited September 2008.  
<http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts> 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. “Historical Highlights: 2002 and Earlier Census  
Years”. Visited December 2008.  
<http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/volume1/us/st99_1_001_001.pdf> 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. “The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002”.  
Visited April 2008.  
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/about/legislative/pdf/PLaw107171.pdf 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. “Census of Agriculture 2002”. Visited November 2008. 
<http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_Subject/Demographics/index.asp> 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. “The 2002 Farm Bill: Provisions and Economic  
Implications”. Visited October 2008 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/AP/AP022/ 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. “Farm Bill 2002 Information Home Page”. Visited  
August 2008. <http://www.usda.gov/farmbill2002/> 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. “Farm Income and Costs: 2007 Farm Sector Income  
Estimates”. Visited December 2008. 
<http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmIncome/2007incomeaccounts.htm> 
“Uncle Sam’s teat; Farm subsidies”. The Economist. September 9, 2006. U.S. Edition. 
Walker, Jack L., Jr. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and  
Social Movements. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991. 
Weintraub, Daniel. “U.S. farm bill keeps Big Agriculture on the dole.” Sacramento Bee.  
13 May 2002 
Wessel, Thomas R., “Agricultural Policy Since 1945” in The Rural West Since World  
 119 
War 2. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998.  
Zremski, Jerry. “Farm bill aims to level the field.” Buffalo News 19 February 2002. 
